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Ghosts and Spirits in Zaju and Noh

XIAOHUAN ZHAO

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Chinese Zaju 雜劇 (variety plays) and Japanese Noh 能 have long been an object for comparative study by scholars of Chinese and Japanese traditional drama, but most of their studies are concentrated on where, whether or to what extent Noh playwrights and performers were influenced by Zaju.¹ It is impossible for us to watch Zaju performance on stage today, but it is not impossible for us to imagine how Zaju was performed onstage in Yuan 元 (1271-1368) times thanks to the Zaju texts that have survived.² Noh demonstrates many points of similarity to Zaju in themes, structures, dramatic devices and theatrical elements. They share even more common features in the liberal use of *hashirimono* 走り者 (running dance) and the theatrical technique of *michiyuki* 道行き (travel scene/song) to realize tempo-spatial transference onstage, the use of speech or song at the entering of characters to introduce themselves (*nanori* 名乗り), and the technique of making characters appear out of settings, and the principle of acting out a story through singing, dancing, speaking, miming, and highly symbolic, stylized body movement.³ Both Noh and Zaju demonstrate themselves as a total theater, and because of these common features and centuries-long cultural exchanges between these two countries, it is difficult to deny that there have been any relations between these two genres of drama,⁴ but it is equally difficult to prove that Noh came about as influenced by Zaju arguably due to a lack of hard and direct evidence.

As to whether or to what extent they are related, it remains an issue for debate. In their discussion about the relation of Noh with Chinese drama, Yoshinobu Inoura and Toshio Kawatake point out, “Scholars of Chinese drama tend to exaggerate, and scholars of Japanese drama to belittle, the influence from China.”⁵ The author of this paper does not wish to join in the debate on Chinese influence on Japanese drama. Instead, this study has its aim set at a comparison and contrast of ghosts and spirits as presented and represented in Noh and Zaju, which remains largely an untouched area. Theater has been and continues to be a mirror of social life and popular beliefs. A cross-cultural comparison of Zaju with Noh in their presentation and representation of strange and supernatural beings will thus provide a better comprehension of Chinese

and Japanese conceptions of ghosts, souls and spirits and particularly their artistic manifestations on stage.

For this purpose, I will first conduct a quick survey of Noh and Zaju with respect to ghosts and spirits staged in these two dramatic traditions, then review briefly Chinese and Japanese (folk and religious) beliefs in ghosts and spirits, and finally compare and contrast Zaju and Noh with focus on theatrical role types, modes of presentation, types of characters in relation to types of ghosts and spirits, and their final disposition. The data for this comparative study will be respectively Zaju plays from the Yuan dynasty⁶ and Noh plays produced between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries. The reason for this is simple: short-lived as it was, the Yuan dynasty in China witnessed the growth and maturity of Zaju, and is therefore best remembered as a golden era of traditional Chinese drama, whereas in Japan during the *Muromachi* 室町 period (1336-1573), Noh developed from earlier forms of performing arts such as *gigaku* 伎楽, *gagaku* 雅楽, *sangaku* 散楽, *sarugaku* 猿楽, and *dengaku* 田楽 into its present form.

GHOST PLAYS IN ZAJU AND NOH: A SURVEY

Traditional Japanese theater, particularly Noh, abounds with ghosts and spirits. There are about 240 plays in the current repertoire of Noh, which are classified into two broad genres, *mugen* (phantasmal) Noh 夢幻能, and *genzai* (present time) Noh 現在能, with the former featuring in the role of *shite* 仕手, an “otherworldly” character, such as a god, a ghost, a demon, or the spirit of a plant appearing in a vision or dream, and the latter featuring in the *shite* a protagonist who is a living person and whose story is revealed as a series of real happenings in the world of the living.

In terms of the theme and the type of character casted into the role of the *shite*, Noh plays are conventionally divided into five categories: (1). *Kami mono* 神物, or *waki* Noh 脇能 (god plays), (2). *Ashura* Noh 阿修羅能, or *Shura* Noh 修羅能 (warrior plays), (3). *Kazura mono* 鬘物 (wig plays), or *Onna monos* 女物 (woman plays), (4). *Kyōran mono* 狂乱物 (madness plays), or *Zatsu* 雑能 (miscellaneous plays),⁷ and (5) *Kichiku mono* 鬼畜物 (demon plays), or *Kiri* Noh 切り能 (concluding plays), as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Noh Categorization and Distribution⁸

Manner of Presentation	Mugen Noh			Genzai Noh	
Content and Character	God Plays	Warrior Plays	Woman Plays	Madness Plays (Miscellanies)	Demon Plays
No. of Pieces	39	16	38	94	53
Total No.	240				

In the surviving corpus of Noh drama, one can hardly find a piece of work entirely free from strange and supernatural elements. Even those which are categorized as belonging to the type of *genzai* Noh with the *shite* portraying a living person, such

as the *Sumidagawa* 隅田川 (Sumidagawa River), the *Miidera* 三井寺 (Miidera Temple), the *Funa Benkei* 船弁慶 (Benkei in a Boat), and the *Dōjō-ji* 道成寺 (Dōjō Temple),⁹ are fairly thick with supernatural elements. Little wonder that one would not think of Noh in Japan without associating it with ghosts and spirits.

When we look at Zaju, we find a similar situation, in which works that contain supernatural and strange elements make up the bulk of Yuan drama. The shape of a Zaju play is confined with some of the strictest bounds of convention known to literature. Around 160 Yuan Zaju plays survive in entirety,¹⁰ and they display a surprising uniformity of length and format.¹¹ The stories acted out in Yuan drama are very seldom original, but are taken from a variety of sources. These include dynastic histories, hagiographies of Buddhist and particularly Daoist saints, myths, legends, anecdotes, old tales in classical Chinese, vernacular and semi-vernacular plain tales (*pinghua* 平話) and storytellers' promptbooks (*huaben* 話本) of the Song 宋 dynasty (960-1279).¹²

As compared with their Japanese counterpart, Yuan Zaju are, in general, much longer and more sophisticated in plot structure, and cover a broader scope of theme and subject matter, thus defying any simple or clear-cut classification. The subject matter of Yuan drama is colorfully and comprehensively, albeit somewhat controversially, described by the early Ming 明 (1368-1644) princely theater enthusiast and playwright Zhu Quan 朱權 (1379-1439), who attempted one of the earliest and most influential classifications of Zaju, as shown below in Table 2:¹³

Table 2: Twelve Types of Zaju

One may conclude from a quick look at the twelve types of Zaju that this genre of drama concerns more mortal beings and real happenings than supernatural beings and strange happenings. This is not true. All the differences between Noh and Zaju

Type No.	1	2	3	4
Type Name	<i>Shenxian daohua</i> 神仙道化 (gods, immortals and transfigurations)	<i>Yinju ledao</i> 隱居樂道 (withdrawal and enjoyment of the Way)	<i>Pipao binghu</i> 披袍秉笏 (wearing court robes and grasping scepters)	<i>Zhongchen lieshi</i> 忠臣烈士 (loyal officials and martyrs)
Type No.	5	6	7	8
Type Name	<i>Xiaoyi lianjie</i> 義孝廉節 (filial piety, righteousness, honesty, and moral integrity)	<i>Chijian machan</i> 叱奸罵諗 (rebuking treachery and slander)	<i>Zhuchen guzi</i> 逐臣孤子 (exiled officials and orphaned children)	<i>Badao ganbang</i> 鏖刀趕棒 (combat and chase)
Type No.	9	10	11	12
Type Name	<i>Fenghua xueyue</i> 風花雪月 (wind on flowers and the moon on snow)	<i>Beihuan lihe</i> 悲歡離合 (sorrowful partings and joyful reunions)	<i>Yanhua fendai</i> 煙花粉黛 (powder and eye shadow)	<i>Shentou guimian</i> 神頭鬼面 (masks of deity and ghosts)

aside, Yuan Zaju theater, as a whole, is packed with gods, ghosts and spirits as well. An examination of the surviving corpus of Yuan Zaju as contained in the *Yuanqu xuan* 元曲選 (A Selection of Yuan Plays, hereafter *YQX*)¹⁴ and the *Yuanqu xuan waibian*

元曲選外編 (A Supplementary Selection of Yuan Plays, hereafter *YQXWB*)¹⁵ shows that those that feature supernatural beings and happenings make up more than half of the current repertoire of Yuan drama. Among them are the well-known *Dou E yuan* 竇娥冤 (Injustice to Dou E), and *Qiannü lihun* 倩女離魂 (Qiannü's Soul Leaves Her Body), both of which are acclaimed masterpieces of Chinese literature.

As is the case with Zaju with the stories, songs, and stylized body movements drawn from a variety of sources, Noh draws heavily on rituals, folk and court dances, and originality is not accorded so much aesthetic value as familiarity with *waka* 和歌 (Japanese poem) and *monogatari* 物語 (prose narrative) literature from the periods of Nara 奈良 (710-794) and Heian 平安 (794-1185), as represented by the *Man'yōshū* 萬葉集 (The Ten Thousand Leaves) and the *Genji monogatari* 源氏物語 (Tale of Genji). Allusions to ancient classics abound in Noh theater, and plots are for the most part based on a variety of earlier texts ranging from histories, folktales, myths, and particularly legendary accounts of historical figures and events in such collections of tales as the *Ise Monogatari* 伊勢物語 (*Tales of Ise*), the *Heike Monogatari* 平家物語 (Tale of the Heike) and the *Konjaku Monogatari* 今昔物語 (Tales of Present and Past).¹⁶ Ancient national themes of honor, revenge, love, death, and war that are drawn from the above-mentioned classics are treated, repeated, embellished, disguised, renewed, and refined in Noh and develop into some of the most enduring motifs in Japanese literature.

GHOSTS AND SPIRITS IN CHINESE AND JAPANESE CULTURE

Before I proceed to compare and contrast ghosts and spirits as staged in Zaju and Noh, I would like to make a brief enquiry into such key concepts as “ghost” (*guǐ* 鬼 /*yūrei* 幽霊),¹⁷ and “soul” or “spirit” (*hun/kon* 魂, or *linghun* 靈魂/*reikon* 靈魂) in Chinese and Japanese ghost culture.

Let us start with the Chinese concept of *guD*, or ghost. The belief in the existence of ghosts as “the soul or spirit of the dead” dates back as far as the Shang dynasty (ca.1554-ca.1045 BC) as shown in the character 𪚩 inscribed on the oracle bones. This pictographic character is composed of the pictogram “fu” 𠂇 (head of a ghost) on top and at the bottom the radical “ren” 人 (human), thus giving the impression of a freak bearing a slight resemblance to a human being and suggesting its being used originally to denote “some strange anthropoid or simian creature,” or “a shaman performing exorcist rituals” with the pictogram “fu” on the top standing for “a mask,” and the radical “ren” at the bottom “a shaman wearing the mask.”¹⁸

In the bronzeware inscriptions of the Zhou 周 dynasty (ca.1045-256 BC), recently excavated ancient scripts of the Warring States 戰國 period (476-221 BC), and small seal scripts (*xiaozhuan* 小篆, the original form of the character *guǐ* is still clear.¹⁹ This character was later used more and more frequently in pre-Qin 秦 (221-206 BC) Confucian classics and Masters' writings to mean “ghost” or “the soul or spirit of the dead,” and, at the latest by the end of Warring States Period, had begun to be used to denote almost exclusively “the dead,” “the ghost” or “the soul of the dead.”²⁰

In the “Shixun” 釋訓 (Explaining Instructions) section of the *Erya* 爾雅 (Approaching the Correct), the earliest glossary dictionary compiled around the third century BC to elucidate terms appearing in earlier Confucian classics, *guǐ* is defined as “to return” or “that which returns” (*Guǐ zhi wei yan guǐ ye* 鬼之爲言歸也),²¹ and is further interpreted as “a dead person being a person who returns” (*Siren wei gui* 死人爲歸) by the Western Jin 西晉 (AD 266-316) scholar Guo Pu 郭璞 (276-324), who cites the *Shizi* 尸子 in his explanatory note to the entry of *guǐ* in the *Erya*, but stops short of clarifying as to where the dead person returns.²² An oft-quoted reply to questions like this is found in the *Liezi* 列子, where we read: “When the spirit (*jingshen* 精神) separates from the body, it returns to its true [realm]. This is what is referred to as a ghost (*guǐ*). A ghost means ‘to return’ (*guǐ*), i.e., to return to its true home.”²³

A ghost is therefore understood as that which leaves the body for a realm alien to the real world of the living. Closely related to the Chinese conception of the ghost as the dead or the soul of the dead is the dualist conception of the soul (*hun po* 魂魄), which probably came about under the influence of the *yin-yang* principle in ancient Chinese cosmology.²⁴ The soul is considered as composed of the airy *hun* and the bodily *po*; the *hun* is ascribed to the *yang* part of the soul, which is active, positive, spiritual, heavenly, masculine, clear, bright, and light, whereas the *po* to the *yin* part of the soul, which is passive, negative, material, earthly, feminine, murky, dark, and heavy. The *hun* and *po* are opposed and complementary to each other so as to maintain a healthy balance in the body of a living person, but at the death of the person, the soul will leave the body and at the same time the *hun* will separate itself from the *po*, with the *yang* part of the soul rising up to heaven, and the *yin* part of the soul sinking down to earth. The dead person may be resurrected so long as the *hun*-soul is called back to reunite with the *po*-soul in the body.²⁵

A highly sophisticated ghost culture was also developed in ancient Japan, when the universe was thought of as inhabited by myriads of sprits—spirits of trees, streams, mountains, of thunder and rain, and of their dead. As noted by Lafcadio Hearn (1850–1904), who is better known in Japan as Koizumi Yakumo 小泉八雲, “[I]n Old Japan, the world of the living was everywhere ruled by the world of the dead—that the individual, at every moment of his existence, was under ghostly supervision,”²⁶ and “in all matters the dead, rather than the living, have been the rulers of the nation and—the shapers of its destinies.”²⁷ At the core of Japanese ghost culture is the ancestor or ghost worship, as is the case with Chinese religion. Ancestor worship originates from the belief in the existence of ghosts as the soul or spirit of the dead, but the concept of the soul of the dead is not native to Japan. According to Suwa Haruo, ancient Japanese regarded all spirits in nature, physically invisible to man, as ghosts, and the idea of the soul of the dead as a ghost was conceived under Chinese influence.²⁸

Of various Japanese words about ghosts and spirits, *yūrei* is the one that is closest to the Chinese conception of *guǐ*. Related to *yūrei* is the conception of *reikon* (soul). While *yūrei* overlaps heavily with *reikon* when denoting the soul or spirit, the

difference between them is obvious in that the former refers to the soul of the dead and the latter to the soul of a person, whether dead or alive, much as the two words are understood in Chinese language and culture. In Japanese folklore, *yūrei* is alternatively called *bōrei* 亡霊 (departed soul or spirit) or *shiryō* 死霊 (dead soul or spirit).

In Nara-Heian times when Buddhism, Daoism and other Chinese influences were at their height in Japanese history, beliefs in the existence of *reikon* and *yūrei* started to gain currency among Japanese people from all walks of life. According to this traditional belief, every human being has a soul called *reikon* residing in his or her body, and at death, the *reikon* will leave the body and enter a purgatory-like realm to wait for burial and memorial services. The primary purpose of these services is to appease and satisfy the *reikon* so that the *reikon* will turn into a peaceful spirit (*nigi mitama* 和御魂), and eventually become a quasi-god known as *kami* 神 to protect and bless the family from which it came. The *kami* resides far above the world of the living, and continues to receive sacrifices offered by his descendants who worship him as their *sorei* 祖霊 (ancestral spirit). However, if a person dies a violent or wronged death, the burial and memorial services are not properly conducted, or sacrifices are not offered regularly, the *reikon* will transform itself into a *yūrei*, or more accurately, an *onryō* 怨霊 (grudge-bearing spirit), to return to the physical world as a ghost to seek revenge.

Legendary accounts of vengeful ghosts and spirits dating from the Nara-Heian period abound in Japanese mythology and folklore. A case in point is the angered spirit of Sugawara no Michizane 菅原道真 (845-903), also known as Kan Shōjō 菅丞相, bringing about one after another calamity and wreaking havoc on the country in revenge for his wronged death. To placate his angered spirit, a shrine was built over the grave of Kan Shōjō, and posthumous titles were awarded to honor his name. Later, he was even deified and became a Tenjin 天神 (heavenly god) of Literature. Legendary accounts of the avenging ghost of Sugawara no Michizane were adapted in the fourteenth century into a fifth-category Noh play—*Raiden* 雷電 (Thunder and Lightning), and later into Jōruri 浄瑠璃 and Kabuki 歌舞伎 as well.

Beliefs in the existence of gods, ghosts and spirits and ancestor-worshipping traditions, as we have seen, led to the establishment of various shrines and temples, and elaborate mortuary and memorial rites and rituals in the hope of purifying and placating the restless souls of the dead, and warding off evils and calling forth blessings from them, which, in turn, influenced in form and content traditional performing arts.²⁹

GHOSTS AND SPIRITS IN ZAJU AND NOH

Both Chinese and Japanese people in medieval times came under influence from many kinds of folk and religious beliefs in supernatural power, native or foreign, that were passed down to them from the preceding period. They believed in a great variety of strange and supernatural beings, whose presence was felt and feared. The beliefs mingled in varying proportions and amalgamated into popular forms of superstition, and found their artistic expressions in literature and performing arts.

Folklorists and historians of performing arts share much over their views of ghosts and spirits, but the differences between them are also obvious and various owing to their different research purposes and perspectives. It is not my aim to compare folklorists and historians of performing arts in their views of supernatural beings or to distinguish and classify ghosts and spirits from a folkloristic perspective. It would be a task beyond the goal set for this study. Nevertheless, for the sake of expediency, I would like to narrow my search for the supernatural beings down to ghosts and spirits as presented and represented in Zaju and Noh, with focus on the types of ghosts and spirits, the type of characters they represent, the manner of their appearing onstage, and their final disposition.

Types of Roles, Types of Characters and Modes of Presentation in Noh

As mentioned above, the belief in the existence of gods, ghosts, and spirits gives rise to the institution of mortuary rites and memorial services in ancient China and Japan. On such an occasion in Japan, there will be a medium, who appears first as an ordinary person and then enters a state of being possessed by the spirit of a dead person or *kami*. The *kami* makes no physical appearance except through the medium, who, upon the request of the audience (the community from which the dead person came), addresses the community in the name of the *kami*, while acting (speaking, singing and dancing) out a story or an episode of the previous life of the dead person to the accompaniment of *kagura* 神楽 (divine music). The ritual comes to an end with the revelation of the true identity of the *kami*, and not until at this moment does the medium regain his consciousness from the trance and return to his former state of being an ordinary person. The possessed medium is called *shite* for his role as the doer and performer in the ritual, and the person selected from the audience to represent the community is called *waki* 脇 for his role as a bystander or spectator.³⁰

The role types of *shite* and *waki* involved in the Shinto-Shamanistic rituals and their features and functions in these rituals are faithfully observed in Noh. In these rituals, as shown below in Table 3, the central figure is the possessed medium, or the *shite*. This is also true of a Noh play, the nature/category of which is determined by the main character cast in the role of the *shite*. In Noh, the *shite* plays a great variety of characters, who may be a supernatural being (god, ghost, spirit, or demon) and may also be a human being, male or female, old or young, of noble or humble birth. The *shite* character is not portrayed through his or her interactions and conflicts with other characters, but more often than not through the inner conflicts between desire and destiny without involving other characters. A typical Noh play is thus focused on one single character, that is, the *shite*, with the whole plot revolving around one single important episode or event in his or her life, hence a small cast of characters and a highly condensed and unified dramatic structure.

The *shite* in Noh plays may appear in various transformations, as shown below in Table 3.³¹

Table 3. Appearances and Transformations of the *Shite*

APPEARANCE	TITLE	SHITE	SUBJECT	WAKI
human	<i>Ataka</i>	Musashibō Benkei (warrior monk)	(madness)	Togashi
	<i>Yuya</i>	Yuya (consort of Taira no Munemori)	(woman)	Taira no Munemori
ghost	<i>Kiyotsune</i>	Taira no Kiyotsune (warrior)	(man)	Awazu no Saburō (retainer)
	<i>Matsukaze</i>	Matsukaze & Marasame, sisters (lovers of the poet Ariwara no Narihira)	(woman)	priest
human	<i>Hachi no Ki</i>	Sano no Genzaemon Tsuneyo (changes from civilian to warrior garb)	(madness)	Hōjō Tokiyori (regent) (disguised as priest)
	<i>Hanagatami</i>	Teruhimae→ same as madwoman	(madness)	retainer
human ghost	<i>Koi no Omoni</i>	old gardener	(madness)	aristocrat
	<i>Kinuta</i>	his angry ghost nameless wife→	(madness)	nameless her ghost husband
demon god	<i>Tanikō</i>	mother→ demon god	(demon)	<i>yamabushi</i>
demoness	<i>Kanawa</i>	a certain woman→ demoness	(madness)	diviner
incarnation god	<i>Takasago</i>	old man→the god of Sumiyoshi	(god)	shrine priest
	<i>Kazuraki</i>	lowly woman→ the goddess of Kazuraki	(woman)	<i>yamabushi</i>
bodhisattva	<i>Taema</i>	nun→Chūjō-hime (Bodhisattva of song and dance)	(demon)	priest
ghost	<i>Michimori</i>	old fisherman→ Taira no Mchimori	(man)	priest
	<i>Izutsu</i>	country woman→ daughter of Ki no Arisune	(woman)	priest
<i>tengu</i>	<i>Dai-e</i>	mountain priest→ the <i>tengu</i> Tarōbō	(demon)	priest
demon god	<i>Nomori</i>	old man→demon god of hell	(demon)	<i>yamabushi</i>
demoness	<i>Dōjō-ji</i>	dancing girl→demoness in body of snake	(madness)	priest
ghostly buddha	<i>Ama</i>	ghost of fisherwoman→ dragon goddess	(demon)	chief retainer

ghost	<i>Aoi no Ue</i>	Lady Rokujō→ demoness	(madness)	exorcist
demon	<i>Ukai</i>	cormorant fisherman→ demon of hell	(demon)	priest
transformation demoness	<i>Kuro-zuka</i>	solitary woman→ demoness	(demon)	<i>yamabushi</i>
angry	<i>Tsuchi-gumo</i>	body of priest→	(demon)	warrior
ghost		spirit of ground spider		
animal	<i>Sesshōseki</i>	country woman→ bewitching fox	(demon)	traveller
tree spirit	<i>Bashō</i>	young lady→ spirit of the plantain tree	(woman)	mountain priest
flower spirit	<i>Kakitsubata</i>	woman → spirit of water iris	(woman)	travelling monk
tree spirit	<i>Saigyōzakura</i>	old man→ spirit of cherry tree	(woman)	Saigyō (monk/poet)

This table provides a list of the type of characters that appear in each act of a play, together with an example of a play, the name of the main character (or *shite*), the subject category, and the “foil” character (or *waki*). Corresponding to the structural pattern of rituals and the type of characters as described above are three ways in which a ghost/spirit may appear in a Noh play:³²

- (1) as a ghost/spirit in both acts;
- (2) as a human in the first act, and a ghost/spirit in the second;
- (3) as an incarnation in the first act, and a ghost/spirit in the second.

Types of Roles, Types of Characters and Modes of Presentation in Zaju

Noh retains much of the ritualistic and religious form or function, which distinguishes it not only from other traditional Japanese performing arts but from Chinese Zaju as well. Whereas the belief in ghosts, spirits, and reincarnation is quite common in both Chinese and Japanese culture, “the ritual that has always played an important role as a connection between beliefs and their artistic/dramatic embodiments is highly developed in Japan.”³³ In China, the religious function and ritualistic form of drama seem to have been seriously confined to the Nuo drama,³⁴ the Mulian drama,³⁵ and the Banxian drama.³⁶ Having assimilated performing arts of earlier times, such as Tang 唐 (618-907) *canjunxi* 參軍戲 (adjutant play), Song *zaju* (variety show), Jin 金 (1115-1234) *yuanben* 院本 (court play), and Song-Jin *zhugongdiao* 諸宮調 (ballad singing in all keys and modes), and integrated with elements of Tang *yuewu* 樂舞 (music and dance, or *tōgaku* 唐樂 in Japanese), Yuan Zaju developed in the direction of secular entertainment,³⁷ and was performed mainly in urban entertainment districts known as *washe* 瓦舍 or *wazi* 瓦子 (tile markets) to cater for the tastes of urban dwellers, for whom “entertainments are at the heart of everything” in their city life.³⁸

The way of introducing and involving characters in a Zaju play is characteristic of and appropriate to drama with a view to invoking conflicts and creating tensions,

and the manner of ghosts and spirits appearing onstage is therefore more dramatic than ritualistic. Like Noh, Zaju also demonstrates a high level of uniformity in length and format. A standard Zaju play is composed of four acts (*zhe* 折) with each act consisting of a set of arias sung by a single character who is either the hero or the heroine in the play, and interspersed with spoken dialogue between the major and minor characters or between minor characters.³⁹ The dramatic plot, as Wilt L. Idema notes, develops alongside the exposition-conflict-climax-denouement sequence as commonly seen in a Western play.⁴⁰ Besides, a *xiezi* 楔子 (wedge) is often inserted in this four-act structure to serve as a prologue by providing background information if placed at the very beginning of the play or to serve as an interlude by explaining the dramatic situation through the dialogue and/or monologue of minor character(s), in a manner analogous to the monologue of the *waki* at the opening scene, or the dialogue between the *waki* and an *ai* actor in a Noh play.

In terms of rhythmic structure, Zaju is different from Noh which is composed on the ordering principle of *jo-ha-kyū* 序 - 破 - 急, which roughly means in English “beginning-break-rapid.” Adapted from the music and dance structure of the *daqu* 大曲 (grand music) imported to Japan from China during the Tang dynasty,⁴¹ the principle of *jo-ha-kyū* is demonstrated in the spacio-temporal structure of a Noh play as a the tripartite sequence of introduction, development and conclusion.⁴² A Noh play composed on the principle of *jo-ha-kyū* often comes to an end without reaching or passing through climax as usually seen in a Zaju play. The reason for this lies in the fact that Zaju is very much a drama of action with the storyline unfolding along the interaction and confrontation of characters. In contrast, Noh is “essentially a drama of soliloquy and reminiscence of the main character who in many plays begins as a reincarnation and then appears as a ghost,”⁴³ thus leaving no room for action but only the recollection of action.⁴⁴ For the same reason, the cast of a Zaju play is usually larger than that of a Noh play, which tends to focus on “just one cross section of, or one single event in, the life of one person.”⁴⁵

The role type system of Zaju is more complicated than that of Noh, which is usually distributed only between two characters with the protagonist played by the *shite* and the deuteragonist by the *waki*, who may be accompanied by companions or attendants called *wakizure*.⁴⁶ As seen in Table 4 above, the role of the *shite* in *mugen* Noh plays is assigned to supernatural beings such as ghosts, deities and spirits, whereas the *waki*, in most cases, acts as a religious person possessing some supernatural power, offering help to the *shite* character in his or her search for the fulfillment of wishes, revenge, love, peace, or spiritual enlightenment and salvation.

The role type system in Zaju may be described as composed of two major categories, the *zhengse* 正色 (lead role) and *waijiao* 外腳 (minor role).⁴⁷ Depending on whether the character portrayed by an actor or actress is female or male, the role type of the *zhengse* is further categorized into the *zhengdan* 正旦 (female lead) and the *zhengmo* 正末 (male lead). The character portrayed by the *zhengse*, if not always, is very often the protagonist, and the predominant role of the *zhengse* in a Zaju play is

justified and reinforced by the fact that the librettos are limited to this primary category of role type.⁴⁸ Similar to the dominant role of a *zhengse* character in Zaju is that of the *shite* in Noh who is the only masked character that dances and sings on stage, as contrasted with the auxiliary role of *waki* who does not sing or wear a mask, but just speaks in prose and verse. Actors who assume all the other role categories in Zaju are conventionally assigned spoken parts and actions only. Classified as belonging to the *waijiao* category are the *mo* 末 type (*fumo* 副末, *chongmo* 冲末, *waimo* 外末, *laomo* 老末, *xiaomo* 小末), the *dan* 旦 type (*fudan* 副旦, *tiedan* 貼旦, *waidan* 外旦, *dadan* 大旦, *laodan* 老旦, *sedan* 色旦, *chadan* 搽旦, and *hundun* 魂旦⁴⁹), and the *jing* 淨 type (*erjing* 二淨, *waijing* 外淨, and *fujing* 副淨), in addition to the *chou* 丑 and the *za* 雜, which includes *gu* 孤 (official), *bolao* 老 (old man), *bu're* 卜兒 (old woman), *lai'er* 孩兒 (child), etc.

As in a Noh play in which the *shite* plays the key role and determines the category of the drama, a Zaju play usually revolves around the *zhengse* character(s), and the theme and subject matter of the play is therefore determined to a great extent by what happens to the *zhengdan* and/or *zhengmo* character(s). The *zhengse* character may be a divine being; a human being, young or old, male or female, noble or plebeian, from all walks of life ranging from the king or queen and court ministers to warriors, magistrates, and scholars, and from a pretty girl of humble birth to a young lady of a big, eminent family; a supernatural or superhuman being; a wandering, disembodied soul; a restless revenant who returns to the world of the living in search for her lover; a vengeful spirit of a person who died a violent or wronged death and is released from Hades to prowl about to seek revenge in the world of the living. A *zhengse* character in a Zaju play is usually portrayed through his or her interaction and confrontation with other characters, and the dramatic conflict is therefore manifested more as coming from outside than from within, which is just contrary to Noh.

Table 4 below provides a list of fifteen Yuan Zaju plays that feature prominently ghosts and spirits, together with the name of the ghost/spirit character, the role type and the act they appear in the play, and the subject of the play.

Table 4. Appearances and Transformations of Ghost/Spirit Characters in Zaju

TITLE	GHOST/SPIRIT CHARACTER	ROLE TYPE	ACT NO	SUBJECT
<i>Xishu meng</i> ⁵⁰	Zhang Fei & Guang Yu (ghosts)	?		violent death; revenge; repose of souls
	Guan & Zhang (ghosts) ↓	?		
	Zhang Fei (vengeful ghost) →	<i>waijiao</i>	II	
	Zhang Fei (wandering soul)	<i>zhengmo</i>	III	
		<i>zhengmo</i>	IV	

<i>Dou E yuan</i> ⁵¹	Dou Duanyun (young girl, renamed Dou E)	<i>zhengdan</i>	wedge	wronged death; injustice;
(vengeful ghost)	Dou E (widow) → <i>hundun</i>	<i>zhengdan</i> IV	I-III trials	revenge; court trials
<i>Houting hua</i> ⁵²	Cuiluan (girl of humble birth) ↓ (revenant)	<i>dan</i> [absent] <i>hundun</i> [absent]	I II III IV	violent death; man-ghost love; revenge; court trials
<i>Yuanjia zhaizhu</i> ⁵³	Zhang Shanyou (Buddhist follower) → (living soul)	<i>zhengmo</i> <i>zhengmo</i>	wedge-III IV	retribution; enlightenment; Buddhist deliverance
<i>Shengjin 'ge</i> ⁵⁴	Guo Cheng (scholar) ↓ (headless ghost)	<i>zhengmo</i> <i>waijiao</i>	wedge I II-IV	violent death; revenge; court trials
<i>Tieguai Li Yue</i> ⁵⁵	Yue Shou (official) (dead soul) → (revenant) → (possessing soul) → (reincarnation as Li Yue)	<i>zhengmo</i> <i>zhengmo</i> <i>zhengmo</i> <i>zhengmo</i>	I II wedge III IV	Daoist deliverance; revival and reincarnation retribution and salvation
<i>Dongchuang shifan</i> ⁵⁶	Yue Fei (warrior) → (underworld soul) Itinerant monk (incarnation of Ksitigarbha) Ksitigarbha Yue Fei (wronged soul) → (appeased soul)	<i>zhengmo</i> <i>zhengmo</i> <i>zhengmo</i> <i>waijiao</i> <i>zhengmo</i>	wedge(1) I II wedge (2) III IV	injustice and retribution; repose of the heroic soul;
<i>Qiannü lihun</i> ⁵⁷	Qiannü (betrothed girl) → (disembodied soul) → Qiannü (lost soul) → (returned soul)	<i>zhengdan</i> <i>zhengdan</i> <i>hundun</i> <i>hundun</i>	wedge-I II III IV	love and romance; union of man with living soul; reunion of body and soul;
<i>Huo Guang gui jian</i> ⁵⁸	Huo Guang (court minister) → (restless ghost) → (revenant)	<i>zhengmo</i> <i>zhengmo</i>	I-III IV	loyal officials and martyrs

<i>Haotian ta</i> ⁵⁹	Yang Liulang (living soul)	<i>chongmo</i>	I	violent death and
	Yang Linggong (restless soul) ↓	<i>zhengmo</i>	I	revenge; repose of the heroic souls;
	Yang Qilang (restless soul) ↓	<i>wai</i>	II-III	Buddhist deliverance
	Yang Linggong Yang Qilang (appeased souls)		IV	
<i>Bitao hua</i> ⁶⁰	Bitao (betrothed girl) (dead) → (ghost) → (possessing soul) → (wronged soul) → (returned soul)	<i>zhengdan</i> <i>zhengdan</i> <i>zhengdan</i> <i>zhengdan</i>	wedge I II III IV	love and romance between ghost and man; revival and reincarnation by borrowing a corpse
<i>Zhusha dan</i> ⁶¹	Wang Wenyong (son, peddler) → (wronged soul)	<i>zhengmo</i>	wedge-I	prognostic dream; violent death;
	Wang Congdao (father) (vengeful ghost)	<i>zhengmo</i> <i>bolao</i>	II III	revenge; retribution
	Wang Wengyong (vengeful ghost)	<i>zhengmo</i>	IV	
<i>Pen'er gui</i> ⁶²	Yang Guoyong (peddler) → (wronged soul)	<i>zhengmo</i>	wedge	prognostic dream; violent death;
	God of Kiln (incarnation)	<i>zhengmo</i>	I	revenge;
	Yang Guoyong (spirit of pot)	<i>zhengmo</i> <i>hunzi</i>	II III & IV	court trials
<i>Shennu'er</i> ⁶³	Shennu'er (son)	<i>lai'er</i>	I-wedge	violent death;
	Li Deren (father) → (angered ghost)	<i>zhengmo</i>		revenge; court trials
	Shennu'er (wronged soul)	<i>lai'er</i> <i>hunzi</i>	II III-IV	
<i>Yueyang lou</i> ⁶⁴	Old Man (incarnation of Old Willow Tree Spirit → White Plum Tree Spirit	<i>wai</i>	I	Daoist deliverance
	Guo Ma'er (reincarnation of Old Willow Tree Spirit →	<i>wai</i>	II	
	He Namei (Guo's wife; reincarnation of White Plum Tree Spirit →	<i>dan</i>		

<i>Guo Ma'er</i> (reincarnation) → (immortal)	<i>wai</i>	wedge	III-IV
He Namei (reincarnation) → (immortal)	<i>dan</i> <i>wai</i>		
<i>Chengnan liu</i> ⁶⁵			
Old Willow Tree (spirit)		wedge ⁶⁶	Daoist deliverance
Peach Stone (spirit)			
Peach Flower Spirit (incarnation)	<i>dan</i>	I	
Willow Tree Spirit (incarnation)	<i>jing</i>		
Lao Liu (reincarnation of Willow Tree Spirit) → (immortal)	<i>jing</i>	II-IV	
Xiao Tao (Lao Liu's wife, reincarnation of Peach Flower Spirit → (immortal)	<i>dan</i>		
<i>Du Liu Cui</i> ⁶⁷			
Liu Cui (prostitute; reincarnation of the willow branch in Bodhisattva Avalokiteshvara's vase) → (willow branch enlightened)	<i>dan</i>	wedge-III	Buddhist deliverance
		IV	

The way ghosts and spirits appear in a Noh play is determined by the mode of presentation of characters, or in Kunio Komparu's term, "production techniques." Komparu identifies two main production techniques in Noh: "the progress-in-the-present method" (*genzai-shinko-hō* 現在進行法), in which "the action moves in a flow of time that is natural and describable in terms of the laws of physics," and "the reflection-in-vision method" (*mugen-kaisō-hō* 夢幻回想法), in which "the flow of time within the play is reversed and takes place in a memory of dream."⁶⁸ He describes plays following "the progress-in-the-present method" as "Phenomenal (*genzai*) Noh," and those following "the reflection-in-vision method" as "Phantasmal (*mugen*) Noh."⁶⁹

In contrast, the production technique employed in a four-act ghost Zaju play is not confined to either "the progress-in-the-present method" or "the reflection-in-vision method," but more often than not manifested as a combination of them. In this kind of spacio-temporal framework, "the progress-in-the-present method" is in most cases adopted in the initial act or scene that deals with the world of the living and in the last one when wrongs are corrected, justice is done, and the restless soul of the dead pacified or revived through religious rituals, court trials or divine interferences. Inserted

in between is “the reflection-in-vision method,” which is often employed to deal with the ghost/spirit of the dead that appears in the dream of the living, acting out onstage the wrongs imposed on them when alive and/or the sufferings they experience in the afterlife. In the case of animistic spirits, “the-reflection-vision-method” is usually employed in the middle act(s) for their original state of being as a plant to be revealed to their reincarnations by their deliverer, and the “the progress-in-the-present method” in the beginning (Wedge or Act I) part of the play to present them either as a plant, or the incarnation or reincarnation of the plant, and in the last act to show their attainment of immortality or buddhahood.

In line with this mode of presentation in Zaju are five ways of ghosts and spirits making their appearance on stage:

- (1) first as a human, and then as a ghost;
- (2) first as a human, then as a ghost, and finally as a reincarnation;
- (3) first as a human, then as a living soul that splits from the body, and finally back to his or her former self;
- (4) first as an incarnation or reincarnation, and finally as an enlightened immortal or a heavenly being, and
- (5) as a ghost throughout the play.

Dreams play a key role in initiating ghosts and spirits into interaction with the world and humans. Of the fifteen Zaju plays given above as examples, twelve have the interactions and communications between humans and supernatural beings realized through the medium of dream. A Daoist immortal, an eminent Buddhist monk, or a shaman/ medium, who is often disguised as a shabby-looking person, will be involved to facilitate this process. They may exercise supernatural power (a kind of hypnosis as we understand today) to usher the soul of a living person down to the underworld and bring him into direct contact with ghosts and sprits there, as seen in the *Yuanjia zhaizhu*. The moment the dreamer awakes from the dream, the soul of the living person that was separated from the body will return from the underworld to reunite with the body, and he will find himself back in the world of the living as his former self.

The dream sequence in traditional Chinese theater is normally presented onstage in three ways:

- (1) verbal narration (singing and speaking);
- (2) gestural demonstration (dancing—highly stylized symbolic movement), and
- (3) the combination of verbal narration and gestural demonstration.

It is not uncommon to see a dream presented onstage through (1) or (2), but more often than not, they are combined to show the dream, as shown in Act IV of the *Dou E yuan*. In this act, the *hundun* (Dou E’s ghost) appears in the dream of the *chongmo* (Dou Tianzhang 竇天章, a high-raking official who turns out to be Dou E’s father), asking him to reexamine her case and put right the wrongs done to her. While the *hundun* is singing and dancing out the dream onstage, the *chongmo* plays falling into sleep, and the ghost and the man are thus engaged in interactions with each other in the dream. With the third-person (dreamer) narration suddenly shifted into the first

person (the ghost appearing in his dream), the nature of what is possible is thus transcended so that past and present are overlapped and fused into a whole that advances both at the same time yet in different dimensions on the stage. This dramatic manipulation of time and space is also frequently employed in *mugen* Noh.⁷⁰

Types of Ghosts and Spirits in Noh and Zaju

As mentioned above, very few pieces of Zaju and Noh are found entirely free from supernatural or strange elements. When people talk about supernatural beings on stage, they tend to think of all the different ghosts, goblins, specters, demons, monsters, and apparitions under the category of spirits. To treat all the supernatural beings simply as spirits without making proper distinctions between them will not help achieve a correct understanding of what is going on onstage. In China as well as Japan, numerous attempts have been made to classify and distinguish supernatural beings, and most of them have been conducted from a folkloristic perspective. The leading Japanese folklorist Yanagita Kunio 柳田國男 (1875-1962), for example, made a clear distinction between *yūrei* (ghosts) and *obake* お化け (apparitions) in his seminal *Yokai dangi* 妖怪談義 (Lectures on Monsters), claiming that “*Yūrei* haunted a particular person, whereas *obake* haunted a particular place, and that *yūrei* can appear to anyone, whereas *obake* must appear to a particular person in a particular place.”⁷¹ “This distinction,” as Kunio Komparu points out, “is appropriate for folklore but not necessarily for Noh, because in Noh the ghosts are not the one-eyed, long-necked spooks of popular ghost tales but rather apparitions of the dead or transfigurations of nonhuman beings into human form, and they always come with some purpose.”⁷²

Komparu identifies four types of ghosts and spirits staged in Noh theater in addition to demons and apparitions from the underworld and gods and goddesses from above. As shown below in Table 5, the four types of ghosts and spirits in Noh are animistic ghosts, ghosts of the dead, possessing ghosts, and vengeful ghosts, respectively.⁷³

Table 5. Types of Ghosts in Noh

↑↑
gods

Types of Ghosts	Noh Plays	Features and feelings	
animistic	<i>Taema</i>	(sentient)	dance to Buddha
ghosts	<i>Yugyō Yanagi</i>	(non-sentient)	
ghosts of the dead	<i>Michimori</i>	ghost of dead showing agony of battle	
	<i>Izutsu</i>	ghosts of dead showing love, longing and dancing human life	
	<i>Ukai</i>	ghost of dead showing state of hell	
possessing ghosts	<i>Makiginu</i>	(god) sacred ghost possesses human	
	<i>Aoi no Ue</i>	(living) ghost of living person separates itself from body to possess another living person	
	<i>Sotoba Komachi</i>	(dead) ghost of dead possesses living	
vengeful ghosts	<i>Kanawa</i>	(living) malevolent ghost of living person attacks living person	
	<i>Funa Benkei</i>	(dead) malevolent ghost of dead attacks living person	

↓↓
demons

Compared with Yanagita's distinction of *yūrei* from *obake*, Komparu's classification is no doubt of more help to our understanding ghost/spirit characters in drama, and will thus be used here as a platform for a comparison with the types of ghosts and spirits in Zaju.

A closer examination of the fifteen Zaju plays reveals that ghosts and spirits in them bear a remarkable typological resemblance to their Japanese counterparts in Noh, as shown below in Table 8. In terms of deeds and needs, ghosts and spirits in Zaju may be divided into four general categories: avenging ghosts, love-seeking ghosts, revenants (souls of the dead brought back to life after being united with the corpse of the new dead), and spirits (of plants) to be delivered into buddhahood or immortality.

Table 6 shows the dominance of avenging ghosts over the other three types of ghosts and spirits in Zaju. Nine out of the fifteen Zaju pieces under discussion deal with ghosts of those who died a wronged or violent death and then appear either in the dream of a living person or make their presence and power felt in the world of the living to seek revenge and justice.

Table 6: Types of Ghosts and Spirits in Zaju

Types	Titles	Characters	Deeds and Needs
Avenging Ghosts	<i>Xishu meng</i>	Zheng Fei & Guan Yu	(Translucent) souls of dead showing frustration over loss of power and resentment over wronged death while wandering about in the world of the living and appearing in dream to seek revenge
	<i>Dou E yuan</i>	Dou E	Ghost of dead released from the underworld to seek revenge, appearing in dream and making itself physically felt at court trial
	<i>Haotian ta</i>	Yang Linggong & Yang Qilang	Ghosts of ead appearing in dream to complain about wronged death and ill-treatment of their remains
	<i>Houting hua</i>	Cuiluan	Soul of the dead separating itself from the dead body and appearing corporeal in search of love and revenge
	<i>Shengjin'ge</i>	Guo Cheng	Ghost of the dead appearing corporeal with head held in hand prowling about in search for revenge and justice
	<i>Dongchuang Shifan</i>	Yue Fei	Ghost of dead appearing in dream to complain about wronged death and seeking revenge and justice
	<i>Zhusha dan</i>	Wang Wenyong	Ghosts of dead appearing in dream to seek revenge and divine intervention
	<i>Pen'er gui</i>	Yang Guoyong	Ghost of dead, having been burned into ashes and moulded into a pot, making its presence felt when seeking revenge and justice
	<i>Shennu'er</i>	Shennu'er	Ghost of dead appearing in dream and then making its presence felt at court to seek revenge and justice
Love-seeking Ghosts	<i>Houting hua</i>	Cuiluan	See above
	<i>Qiannü lihun</i>	Zhang Xiaoqian	(Living) soul splitting from body to seek love and union with man
	<i>Bitao hua</i>	Bitao	Animated corpse coming from the underworld to pursue romantic love in the world of the living and rising from the dead through entering the body of the new dead
Revenants/ Possessing Ghosts	<i>Bitao hua</i>	Bitao	See above
	<i>Tieguai Li</i>	Yue Shou	Ghost of dead entering the corpse of the new dead to be reincarnated and delivered
Animistic Spirits	<i>Yueyang lou</i>	Guo Ma'er	Spirit of Willow Tree reincarnated as a male person before being delivered into immortality
		He Namei	Spirit of White Plum Tree reincarnated as a female person and arranged to be Guo's wife before being delivered into immortality
	<i>Chengnan liu</i>	Lao Liu	Spirit of Willow Tree reincarnated as a male person before being delivered into immortality
		Xiao Tao	Spirit of Peach Blossom reincarnated as a female person and arranged to be Lao Liu's wife before being delivered into immortality
	<i>Du Liu Cui</i>	Liu Cui	Banished to the world to be enlightened to the truth and delivered into Buddhahood

The belief in the soul of the dead continuing to exist as a separate entity in afterlife to seek fulfilment of wishes is also deeply rooted in Chinese ghost culture—where how one died in life could determine what kind of ghost/spirit he or she would become in the afterlife. The souls of those who died a violent or wronged death would often return to the world of the living for vengeance, as recorded in the *Zuozhuan* 左傳 (Zuo's Commentary on *Spring and Autumn Annals*) under the entry title of “Xianggong sanshinian” 襄公三十年 (the Thirtieth Year [543 BC] of Duke Xiang 襄公 [r. 573-542]), where it is reported that the State of Zheng 鄭 (806-375 BC) was plunged into turmoil by the avenging ghost of a nobleman Liangxiao 良霄 (aka. Boyou 伯有) hanging around his political enemies to seek revenge after he was murdered at a sheep market.⁷⁴ A more detailed account of this event is given in the entry of “the Seventh Year (543 BC) of Duke Zhao 昭公 (r. 542-510 BC)” of the *Zuozhuan*, in which Zichan 子產 (d. 522 BC), the Chief Councilor of the State of Zheng is quoted as saying when asked whether it is possible for Boyou to become a ghost:

That which is transformed into at the very beginning of one's life is called the *po*, which will give birth to its positive part called *yang*. If s/he is well fed, his or her *hun* and *po* will grow strong enough to attain luminescence and intelligence. Even the *hun* and *po* of an ordinary man or woman, after dying a violent death, are still able to keep hanging about men in the shape of an evil apparition; how much more might this be expected in the case of Liangxiao, a descendant of our former ruler Duke of Mu, the grandson of Ziliang, and the son of Zi'er, all ministers of our State, engaged in its government for three generations.”

人生始化曰魄，既生魄，陽曰魂，用物精多，則魂魄強，是以有精爽，至於神明。匹夫匹婦強死，其魂魄猶能馮依於人，以為淫厲。況良霄，我先君穆公之冑，子良之孫，子耳之子，敝邑之卿，從政三世矣。⁷⁵

Boyou's ghost made no more appearance after Zichan put his son Liangzhi 良止 in charge of the office formerly held by Boyou to appease his troubled soul. Later on when asked for an explanation of this strange happening, Zichan replied:

If a ghost has somewhere to return, it will not haunt people to cause trouble to them. I have provided a proper place for the ghost to return to.⁷⁶

鬼有所歸，乃不為厲，吾為之歸也。

Accounts and records about male avenging ghosts abound in Chinese ghostlore. As shown in the above table, seven out of the nine avenging ghost plays feature male avenging ghosts, and of these seven plays, three concern ghosts of warriors, such as Zhang Fei and Guan Yu in the *Xishu meng*, Yue Fei 岳飛 in the *Dongchuang shifan*, and Yang Linggong 楊令公 and his son Yang Qilang 楊七郎 in the *Haotian ta* 昊天塔 (Haotian Pagoda). The ghosts of these warriors cannot let their soul rest in peace because of the violent or wronged death they suffered in life. In contrast, it seems that male avenging ghosts are less common and less likely to be seeking revenge than female ones in Japanese ghost culture. A common type of male ghost found in Noh is

the warrior who was killed in battle. As a warrior, he bears no personal grudge against his enemy who killed him on the battlefield, as to lay down his life is part of his profession and a kind of honor, although he still finds it hard to pull himself away from the tragic event that led to his death. This type of *yūrei* figures often in Noh plays of the *Ashura* category, and he is often indistinguishable at first sight from a real person. He hangs around ancient battlefields or moss-covered temple precincts waiting for a kind person to come along to listen to his story of what took place there in the past. A record is thus set straight, a smeared reputation untarnished, and a name cleared. Such ghosts let out the secrets of history, and are bent only on letting the truth be known.

The second largest type of ghost plays in Zaju is almost exclusively devoted to stories about erotic female ghosts falling in love with men, as exemplified in the *Houting hua* 後庭花 (The Flower in the Rear Courtyard), the *Bitao hua*, and particularly in the *Qiannü lihun*. Love and romance between female ghosts and men is one of the most fascinating and enduring themes in Chinese ghost literature, where ghost women are usually portrayed as timid, lonely, and lovely, and talented, thus often arousing sympathy and admiration from men, as embodied in the above three ghost dramas by the female ghost protagonist Cuiluan 翠鸞, Bitao 碧桃, and Qiannü 倩女. In Yuan Zaju, a female ghost in love is often portrayed as having a corporeal existence, and dating and living with the man she loves and even bearing his children. The female ghost seems to show no fundamental difference from any living girl except that the ghost can only make her physical appearance after sunset and will have to return to the dark underworld before daybreak because sunlight will force them to show their true features as ghosts. It is widely believed that ghosts belong to the dark underworld, are earthbound and therefore filled with strong yin energy, which will pass on to men through sexual intercourse, breaking the yin-yang balance in their body and causing illness and even death, as seen in the *Bitao hua* which features a talented young scholar Zhang Daonan 張道南 falling ill as a result of his romantic union with the ghost of Bitao.

Female ghosts in love with men also figure prominently in Noh, but in Noh, this kind of love is usually presented as a historical event that happened in the past between men and women of ancient times rather than as a present continuous event, as often seen in Zaju between a female ghost and a male living person. It always turns out towards the end of the Noh drama that what has been presented and performed onstage about the love story is nothing but a dream or a reflection of illusion conjured up in the *waki*'s mind. The *waki* character is usually a Buddhist priest, to whom the ghost girl reveals its real identity as the heroine in the love story with the request for him to pray to console her restless soul. The role of the priest in such a play is passive, but essential and is not replaceable.⁷⁷ This is because many *yūrei* are female ghosts who suffered badly in life from the vagaries of love, and whose powerful emotions of jealousy, sorrow, regret, or spite at their time of death have brought them to seek revenge on whomever it was who caused their suffering, and because they could not find peace with themselves except through religious rituals and priests' prayers.

Ghosts staged in Noh theater are almost without exception historical figures. They act out their previous life onstage, and will walk back into history at the end of the drama. They are neither brought back to life in dream nor in reality, and what they wish for is to forget their previous life and to attain salvation before returning to where they belong with peace of mind. In contrast, the interactions of ghosts and spirits with humans are usually shown in Zaju to be real and present continuous happenings. On stage, a character may die and become a ghost, who may appear corporeal in the real world to fulfill its wish(es) and may even rise from the dead and come back to life. Whereas dreams in Noh serve as a window through which to see what happened to the *shite* character in the past, they are employed in Zaju as a medium through which to realize the interactions and communications between the living and the dead. It is therefore not uncommon with Zaju that while a living person is dreaming of a ghost appearing to give an instruction or to make a request, the ghost is shown onstage acting out the dream through singing, dancing, and speaking. With the dreamer in the reality and the ghost in the dream appearing onstage at the same time, yet playing his or her role independently from each other, the stage is divided into two dimensions, one belonging to the dreamer in the reality, and the other to the ghost in the dream.

The way of presenting and revealing dreams in Zaju is also commonly seen in Noh. A typical two-act *mugen* Noh play usually starts with an itinerant priest finding himself coming to stand at a site of historical interest, asking passers-by about a legend associated with the place, and then a local person (the *shite* in transformation) appears from nowhere, revealing its real identity as the ghost of the hero or heroine in the legend before walking offstage. In the second act, the ghost reappears, assuming its physical appearance it had in life, singing and dancing out its previous life, while the *waki* actor remains sitting onstage, playing sleeping and dreaming. The ghost disappears when the day dawns, and not until this moment does the *waki* wake up from his sleep and reveal to the audience that all shown onstage is actually taking place in his dream, thus manifesting the Buddhist view of the world as nothing but a dream, let alone the revival of the dead.

Revenants that feature in the two Zaju plays, the *Bitao hua* and the *Tieguai Li Yue*, are also possessing ghosts. For revenants, possession is very much a means to an end. This has its roots in the Chinese conception of "borrowing a corpse to revive the soul of the dead" (*jieshi huanhun* 借屍還魂), which originates from the belief in Chinese ghost culture that the death of a living person means the death of the body rather than the soul. The soul will split from the body upon death and makes its way to a place of a different dimension from the human world. To revive the dead person is to recall the soul and to have it enter or possess a living body or the body of a new dead which has not yet decomposed. In either case, the revived being will take up the physical appearance of the person whose body is "borrowed" or possessed by the soul but at the same time maintain the vitality and personality of the person whose soul is summoned to enter the body. It is the soul that gives life to a living person, and it is also the soul that determines his personality, or in the American anthropologist

Stevan Harrell’s words, “give his or her individuality.”⁷⁸ As shown in the *Tieguai Li Yue*, an official named Yue Shou 岳壽 died, and soon after his death, his body was burned to ashes as part of a burial ceremony. In order to bring him back to life, a well-preserved body has to be found for the summoned soul to enter, and the body found suitable for this purpose happens to be that of Li Yue, the crippled son of a butcher who died only a couple of days ago. With his soul entering the body of Li Yue, Yue Shou comes back to life, but the revived being insists that he is Yue Shou, although physically he appears to be no other than Li Yue when alive, thus giving rise to much confusion and comic effect.

As said before, the belief in “borrowing a corpse to revive the dead” is native and peculiar to Chinese ghostlore, but the idea of the splitting of soul from body is also found widespread in Japanese culture. In early and medieval times, both Chinese and Japanese believed that the soul would separate itself from the body upon death or at a time of emotional or mental crisis, as vividly manifested in the *Aoi no Ue* 葵の上 and the *Qiannü lihun*.

Aoi-no Ue, the formal wife of Hikaru Genji 光源氏, has been possessed by a phantom, which turns out to be the vengeful spirit of *Rokujo no Miyasudokoro* 六条御息所, the wife of a deceased crown prince and a lover of Genji, whose spirit bursts out of her body torn by jealousy to beat and humiliate Aoi and takes her soul out. It is interesting to note that whereas in the *Aoi no Ue*, the (living) soul of a female person separates itself from its body to possess another living person out of her irrepressible jealousy, in the *Qiannü lihun*, the living soul of a female person splits from the body out of her uncontrollable love.

Girls who come of age for love and marriage are usually depicted as shy, timid, quiet and reserved in traditional Chinese literature, but in this play, Qiannü, as her name suggests, is portrayed as a beautiful young lady (*jiaren* 佳人), an active, ardent pursuer of Wang Wenju 王文舉, a handsome young scholar (*caizi* 才子) to whom she had been betrothed before they were born (*zhifu weihun* 指腹為婚). In contrast, the *caizi* is presented as the passive object of her desire and passion.⁷⁹ For fear of her parents reneging on the antenatal betrothal, the *hun* soul splits from her body on the day when Wang is sent off on a distant journey to the capital to take the imperial examination, follows the scholar all the way, marries him and even bears children with him. With her *hun* soul gone, Qiannü, or more exactly, her body falls ill, becomes bedridden, and does not come back to her former self until her *hun* soul returns to be reunited with the body in three years.⁸⁰

In both Chinese and Japanese ghostlore, as manifested in the *Aoi no Ue* and *Qiannü lihun*, the splitting of the soul from the body does not necessarily lead to the death of the person, but will send him or her into an abnormal mental state of delirium, coma or dream when the body is similarly immobilised like a dead person; in the Chinese case, the disembodied soul may maintain the same corporeal form as its physical body, while living separately and independently from the physical body, and may even be able to bear children.

FINAL DISPOSITION OF GHOSTS IN NOH AND ZAJU

“In Noh there is poetic justice, a judgement against evil within the play,” as Komparu notes, “but it does not take the form of clear reward for good and punishment for evil because there are no characters that are innately evil.”⁸¹ He finds that the final disposition of ghosts in Noh usually takes the following four forms,⁸² as shown in Table 7:

Table 7. Final Disposition of Ghosts in Noh

Spirits of the dead	Prayers for salvation, buddhahood
Vengeful ghosts	Enlightenment, salvation
	Subjugation by power of Buddhist law
Ghostly demons	Combat; defeat
Apparitions	

“For the first two types,” Komparu continues, “it would perhaps be more appropriate to say the granting of forgiveness.”⁸³

It is clear that the final disposition of ghosts in Noh is conceived of under the strong influence of Buddhism with the possible exception of the type of non-human demons and apparitions, whose final disposition is not rendered as religious as is that of the other types of ghosts. The final disposition for the ghosts and spirits in Noh displays much in common with that in Zaju, which ends in most cases positively with the troubled soul reposed, and the dead person resurrected, the wrongs corrected, the wish to be husband and wife fulfilled, and the corrupted spirits enlightened to the truth and delivered into buddhahood or (Daoist) immortality, as shown in Table 10.

Table 8. Final Disposition of Ghosts in Zaju

Vengeful ghosts	Wandering soul haunting the world
	Return to earth with soul set at peace
Love-seeking ghosts	Resurrection and union/reunion with lover
	Return to earth with soul set at peace
Revenants/possessing ghosts	Resurrection as reincarnated
	Enlightenment and salvation
Spirits of plants	Attainment of immortality
	Attainment of buddhahood

However, it must be pointed out that Yuan playwrights, or more accurately, their Ming editors, positively arranged the final disposition of (ghost/spirit) characters by creating for Zaju the scene of “grand reunion” (*da tuanyuan* 大團圓) more out of their

wish to cater for the aesthetic and philosophic need of sophisticated literati for a tighter resolution and at the same time to meet the desire of the pleasure-seeking audience in urban entertainment districts for a happy ending than out of their religious concern.⁸⁴

CONCLUSION

To conclude this paper, I would like to sum up the major points discussed above with emphasis on the differences between Zaju and Noh in their presentation and representation of ghosts and spirits on stage.

In terms of form and format, Noh maintains a direct link between religious and folk beliefs and related rituals, and the distribution of role types, their characterization and performance, usually follow a fixed pattern similar to that of a Shinto-shamanistic ritual. There is not much action involved in a Noh play, and what is presented onstage is basically the recollection of action which culminates in a dance, as the primary interest of Noh is not to present dramatic conflicts or confrontations, but to represent a religious ritual in a most symbolic and abstract way.⁸⁵ As a symbolic art of representation, Noh has its focus on “one cross section of, or one single event in, the life of one person,”⁸⁶ but Zaju, as a drama of action, has its plot built primarily on the interactions and confrontations between characters.

The ontological differences between Zaju and Noh give rise to differences between them in the distribution of roles types, types of characters, and modes of their presentation. In terms of role types, the relationship and interaction between the *shite* and the *waki* in Noh is fixed and predicable with the former usually featuring a ghost and the latter a priest. Whether a ghost is played by a *zhengse* or *waijiao* actor/actress in a Zaju play is, however, determined by the role of this ghost in the overall structure of the story, which may change from act to act with the unfolding of dramatic plot, as typically shown in the *Xishu meng*.

In line with the differences between them in the assignment of role types, the cast of a Noh play is relatively small, usually restricted to the *shite* and the *waki*. In contrast, the number of characters that figure in a Zaju play is not fixed, either, and usually larger than that in a Noh play, because the dramatic plot in Zaju is seldom confined to one single event or one single person. Another noticeable difference between Noh and Zaju is that the former usually feature historical figures, or more exactly, the ghosts of historical figures, whereas the latter, more often than not, fictional or legendary figures.

Closely related to the assignment of role types and the type of ghost/spirit characters they play is the mode of their presentation. Two basic modes of presentation have been identified in Noh: the *genzai* mode and the *mugen* mode, which corresponds to the *genzai* Noh and *mugen* Noh, respectively. But in Zaju, these two modes are often found crisscrossed with each other, thus giving rise to a network structure in its spacio-temporal framework.

As far as types of ghosts are concerned, Zaju shows no significant differences from Noh except that there is no counterpart in Noh for ghosts of the dead revived by borrowing a corpse.

Note

- 1 See, e.g., Jūkei Shichiri 七里重惠, *Yōkyoku to Genkyoku* 謡曲と元曲 (Tokyo: Sekibunkan, 1926); Takemoto Mikio 竹本幹一, “Nō niokeru Kanshibun no juyō” 能における漢詩文の受容, in *Chūsei bungaku to Kan bungaku* 中世文学と漢文学, ed. Wa-Kan hikaku bungaku kai 和漢比較文学会 (Tokyo: Kyūko shoin, 1987), vol. 2, 263-82; Suwa Haruo 諏訪春雄, *Nicchū hikaku geinō shi* 日中比較芸能史 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa koubunkan, 1994); Oka Haruo 岡晴夫, “Lun Ri-Zhong chuantong xiju de yitong—yi ‘Neng’ he ‘Zaju’ wei zhongxin de bijiao” 論日中傳統戲劇的異同—以“能”和元雜劇、歌舞伎與京劇為中心的比較, *Zhonghua qiku* 中華戲曲 1(1986): 68-80; Zhang Zhejun 張哲俊, *Zhong Ri gudian beiju de xingshi: San ‘ge muti yu shanbian de yanjiu* 中日古典悲劇的形式：三個母題與嬗變的研究 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2002), esp. Appendix 2, “Ribei nengyue de xingshi yu Song-Yuan xiqu” 日本能樂的形式與宋元戲曲, 216-31; Weng Minhua 翁敏華, *Zhong Ri Han xiju wenhua yinyuan yanjiu* 中日韓戲劇文化因緣研究 (Shanghai: Xuelin chubanshe, 2004), chap.7.
- 2 Oka Haruo, “Lun Ri-Zhong chuantong xiju de yitong,” 72.
- 3 For a brief description of stage performance of Noh drama in comparison with that of the Kun opera (*Kunqu* 崑曲)—the living fossil of traditional Chinese drama, see Akamatsu Norihiko 赤松紀彦, Komatsu Ken 小松謙, and Yamazaki Yoshiyuki 山崎福之, *Nōgaku to Konkyoku: Nihon to Chūgoku no koten engeki o tanoshimu* 能樂と昆曲：日本と中国の古典演劇をたのしむ (Tokyo: Kyūko shoin, 2009), chap. 3, esp. 41-61. For a detailed description of theatrical performance of Yuan Zaju, see J.I. Crump, *Chinese Theater in the Days of Kublai Khan* (Tucson, Arizona: The Univ. of Arizona Press, 1980), chap. 3, esp. 70-109.
- 4 These common features led the two influential Japanese scholars of the Edo Period 江戸 (1600-1868), Arai Hakuseki 新井白石 (1657-1725) and Ogyū Sorai 荻生徂徠 (1666-1728), to believe that Noh had its roots in Yuan drama. For this note, see Komatsu Ken, “Hajime ni nōgaku to Chūgoku engeki no kankei wa” はじめに 能樂と中国演劇の關係は, in *Nōgaku to Konkyoku*, i-iii. The contemporary Japanese scholar of comparative (Chinese, Japanese and Korean) drama Suwa Haruo holds that Chinese Nuo drama (*Nuoxi*: 傩戲) and Mulian drama (*Mulianxi* 目連戲), among many other Chinese elements of music and performing arts, played a key role in the birth and growth of Japanese Noh. For his studies of Chinese influences on Noh, see Suwa Haruo, “Engeki: Kodai chūsei sangaku” 演劇 - 古代・中世散樂, “Kugutsu ki no seikai” 傀儡子記 ■ 世界, “Nagi to nō” 儺戲 ■ 能, and “Chūsei minkan kagura to na” 中世民間神樂 ■ 舞, in *Chūnichī bunka kouryū shi sōsho* (roku) 中日文化交流史叢書(六), ed. Nakanishi Susumu 中西進 and Yan Shaodang 嚴紹盪 (Tokyo: Taishūkan shoten, 1995), 233-52, 253-61, 262-79, and 280-88, esp. 262-79, and also his *Riben de jisi yu yineng: Quzi Yazhou de jiaodu* 日本的祭祀與藝能：取自亞洲的角度, trans. Ling Yunfeng 凌雲鳳 (Changsha: Hunan meishu chubanshe, 2002), 153-86.
- 5 Yoshinobu Inoura and Toshio Kawatake, *The Traditional Theater of Japan* (Tokyo: Japan Foundation, 1981), 126.
- 6 It is important to note that there are hardly any Yuan playwrights whose years of birth and death are known for sure to us, not to mention the year when an individual Yuan

Zaju play was composed, published or performed, and that there is no hard (textual or contextual) evidence either by which to date an individual play from the late Yuan-early Ming era to the Yuan or the Ming dynasty without engendering any controversy. In view of this, Yuan drama in this study is to be understood in its broad sense to include Zaju plays produced during the late Yuan-early Ming period, as suggested by Zheng Qian 鄭騫, “Yuan zaju de jilu” 元雜劇的記錄, in *Jingwu congbian* (shangbian) 景午叢編(上編) (Taip ei: Zhonghua shuju, 1972), 83.

- 7 In ancient Japan, madness was thought to be caused by spirit obsession or possession. Actually, when Zeami uses *kurui*, the noun form of the Japanese word *kyō* 狂 (mad), to refer to this type of Noh, he means a demon Noh. For this note, see Chifumi Shimazaki, *Restless Spirits from Japanese Noh Plays of the Fourth Group: Parallel Translations with Running Commentary* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. East Asian Program, 1995), 40.
- 8 The table is adapted from Benito Ortolani, *The Japanese Theater: From Shamanistic Ritual to Contemporary Pluralism* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1995), 132-33. It is worth noting that the number of pieces given to each of the five categories in the table is an approximate one and may vary, albeit slightly, from one to another among the remaining five schools of Noh. For the categorization of two hundred thirty-five “Noh plays currently performed,” see Kunio Komparu, *The Noh Theater: Principles and Perspectives*, trans. Jane Corddry and Stephen Comee (New York: Weatherhill, 1983), Appendix 2, 351-52. For the synopsis, classification and authorship of all the plays in the current Noh repertoire, see Nishino Haruo 西野春雄 and Hata Hisashi 羽田昶, *Noh kyōgen jiten* 能・狂言事典 (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1987), 12-163.
- 9 Traditionally classified as a fourth-category Noh, *Dōjō-ji* is usually grouped into the fifth category in modern Japanese Noh scholarship because of the demonic nature of the main character. For this note, see Komparu, *The Noh Theater*, 351.
- 10 No less than 1,000 Zaju plays were produced during the Yuan dynasty, and as many as 736 of them are still known to us by their titles, but only 150 or more are extant to date, accounting for only one-fifth of the known titles. For a complete list of the 736 titles of Yuan drama, see Liu Xiusheng 李愷生 et al. ed., *Yuanqu da cidian* 元曲大辭典 (Nanjing: Fenghuang chubanshe, 2003), Appendix 1, 1-60.
- 11 It must be pointed out that few of them are exempt from being revised, expanded and rectified by their late Ming editors or collectors except for the thirty independent Yuan printings of Zaju that had been grouped together since the eighteenth century under the collective title of the *Yuankan zaju sanshi zhong* 元刊雜劇三十種. However, no one can tell now for sure how much the original state of the Yuan Zaju texts is preserved in the late Yuan editions. For textual criticism of the *Yuankan* editions as compared with Ming editions of Yuan drama, see Stephen H. West, “Text and Ideology: Ming Editors and Northern Drama,” in *Ming Qing xiqu guoji yantaohui lunwenji* (shang) 明清戲曲國際研討會論文集(上, ed. Hua Wei 華瑋 and Wang Ailing 王瓊玲 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiu yuan Zhongguo wenzhe yanjiusuo chouben, 1998), vol.1, 235-84; Wilt L. Idema, “Why You Never Have Read a Yuan Drama: The Transformation of Zaju at the Ming Court,” in *Studi in onore di Lanciello Lanciotti*, ed. S. M. Carletti et al. (Napoli: Istituto Universitario Orientale), 765-91. See also Komatsu Ken and Kim

Moonkyong 金文京, “Shilun Yuankan zaju sanshi zhong de banben xingzhi” 試論元刊雜劇三十種的版本性質, trans. Huang Shizhong 黃仕忠, *Wenxue yichan* 2 (2008): 1-10.

- 12 For the source materials of Yuan Zaju, see Bottom of Form Tanaka Kenji 田中謙二, “Gen zatsugeki no daizai” 元雜劇の題材, in *Tanaka Kenji chosakushū dai 1 kan* 田中謙二著作集第1卷 (Tokyo: Kyūko Shoin. 2000), 95-128.
- 13 This table is adapted from Zhu Quan, “Zaju shi’er ke” 雜劇十二科, in *Taihe zhengyin pu jianping* 太和正音譜箋評, punct., collat., & comm. Yao Pinwen 姚品文 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2006), 38-39. The English translation of the twelve types of Zaju is based on J. Crump and Chunfan Fei, ed. & trans., *Chinese Theories of Theater and Performance from Confucius to the Present* (Ann Arbor: Michigan Univ. Press, 1995), 44.
- 14 Zang Maoxun 臧懋循 (1550-1620), ed. & comp., *Yuanqu xuan*, 4 vols. (1958; rpt. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979). Included in this collection are inety-fohem are from = Northern Drama) 100 plays with six of them (the *Ernü tuanyuan* 兒女團圓 [Reunion with Son and Daughter], the *Jin Anshou* 錦繡, also known as *Jintong yunü* 金安壽 [The Golden Lad and the Jade Maiden], the *Chengnan liu* 城南柳 [The Willow South of the City], the *Wuru taoyuan* 誤入桃園 [Entering the Peach Garden by Mistake], the *Dui yushu* 對玉梳 [The Jade Comb], and the *Xiao Shulan* 蕭淑蘭 identified as coming from the hand of late Yuan playwrights who survived the fall of the Mongol rule of China in 1368.
- 15 Sui Shusen 隋樹森 (1906-1989), ed. & comp., *Yuanqu xuan waibian*, 2 vols. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959). A total of 62 Yuan zaju plays were collected from other sources into this anthology as a supplement to the *Yuanqu xuan*.
- 16 For a brief account of the source materials of Noh, see Yamazaki Yoshiyuki, “Nohgaku no aramashi” 能楽のあらまし, in Akamatsu Norihiko et al., *Nohgaku to Konkyoku*, 3-11.
- 17 No tone markers are given to pinyin in this paper except for the character *guī* 鬼 so as to distinguish it from another Chinese character *guī* 歸 which means “to return” and is often used in early Chinese classics and dictionaries to define *guī*.
- 18 For a pioneering philological and palaeographical study of *guī*, see Shen Chien-shih, “An Essay on the Primitive Meaning of the Character 鬼,” trans. Ying Ch’ien-li, *Monumenta Serica* 2.1 (1936): 1-20, esp. 17-20.
- 19 Gao Ming 高明 and Tu Baikui 塗白奎, *Guwenzi leibian* 古文字類編 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2008), 1353.
- 20 For an excellent review of Pre-Qin Chinese conceptions of ghosts and spirits, see Qian Mu 錢穆, “Zhongguo sixiangshi zhong zhi guishen guan” 中國思想史中之鬼神觀, in *Linghun yu xin* 靈魂與心 (1975; rpt. Taipei: Lantai chubanshe, 2001), 61-114, esp. 61-74.
- 21 Guo Pu, annot., and Xing Bing 邢昺 (932-1010), comm., *Erya zhushu* 爾雅註疏, *Shisan jing zhushu* 十三經註疏 edition (1815; rpt. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1980), 4. 2592.
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 Yang Bojun 楊伯峻, ed., *Liezi jishi* 列子集釋 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979), 1.20.
- 24 Ying-shih Yü, “‘O Soul, Come Back!’ A Study in the Changing Conceptions of the Soul and Afterlife in Pre-Buddhist China,” *HJAS* 47.2 (Dec. 1987): 374.

- 25 For a brief description of the ritual of “summoning the *hun*-soul” in ancient China as recorded in the Three Confucian Books of Rites (*San li* 三禮), namely the *Zhou li* 周禮, the *Yili* 儀禮, and the *Liji* 禮記, see Ying-shih Yü, “O Soul, Come Back!,” 365.
- 26 Lafcadio Hearn, *Japan: An Attempt at Interpretation* (1904; rpt. Charleston, South Carolina: Forgotten Books, 2008), 72.
- 27 Ibid., 17.
- 28 For Suwa Haruo’s view of Chinese influence on Japanese conceptions of ghosts and spirits, see Min Tian, “Chinese *Nuo* and Japanese Noh: *Nuo*’s Role in the Origination and Formation of Noh,” *Comparative Drama* 37.3/4 (Fall/Winter 2003-4): 351.
- 29 See Zvika Serper, “Between Two Worlds: the Dybbuk and the Japanese Noh and Kabuki ghost plays,” *Comparative Drama* 35.34 (Fall/Winter 2001-2002): 348-49. For more about their implications on the performing styles, see H.H. Plutschow, *Chaos and Cosmos: Ritual in Early and Medieval Japanese Literature* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990), 135-57.
- 30 For an inspiring discussion on the influence of religious rituals on traditional Japanese performing arts, see Jacob Raz, “*Chinkon*—From Folk Beliefs to Stage Conventions: Certain Recurring Folkloristic Elements in Japanese Theater,” *Maske und Kothurn* 27:1 (1981): 12-18. See also Serper, “Between Two Worlds,” 348-49.
- 31 Komparu, *The Noh Theater*, 46 -47, to which I add the last three pieces that feature non-sentient animistic spirits.
- 32 Adapted from Komparu, 49-50. It is worth noting that Komparu’s observation here is incomplete in that he does not take into account one-act ghost/spirit Noh plays, such as *Kakitsubata* 杜若 (Water Iris).
- 33 Serper, “Between Two Worlds,” 345.
- 34 *Nuo* 傩 refers to an ancient Chinese rite of exorcism dating from Shang 商 (ca. 16th-11th century BC)-Zhou 周 (11th century-256 BC) times. *Nuo* was later developed into a highly ritualized drama known as Nuoxi performed by shamans who wore masks dancing and singing to exorcise ghosts and spirits and to evoke blessings from gods and deities. For a book-length study of the origins and development of Chinese *nuo* and its influence on Japanese *na* or *tsuina* 追儺 (rituals of exorcism), see Hirota Ritsuko 廣田律子, *Oni no kita michi: Chūgoku no kamen to matsuri* 鬼の来た道: 中国の仮面と祭り (Tokyo: Tamagawa daigaku shuppanbu, 1997), 29-42. For the most informative research in English on the influence of *Nuo* on Noh, see Min Tian, “Chinese *Nuo* and Japanese Noh,” 343-60.
- 35 The Mulianxi is a religious drama combining elements from Buddhism, Nuoxi, and other Chinese folk beliefs and religious rituals with its main story centering on Mahāmaudgalyāyana, or Mulian’s rescue of his mother from hell.
- 36 Lixi 例戲 (exemplary play), alternatively known as Jixiang xi 吉祥戲 (fortune play), Banxian xi 扮仙戲 (immortal play), or Kaichang xi 開場戲 (scene-opening play), refers to a genre of light ritualistic short drama that arose in late Ming and early Qing times and were usually performed as a prelude to the Zhengju 正劇 (serious drama). For a definition of this genre of drama, see Zhang Yuezhong, *Yangju yishi yu xinyang—Zhongguo chuantong lixi juben jijiao* 演劇、儀式與信仰——中國傳統例戲輯校 (Beijing: Zhongguo xiju chubanshe, 2011), 4.

- 37 It seems to have been widely accepted that Yuan drama derived its form from a variety of sources arising from a great complexity of origins since Wang Guo wei 王國維 (1877-1927) published his pioneering research on the history of Chinese drama, *Song-Yuan xiqu shi* 宋元戲曲史 (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1915), but recently in Japan, this multiple-source theory has been forcefully yet controversially challenged by Tanaka Issei 田仲一成, who argues that Yuan Zaju has its roots in the countryside and originates solely from religious and shamanistic rituals, particularly the burial and memorial services conducted to settle down and calm the spirit of the dead (*chinkon* 鎮魂), much as the classical Greek drama and Japanese Noh do. He even identifies traces of the *chinkon* rituals, and *family* festivals and *sacrificial* ceremonies in such Zaju plays as the *Xishu meng* 西蜀夢 (Dream of Western Shu), the *Huo Guang guijian* (The Ghost of Huo Guang Admonishes the Throne), the *Dongchuang shifan* 東窗事犯 (The Plot Under the Eastern Window Is Exposed), the *Tieguai Li Yue* 鐵拐李岳 (Iron Walking Stick Li Yue), the *Yuanjia zhaizhu* 冤家債主 (A Debtor and His Creditor), the *Dou E yuan*, etc. For more about his ethnographical studies of Yuan Zaju as “sacrificial drama” (*saishi engeki* 祭祀演劇), see Tanaka Issei, *Zhongguo jisi xiju yanjiu* 中國祭祀戲劇研究, trans. Bu He 布和 (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2008), chap. 5, esp. 185-212, and 226-30; *Zhongguo xiju shi* 中國戲劇史, trans. Bu He 布和 (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2011), 119-43. For criticism and counter-criticism of his hypothesis, see, i.e., Tanaka Issei, “Xianyi yu yi minsuxue wei jinji de zuofeng—Jiu Zhongguo xiju de fasheng deng wenti da Xie Yufeng xiansheng” 獻疑於以民俗學為禁忌的作風——就中國戲劇的發生等問題答解王峰先生, *Xueshu yanjiu* 3 (2007): 142-46; Xie Yufeng, “Minsuxue dui Zhongguo xiju yanjiu de juxian—Jianda Tianzhong Yicheng xiansheng” 民俗學對中國戲劇研究的局限——兼答田仲一成先生, *Xueshu yanjiu* 9 (2007): 141-45, originally published in *Xishi bian* 戲史辨, ed. Hu 洛地 and Luo Di m0W (Beijing: Zhongguo xiju chubanshe, 2004), ser. 4.
- 38 See Stephen H. West and Wilt L. Idema, ed., trans., & intro., *Monks, Bandits, Lovers and Immortals: Eleven Early Chinese Plays* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2010), xi.
- 39 It is important to note that different from late Ming editions, the Yuan printings of the thirty Zaju plays show no marked form for the *zhe* division, which manifests itself in the musical structure of arias of the play.
- 40 Wilt L. Idema, *The Dramatic Oeuvre of Chu Yu-tun (1379-1439)* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985), 28.
- 41 A typical structure of Tang *daqu* is made up of three sections: the *sanxu* 散序 (beginning random sequence facilitated by instrumental music), 歌 (singing), also called *zhongxu* 中序 (middle sequence), and 破 (fast exposition accelerated primarily by dancing). See Yang Yinliu 楊蔭瀏, *Zhongguo gudai yinyue shigao* 中國古代音樂史稿 (Taipei: Dahong tushu youxian gongsi, 1997), vol.1, 2.31-33. For the influence of *daqu* on the structural principle of *jo-ha-kyū* in Noh, see Min Tian, “Chinese *Nuo* and Japanese Noh,” 343.
- 42 Komparu, *The Noh Theater*, 27.
- 43 Serper, “Between Two Worlds,” 345.
- 44 It is interesting to note that for this very reason, the influential Japanese Noh researcher Nogami Toyochirō 野上豊一郎 (1883-1950) does not consider Noh to be a genre of

- drama, which he defines as presenting onstage two or more than two contemporaries involving themselves in a series of conflicts of interest. See Nogami Toyoichirō, *Nō no yūgen to hana* 能の幽玄と花 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1943), 208.
- 45 Komparu, *The Noh Theater*, 45.
- 46 Some plays have more than one *shite*-like figure, and in these cases, one is the *shite* and the others, defined as subordinate, are called *zure*. It is also worth noting that when we talk about role types in Noh, we should not ignore the role of chorus, which, although it has no identity of its own, often provides background information or fills the gaps of information through singing for the *shite*, and occasionally, for the *waki*, or singing lines that do not clearly belong to any figure on stage.
- 47 For a general description of the role categories of Yuan Zaju, see William Dolby, *A History of Chinese Drama* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1976), 60-61.
- 48 There are occasional exceptions to this—but not many in Yuan Zaju, as exemplified in the *Shengjin 'ge* 生金閣 (A Musical Box), where the *Zhengmo* plays Guo Cheng 郭成 the protagonist in the Wedge and Act I, and in Act II, the singing role is shifted to the *Zhengdan*, who plays an old woman servant (*momo* 嬷嬷), a minor character in this play, and in Act III shifted back to the *Zhengmo*, who plays Judge Bao 包公 trying the murdering case and bringing the villain Pan Yanei 龐衙內, or Master Pang to justice. This is also the case with the *Dongchuan shifan*, the *Shennu'er* 神奴兒, and the *Bitao hua* 碧桃花, (Emerald Peach Flower), in which the *Zhengse* is found playing a minor character in an act where the protagonist makes no physical appearance.
- 49 The term *hundun* is not seen in the Yuan printings of thirty Zaju plays. The earliest known use of *hundun* to refer to the female ghost role is found in the late Ming edition of Yuan drama, *Yuanqu xuan*, in which this word is used in the *Dou E yuan* to refer to the ghost of Dou E and in the *Qiannü lihun* to differentiate the heroine's disembodied soul from her immobilized body designated as the *zhengdan*. On other occasions when a ghost appears, terms such as *dan*, *danhun* 旦魂, or *dan hunzi* 旦魂子 are usually used to refer to a female ghost role, and *hunzi* 魂子 to a male ghost role in Yuan Zaju. For more about *hundun* as a sub-role type of *dan*, see Judith T. Zeitlin, *The Phantom Heroine: Ghosts and Gender in Seventeenth-Century Chinese Literature* (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawai'i Press, 2007), 134-36.
- 50 *YQXWB*, vol. 1, 1-7. This play fails to survive in its entirety. Extant to us are only its arias that have come down to us in the *Yuankan* collection, which gives no information regarding the role type of Zhang Fei 張飛 and Guan Yu 關羽.
- 51 *YQX*, vol. 4, 1499-517.
- 52 Ibid., vol. 3, 929-49.
- 53 Ibid., vol. 3, 1130-45.
- 54 Ibid., vol. 4, 1716-36.
- 55 Ibid., vol. 2, 490-511.

- 56 *YQXWB*, vol. 1, 405-15.
- 57 *YQX*, vol. 2, 705-19.
- 58 *YQXWB*, vol. 2, 581-89.
- 59 *YQX*, vol. 3, 827-41.
- 60 Ibid., vol. 4, 1684-1702.
- 61 Ibid., vol. 1, 386-403.
- 62 Ibid., vol. 4, 1389-409.
- 63 Ibid., vol. 2, 557-76.
- 64 Ibid., vol. 2, 614-31.
- 65 Ibid., vol. 3, 1187-99.
- 66 No role type is marked out in the Wedge for the (spirits of) Old Willow Tree and Peach Stone, as neither of them is involved in any dramatic action at this stage.
- 67 *YQX*, vol. 4, 1335-52.
- 68 Komparu, *The Noh Theater*, 74-75.
- 69 Ibid., 75.
- 70 Ibid., 77.
- 71 Cited in Komparu, *The Noh Theater*, 49.
- 72 Ibid.
- 73 This table is drawn on the basis of Komparu, *The Noh Theater*, 50.
- 74 Yang Bojun, ed. & annot., *Chunqiu Zuozhuan zhu* 春秋左傳注, 4 vols. (1990; rpt. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2006), vol. 3, 1169, 1175-77.
- 75 Ibid., vol. 4, 1292. The translation is adapted from James Legge, trans., *The Ch'un Ts'ew with The Tso Chuen*, in *The Chinese Classics*, 5 vols. (1991; rpt. Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc., 2000), vol. 5, 618.
- 76 Ibid.
- 77 For a very insightful analysis of the crucial role the *waki* character plays in his relationship with the *shite*, see Royall Tyler, "The *Waki-Shite* Relationship in *Noh*," in *Noh and Kyōgen in the Contemporary World*, ed. James R. Brandon (Honolulu: The Univ. of Hawai'i Press, 1997), 65-90.
- 78 Stevan Harrell, "The Concept of Soul in Chinese Folk Religion," *JAS* 38.3 (May, 1979): 527.
- 79 For a book-length study of the stereotypical image of *caizi* portrayed as a handsome, yet somewhat fragile and womanish, young man in traditional Chinese "scholar-beauty" romances, see Geng Song, *The Fragile Scholar: Power and Masculinity in Chinese Culture* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Univ. Press, 2004).
- 80 For more about the Chinese folk belief in the loss of soul resulting in many kinds of diseases and aberrations, see Stevan Harrell, *The Concept of Soul*, 519, 524-25.
- 81 Komparu, *The Noh Theater*, 50.

- 82 Ibid., 51.
- 83 Ibid., 50.
- 84 Wilt L. Idema, “The Many Shapes of Medieval Chinese Plays: How Texts Are Transformed to Meet the Needs of Actors, Spectators, Censors, and Readers,” *Oral Tradition* 20.2 (Oct., 2005): 330.
- 85 It is for this very reason that Nogami Toyochir 野上豊一郎 (1883-1950) did not regard Noh as drama. For this note, see Nogami ToyochirM, *NM no ykgen to hana* 能の幽玄と花 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten), 208.
- 86 Komparau, *The Noh Theater*, 45.

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Approaching “lost love” theme in two culturally different poems: A cognitive linguistic analysis

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1. INTRODUCTION

Poetic discourse poses and promotes a cascade of intriguingly perverted regular cognitive principles especially with the profoundly judicious use of stylistic devices and marvelous esthetic imagery. Among various poetic themes, “Lost love” is a cornerstone in the architecture of poetic domains. All lamentations for a lost beloved and expression of the inwardly severe heartache are associated with the depiction of the outstanding natural beauty and natural hazards. Poets viewed the sense of personal competence against the powerful arms of tragic fates. Most of them grouse; blaming the barbed wire of their fate and fortune and accuse their beloved of stony-heartedness and invulnerability. Moreover, the majority of poets are relieved by evoking pleasant memories from their past and spelling how nostalgic they are in regard with such perfect memories.

This study cognitively approaches the “lost love” theme, hereafter referred to as “conceptual domain”, in two English and Arabic poems. The Arabic poem, Nagi’s “*Burning Flute*”, is chronologically modern with romantic inclination, while the English poem, Shelley’s “*When the Lamp is Shattered*”, is chronologically and poetically romantic (Cf. *Appendix A*). Basically, the employed linguistic tools are Trier’s semantic field theory, to detect the conceptual similarities between the two poems, and semantic mapping to visualize the contrastive cross-cultural conceptualization of “lost love”. Charts and illustrations are used in the practical discussion toward a better delineation of the details. The study addresses the following questions:

1. Can figures of speech be poetically different and conceptually similar?
2. What are the poetic and linguistic similarities and differences in the conceptualization of “Lost Love” in the two poems?
3. What are the most frequently used semantic fields in the two poems?
4. How far can the contrastive semantic map represent cross-cultural conceptualization of “Lost Love”?
5. Can semantic fields be criteria to judge the linguistic richness of a poem?

2. LITERATURE UNDERPINNING:

The recent approach to literary interpretation has revolutionarily changed. The attention is no longer centralized on literary esthetics. Imagery and figures of speech have been cognitively analyzed offering a deeper level of understanding and providing more enlightening interpretations to the reader. Holyoak (1982) has stated that “an essential point to notice is that the initial phase of literary interpretation is essentially the reverse of analogical problem-solving. In the case of problem-solving, the person faces an inadequately understood target problem, and must notice and retrieve a known base analog in order to develop a solution to the target. In the literary case, the idealized reader fully understands the text base, but must notice a covert target topic and then use the text base to generate an analogical interpretation.” This conceptualization has paved the way toward applying the linguistic tools on the literary texts in order to generate such analogical interpretations.

Stressing the significance of linguistics to literature, Shen (1988) in his review “stylistics, objectivity and convention” has concluded that the linguistic facts, in many stylistic analyses, serve to contribute or give rise to the literary interpretation in question, functioning in varying degrees as ‘independent evidence’ of the involved impressions or themes which emerge from the writer’s verbal choices.

Speaking of metaphors, Steen (1989) has suggested that many metaphors in literary texts require a general discourse theory of metaphor for empirically bridging the theoretical and methodological gap. Cognitive psychology and other disciplines, on the one hand, have not extensively concerned with discourse differences such as literature versus non-literature. Literary theory, on the other hand, has recently begun to develop an empirical awareness.

Moreover, Blasko (1999) has highlighted the connotation of a variety of studies that investigated stages of interpretation. The full depth, characteristics and richness of these studies have theoretically deemed to influence comprehension. Results would be confirmed with divergence tasks, measuring different aspects of metaphor understanding to define the outer limit of comprehension and to compare different types of stimuli.

3. BACKGROUND:

3.1 Likeness relations in Arabic and English

Comparison is both a mental process and a figurative device depending on the similarities and differences between two items. Likeness relations in literature are based on this mental process of comparison. Such relations take different poetic realizations; similes and metaphors among others

3.1.1 Metaphors

Arabic metaphors are based on the likeness relationship between two items; source and target domains, yet one of them is typically omitted (Almaany). According to Al- Suyuti (2005), a metaphor is borrowing a certain word well-known for a specific thing, for another word which is not known for it. The purpose of metaphor is revealing what is hidden. Moreover, it is not only a rhetorical figure of speech. It can be a device

of clarification as well. Al-Tahanawi (1996) has highlighted the controversial debate over metaphors; others consider it a “linguistic” figure of speech while others believe that it is a “conceptual” figure of speech. Al-Jurjānī (1991) emphasized that the more the similarities are implied, the more eloquent is the metaphor. Thence, eloquence arises from stimulating the mind to think and search for such hidden similarities. Metaphors are therefore conceptual by nature.

In a similar vein, English metaphors are traditionally viewed as “a figure of speech in which one thing is described in terms of another”. It implies a comparison between two items, and is regarded as the “basic figure in poetry” Penguin Dictionary (1998). Longman Dictionary (2010) expounds that Metaphors are semantically and culturally loaded. Cognitive linguistics, however, proposes a broader understanding of metaphors. Lakoff & Johnson (2003), suggest that metaphors are not only used in poetic language, they are used in our everyday life. They defined a metaphor as “understanding one thing in terms of another”, reflecting our experience of the world. That is to say, metaphors are our experiences and concepts about the world. So, regardless of the poetic use of metaphors, our “conceptual system is metaphorical by nature”. Lakoff & Johnson (2003) added that personification, which conceptualizes human experience with nonhumans in relation to “human motivations, characteristics, and activities”, is “the most obvious *ontological* metaphors”.

Therefore, the two languages study both the figurative use of metaphors and their conceptual function as well. This study adopts the broader linguistic sense of metaphors since every metaphor retains a concept, perception and cognition. To highlight this cognition, metaphors are analyzed into their key elements; the source and target domains. These domains are further analyzed and subcategorized, according to the semantic fields they belong to.

3.1.2 Simile

Simile relations are typically conceptualized in both Arabic and English. Penguin Dictionary (1998) elaborates “the function of similes is to clarify and enhance an image” by explicitly comparing two things. It differs from metaphors in its uses of explicit comparison word such as “as” or “like”. It is extensively employed in prose and verse. In Arabic, the idea of explicitly comparing two items using a likeness word is one of the simile relations. Arabic uses different forms of similes and more comparison words than English; verbs, nouns, phrases, and particles. Similes are not merely figurative of speech in Arabic; they are basic explanation tools used in dictionaries (Helal 2005). The only figurative trope is the implied Similes. It is a complex imagery where one or two implicit metaphors are rationally loaded within an explicit simile.

3.1.3 Metonyms

On the one hand, an Arabic metonym is a word or a phrase used figuratively to convey an associative meaning other than its basic literal meaning. Every metonym has a certain implicature deduced by the listener. The basic difference between Arabic metaphors and metonyms is that the latter is based on likeness. Al-Jurjānī (1991) has clarified that metonyms are based on understanding the concept not the mere words

used. It draws upon an already established concept in the mind. A metonym recalls a previous cognition in the mind conceptually, not linguistically.

Toward understanding this section, let’s pose the following example”: كَثِيرُ رَمَادٍ الْفَرَّ / kəθiɾu rɑ:mɑ:del kədər / is a metonym of hospitality and generosity. Literally, it denotes the abundant amount of ashes and debris of charcoal, using in grilling or cooking, upon serving a banquet. The larger the amount of ashes, the greater is the catered food in the banquet which is a clue of generosity. Etymologically and historically, fire was the only available source for cooking. This is, more or less, obsolete now except for the barbecue banquets. It recently connotes an additional lavish gesture. Lexically, the textual analysis of the phrase does not indicate any hospitality. However, it is now well-established both conceptually and pragmatically.

On the other hand, English Metonymy is “A figure of speech in which the name of an attribute or a thing is substituted for the thing itself” Penguin Dictionary (1998). Longman Dictionary (2010) defines it as the use of “an associated word” to refer to something. The two definitions irritate that the metonymic word and the real concept are related. That is to say using a word from a semantic field is to refer to another word which belong to the same or a similar semantic field. It somehow resembles the symbolism relation in using a “refer to” relationship. Lakoff & Johnson (2003) have indicated that metonyms are cognitively established “referential devices”. They do serve the same function of metaphors; understanding enhancement. However, their primary function is drawing the attention to the “referred to” aspects. Adel (2014) uses a cognitive linguistic definition of metonyms; “indirect reference or reference shift, in which a linguistic sign refers not (only) to its default concept A, but to another concept B, within a single semantic domain.”

In a nutshell, Arabic and English metonyms are linguistically and conceptually different. Arabic metonym depends on the deduced implicature, while the English one is based on the referential relationship. This difference is more crystallized in the two languages’ realization of the synecdoche.

3.1.4 Synecdoche:

Deignan (2005) stated that a synecdoche using “part of an entity to stand for the whole entity”. This “stand for” relationship inspired many linguists to consider it a subtype of metonymy (Lakoff & Johnson 2003, Adel 2014). Lakoff & Johnson asserted that the so-called synecdoche is a special kind of metonyms; as it is based on the “refer to/stand for” relation. It is well established in the cognition system; part-whole formula is a basic concept in painting, portrayal, language, etc. It is conceptually and universally constructed that face stands for a person. Adel (2014) supported their point clarifying that body parts are widely figuratively used. Synecdoche in this sense is conceptualized in Arabic poetics too. This part-stands-for-a-whole relation is one of many relations of a literary trope called “مَجَازُ مَرْسَلٍ” / mægæz mɑ:rsəl / . Body parts are the typical of such relation in Arabic as well. However, it cannot be related to Arabic metonymy by any means; for the different conceptualization and realization of the term “metonymy”.

Using synecdoche, if appropriate, helps writers achieve brevity and gives otherwise common ideas and objects deeper meanings and thus draw readers' attention creatively.

3.1.5 Symbolism

In Arabic literature, a symbol is "an abstract or concrete word refers to a meaning varies according to both the writer's intention and the reader's perception" Abdelnour (1979). That is to say, the symbolic meaning is mutually negotiated between the writer and the reader. Ahmed (1978) has focused the light on the difference between symbolism and reference; symbolism refers to an unfixed meaning, while reference points to a specific well defined one. The literary definition of a symbol does not differ from the literal one, which is the implicit reference to something. Symbolism is a rhetoric strategy enables writers to indirectly address a concept and involve the reader in the writing process.

The traditional viewpoint of a symbol in English points out that the meaning of the sign/symbol is "conventional" in the language Routledge Dictionary (2006). Based on the English definition on a metonymy, Lakoff & Johnson (2003) regarded "cultural and religious symbolism" as "special cases of metonyms". Such symbols reflect the perception and cognition of the real world offering a better understanding of religion and culture. They are as cognitively structured as other metonyms and metaphors. Thus, Penguin dictionary refers to the probable universality of a symbol without ignoring the specificity of some private symbols in a language.

3.2 Semantic fields

Semantic field is a linguistic method of grouping words according to the conceptual domain they belong too. Trier introduced the concept in 1931 following a "holistic systematic" method to study words as part of a larger semantic system. Consequently the meaning of a word is dependent on the other words forming this system. The three tenets of the semantic field theory are: the meaning of a word in a certain lexical domain depends on the meaning of other neighboring words, a lexical field of words portrays the same picture in the reality without "gaps", and the semantic change of a word affects the semantics of whole lexical field it belongs to Longman Dictionary (2010). Words in the same semantic field are linguistically related (out of the semantic relations; synonymy, hyponymy, etc.) and conceptually related (as they represent the human cognition of the world).

3.3 Semantic mapping

One of the most intriguing and intermittently popular components of the grammatical models is "semantic mapping". Semantic maps are also called 'implicational' or 'conceptual'. Croft (2001) preferred to designate them 'spaces'. Since semantic maps only show the relative closeness or distance of relations, not the exact nature of the relations within semantic space. So semantic maps cannot replace cognitive-semantic analyses, but they can supplement them and constrain them in various ways. According to Tomasello (2014), semantic maps function to (1) allows the representation of cross-linguistic similarities and differences. (2) provide objective evidence for which meanings or functions are perceived as similar by speakers. (3) play an important tool for diachrony,

in particular grammaticalization studies by showing that some changes presuppose others and (4) summarize the synchronic relationships between different grammatical meanings

4. APPLICATION AND DISCUSSION:

4.1 Data

The researchers analyze two Arabic and English poems belonging to different poetic eras, but sharing a number of poetic and linguistic features. The Arabic poem "*Burning Flute*" appeared in Ebraheme Nagi's first poetic collection. The collection is centered on the "Lost love" theme. The poetic persona, which is projected by Nagi, is that of a heart-broken man longing for his beloved. So, the overall tone is gloomy and depressed. Similarly, Shelley's "*When The Lamp is Shattered*" is epitomical of his finest romantic lyrics. The poetic persona is, too, a broken-heart man who is bewailing his lost love. The destitute tone is so pessimistic. The overwhelming mood is vulnerability. The overall picturesque is so comparable.

4.1.1 Ebraheme Nagi

Ebraheme Nagi was an Egyptian poet, essayist and author, born in Cairo in 1898. His father, a well-cultured physician, encouraged him to read and appreciate literary works since he was a child. Nagi started composing poetry at the age of 12. He joined the faculty of medicine, commenting on this period "I used to practice medicine as an art and to compose poetry as a science; abide by rules of logic and clarity". His first poetic collection was "*Behind the fog*". It was not well-received by critics; he stopped writing for a while. He was a member of "Apollo's society"; which included a group of great poets all over the Arab world and was known for its romantic inclination. Nagi is best known for his poem "The Ruins". He described his poetry as "the window through which I see life, eternity, and what behind eternity. It is the air I breathe and the medicine I use to heal my soul wounds". (Khaleel 2003 and Daouat-alhaq 2012).

He has composed "*Burning Flute*" at the inception of his poetic experience. In this poem, he is immersed in the darkness of his loneliness and depression, complaining of his mistress who has abandoned him. Motivated by his anguished woe passion, he creates masterpieces of music and poetry. His poetic creations immortalize both his grieve and innovation. They are both a consolation and evocation of his lost love memories. Nagi reveals his sadness and torment to his burning flute, which symbolizes his agonized heart and tormenting thoughts. The flute turns his sadness into beautiful, but grieved, melodies. Both Nagi and the flute exploit their poetic and music innovation, pleading the absent mistress, until her beautiful shadow appears. Once he passionately approaches it, his daydream collapses, and he realizes that he is still alone in the darkness listening only to the echo of his grievous thoughts. Nagi's poem deals abundantly and essentially with the ideal romantic covenants of passion where he laments upon his unfulfilled love oath. The inherent veracity of his deep feelings toward her mistress was evocative enough to inspire these lines to flow in such a powerful expression of love, regret and grief at the end of a relationship. Unexpectedly, he is not mad at her and his daydreams are so much craving to their reunion.

4.1.2 Percy Bysshe Shelley

According to O'Neill (2009), the greatness of the poetry of Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792-1821) does not essentially reside in his capacity to articulate his strong libertarian beliefs. Shelley's importance and achievement as a poet derive from the way in which he tests, dramatizes, anatomizes, and enacts the processes involved in belief or, indeed, doubt. He turns out, surprisingly given the terms of his reputation as a poet hurrying always to exalt principles of liberty, love, and equality. Shelley is a poet of emotional and conceptual extremes conveyed in verse of great distinction, force, and subtlety. He is a poet of desire, of the longing for change, for 'some world far from ours', who writes compellingly about all that thwarts desire. He is to his fingertips a poet of crisscrossing perspectives; if his poetry 'enlarges the circumference of the imagination by replenishing it with thoughts of ever new delight. Classical to his major works are *Ozymandias*, *Ode to the West Wind*, *To a Skylark*, *Queen Mab*, *Alastor*, *The Revolt of Islam*, *Adonais*, and *Prometheus Unbound* (1820).

Percy Bysshe Shelley wrote "*When The Lamp is Shattered*" at the height of his poetic pinnacle, in the last year of his short life, after he was exiled to Italy. Shelley was immersed within a unilateral undisclosed relationship with a married woman, Jane Williams, to whom he addressed most of his best romantic poems including, controversially, this poem. "*When The Lamp is Shattered*" incepts with a catalog of images that predicts the expiry of his poetic creativity: the ruin he suffered by the loss of his love towards the glamorous and beautiful Jane. The poet has, then, become like a shattered lamp; stripped of his genius like the dispersing clouds do to the magnificent rainbow, fragmented like a broken lute that is incapable of producing sweet tones to revive memories of past memories. Accordingly, the gloomy tones are only played. Grief infiltrated deep down in his heart because of this enigmatically eloping world. Disappointment and lovelorn inflamed the poet to render a panorama of his best agonized imagery that go hand in hand with the deep meaning in such unparalleled poetic lines.

4.2 Methodology

Each poem is separately analyzed at the poetic level and at the cognitive linguistic level. First, the poetic images of metaphors, similes, metonyms, synecdoche and symbolism are extracted and analyzed into their source and target domains. Second, the source and target domains are linguistically categorized according to their semantic fields. Finally, a contrastive cross-cultural semantic map is drawn depicting the "Lost Love" conceptual domain for revealing the similarities and differences between the two poems.

The key linguistic tools of analysis are Trier's Semantic field theory and semantic mapping. The researchers were challenged by some words which were difficult to classify; they can belong to two different semantic fields. In such cases, the literal meaning determined the most appropriate semantic field. Monolingual Arabic and English dictionaries were consulted to systematically figure out the basic meaning elements of each word, and thus to accurately select the proper semantic field. The literary devices detected are metaphors, similes, metonyms, synecdoche and symbolism, whether explicit

or implicit. All literary relations are viewed as "something stands for/is similar to something else". This enables the researchers to divide each figurative speech into source and target domains.

Because prosody and lexical terms would be affected by the human translation either superiorly or inferiorly, the two poems were, toward mitigating this liable effect, inter-semiotically retranslated into a sketch (appendix B). The similarity between the two poems is depicted at large.

4.3 Poetic and semantic field analysis of Nagi's "*Burning Flute*"

Figure of speech	Type	Source domain	Semantic field	Target domain	Semantic field
əlailoʊ yaʃə (L2) [lit. night covers]	Metaphor	Dress	Cloth	Night	Darkness
æðˈɑːm (L4) [lit. murk]	Symbol	Darkness	Darkness	Loneliness	Emotions
ædæmʃə lahnən (L5) [lit. craft tears into tone]	Implicit likeness	Tears	Emotions	Melody	Music
æʃɪrə nəjə (L6) [cf. L6, Appendix A]	Implicit likeness	Poetry	Words	Flute	Music
joʊloʊbiː hətˈɑːmən (L7) [cf. L7, Appendix A]	Metaphor	Answerer	Human	Ruins	Destruction
hətˈɑːmən (L2) [lit. ruin]	Symbol	Ruins	Destruction	Memories	Time
ʔʃɛltəhoʊ bɪ goʊwæjə (L8) [lit. I sparked inwardly]	Metaphor	Fire	Nature	Sentiment	Emotions
ənoːr (L9) [lit. fire]	Symbolism	Fire	Nature	Sentiment	Emotions
əriːhoʊ tæðˈruː (L10) [lit. wind scatters]	Symbolism	Wind	Nature	Days	Time
ælbəqɑːjə (L2) [lit. remnants]	Symbolism	Remnants	Destruction	Memories	Past time
mæ ʔtʃəs (L11) ənai / jəʃduː / (L11) mɔrgzːɪn (L14) moʊstˈəʃtefən (L15) [Cf. L11-15]	Extended Metaphor	Person	Human	Flute	Music
tˈəwaɪnə ʃælə hæwæhoʊ (L15-16) [cf. L15-16]	Metaphor	Book	Words	Heart	Body parts
θəʊrɪhɪ (L20) [lit. her mouth]	Synecdoche	Lips	Body parts	Beloved	Human
ʃæfətəjə (L20) [lit. my lips]	Synecdoche	Lips	Body parts	Lover	Human
ʃaɪnæjə (L22) [lit. my eyes]	Synecdoche	Eyes	Body parts	Lover	Human
sˈædɑːjə (L24) [lit. night echo]	Symbolism	Echo	Sound	Memories	Past time

The Arabic words are transcribed in APA (Cf. Appendix C)

Nagi makes an extensive use of both metaphors and symbols in his poem. His metaphors vary targeting emotions, music, destruction and darkness, which are basic elements of his picturesque of “Lost Love”. The strong metaphor of “wæl lailoŷ ƳaƳjə [lit: night covers]” expressively reflect the overall grievous mode of the poem and the psychological state of the poetic personae he projects. Night is likened to a dress which covers the whole body, as night conceals nature and its beauty. Sadness covers his heart in the same way, he feels lost in the darkness of night and sadness. Darkness symbolizes his loneliness and sadness, and corresponds to the other symbols of destruction and powerful nature. Nagi depicts nature as a powerful monster tormenting him. The elements of nature; fire and wind “əna:rou toʊyele fihl [lit: fire delves into it] “wəri:hou tæðʻru: ælbəq:ja” [lit: wind blows the remnants away]”, are cruelly burning his heart and blowing its ashes away. The natural elements are icons of torment and suffering. The body parts synecdoche is the most common in Arabic and English; specially eyes and lips, which usually refers to the Beauty of the Beloved woman. “TḌsäajroŠ ædæm•Y la’nYn [lit: convert tears into a melody]” and “a•YloŠ æfi•rY næjY [make poetry a flute]” cannot be categorized into a certain Arabic figure of speech. The implicit comparison, however, is not to be ignored. Even music is associated with sadness and tears. It is a way to express one’s inner feelings and thoughts. The extended metaphor personifying the flute as a sad person is central to the poem. It reflects the art and music appreciation of “Apollo’s society”. It portrays Nagi’s autism with music and poetry. The flute stands for him with its sad, but captivating melodies, just like the poet’s sad poems. Both convert their sadness into innovative masterpieces of melodies and words.

4.4 Poetic and semantic field analysis of Shelley’s “When the Lamp is Shattered”

Similarly, Philip (2002) confirms that Shelley recruited comprehensively metaphors and simile in this poem. His catalog of metaphors expresses the extent of his bereavement. It starts with the “*shattered lamp/ broken lute and rainbow*” that implicitly describe the speaker’s lovelorn state of desolate poetic imagination. The second stanza continues to utilize creative simile of such a state, like cramped ancient apartment in a ruined monastery or like the doleful sea-wind and crashing waves that hit the death knell for a drowned sailor. The third and fourth stanzas delineate a central personification metaphor where it personifies love as a nesting eagle that bemoans the frailty of the heart’s affection. it denotes the possession by a strong emotional attachment. The explicit similes of storm and sun integrate with pervasive eagle metaphor to crystalize the wintry embitterment of the poet with his lost love.

To contrast, Nagi has invested his grief to flame up his poetic muse. Shelley resorted to isolate himself and allow his ecstatic poetry to get tarnished secondary to the same agony. Overall, music has sympathized through burning; either the burnt musical device or the burning melodies. Nature has been ironically amalgamated constitutently through a cloudy moonless sky, strong gusts of wind blowing, mocking sun and hauling jet darkness that wrapped the bereaved lover. Body parts quivered; the heartily beats have been compromised, lips trembled and mumbled with no more

Figure of speech	Type	Source domain	Semantic field	Target domain	Semantic field
<i>lamp</i>	Implicit Metaphor	Lamp	Light	poetic creativity	words
<i>Dead Light</i>	Implicit Metaphor	Light	Nature	Lost love	Emotions
<i>Light lies dead</i>	Personification	Light	Illumination	Dead person	human
<i>The dust</i>	Metonymy	Dust	Destruction	Termination	Destruction
<i>Scattering cloud</i>	Implicit Metaphor	Cloud	Nature	Robbing his poetics	Destruction
<i>[Infiltrated] rainbow</i>	Implicit Metaphor	Rainbow	Nature	Palin poetry	Words
<i>Broken lute</i>	Implicit Metaphor	Lute	Music	Lovelorn state	emotions
<i>Speaking lips</i>	Synecdoche	Lips	Body part	Human	Human
<i>Remembered tones</i>	Symbolism	Tone	Sound	Halcyon days	Time
<i>Music survives not</i>	Personification	Music	Music/sound	Human	Human
<i>Splendor survives not</i>	Personification	Splendor	Emotions	Human	Human
<i>Echoes of the heart</i>	Metonymy	Echo	Sound	Unilateral love	Emotions
<i>Heart</i>	Synecdoche	Heart	Body parts	Human	Human
<i>No songs</i>	Metonymy	Songs	Sound	Lovelorn state	Emotions
<i>Mute spirit</i>	Personification	Spirit	Body part	Human	Human
<i>but sad dirges Like the wind through a ruined cell,</i>	Simile	Sad dirges	Sound	Wind	nature
<i>Sad dirges</i>	Metonymy	Dirges	Sound	Melancholy and embitterment.	Emotions
<i>Dead seaman’s knell</i>	Metonymy	Knell	Sound	Mortality	Destruction
<i>O love!</i>	Personification	Person	Human	Love	Emotions
<i>cradle, home, bier</i>	Symbols	<i>cradle, home, bier</i>	Place	life stages	time
<i>passions will rock thee, As the storms rock the ravens</i>	Simile	Passion Thee	Emotions Human	Storms Ravens	Nature Birds
<i>Bright reason will mock thee, Like the sun from a wintry sky</i>	Simile	Reason Thee	Thinking Human	Sun Wintry sky	Nature Nature
<i>Leaves fall</i>	Symbol	Leaves	Nature	End	Time
<i>Wintry sky</i>	Metaphor	Sky	nature	Heartily wintry embitterment	Emotions
<i>Cold Wind</i>	Symbol	Cold wind	Nature	Fear	Emotions

love accents, and spirits got lost (Cf. figure 1). Both poems develop their organic consistency through accurately selected words and imagery. Eventually, Nagi’s poem was sealed by an eluding daydream that, upon vanishing, harvested no more than wishes. Shelly concluded up, pessimistically, using a similar gloomy image: the destruction image he started with plus more darker texture. That is to say, “lost love/ lovers” can speak the same language regardless of their genealogy.




Figure 1: a chart describes the frequency distribution of semantic fields in both poems

4.5. Semantic mapping of the “Lost love” conceptual domain in Nagi’s and Shelley’s poems

The following diagram maps the recruited semantic fields in both Nagi’s and Shelley’s poems

Echo Music (melody- flute- sing)	Sound	Lost Love	Sound	Lute- music song- tones - knell- echoes- dirges
Fire Wind	Nature		Nature	Cloud –dust- rainbow- sky- Storms- Sun
Dress	Cloth		Cloth	N/A
Loneliness – ars – sentiment	Emotions		Emotions	Loved- Passions- mocking splendor
Book- poetry	Words		Words	Poetry
Heart- lips – eyes	Body parts		Body parts	heart- lips –spirit
Night	Darkness/ Light		Darkness/ Light	Lamp –light
Memories Days	Time		Time	Remembered- survive- bewail
Ruins Remnants	Destruction		Destruction	Broken- dead – ruined- shattered
Lover Beloved Answerer Sad person	Human/ animal		Human/ animal	Human - Eagle
N/A	Location / stages		Location / stages	Cradle-home – bier- nest.

4.6 Statistical findings:

By calculating the Pearson Correlation Coefficient (R), which measures the strength and direction of the relationship between two variables, of the two frequent semantic fields for both Nagi and Shelley, the value of R was 0.56. Conducting the same test on the logarithms of the given values rendered a score of 0.51. Both values show a moderate positive correlation, which means there is a tendency for high similarity between Nagi’s usages of semantic fields to go hand in hand with Shelley’s. Initially, the test was performed using the same sorting of superordinates in figures 1 (alphabetical). Rationally, sorting the same set according to the most frequent or least frequent yielded the same result (no value difference).

CONCLUSION:

This study has analyzed the conceptual domain of “Lost love” in two Arabic and English poems. It adopts the cognitive linguistic approach to explore the simile, metaphors, symbolism, metonyms and synecdoche. It relies on Trier’s semantic field theory in the linguistic analysis of the mentioned poetic devices. It draws a contrastive semantic map of the two poems based on the poetic and linguistic analysis.

The two poems share the same conceptual domain of “Lost Love”. While Nagi depends poetically symbolizing nature and music, Shelley extensively uses similes comparing his grief and pessimism to natural and musical elements. The two poets, however, conceptually use very similar semantic fields of; nature, destruction, emotion, time, music and words. They differ in the incidence of usage and in the poetic forms they employ. The contrastive semantic map illustrates the relative semantic richness of Shelley’s poem in terms of the used lexes under the semantic fields. The semantic fields are statistically correlated, which suggests the universal cross-cultural cognition of this conceptual domain.

LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

The study examines the validity of the mentioned methodology in cross-cultural analysis poetic conceptual domains. However, it has certain limitations. First, the analyzed data are two poems, so the results cannot be generalized. Second, the study poetically focuses on five figures of speech, the most frequent in the two poems, and draws upon their semantic mapping. More comprehensive analyses of all the figurative devices are required, especially for longer poems. A larger scale of “corpus analysis” is recommended to draw a more representative picture of any conceptual domain in a given poetic era.

Appendix-A

1. Nagi's poem and its translation

Line	Translation	Transcription (IPA)	Text	
	How often, my love, had	kəm məɾətən jæ hæbi:bi:	كم مرة يا حبيبي	1
	Nights got people overwhelmed?	wəl lailoo ɣayfə ælbəɾə:jə	والليل يغشى البرايا	2
	While I, alone , wandered;	?hi:moʊ wæhdi wæmə fi	أهيم وحدي وما في	3
	No moaners, through the murk, did.	æðʔəla:mi: jækin soʊwæjə	الظلام شاك سوايا	4
5	From tears, I craft a tone,	ɔ:s'ajroʊ ædæmʔə lahnən	أصيرُ الدمعُ لحناً	5
	And make poetry a flute.	wə ʔgʕəloʊ æfɪʕrə nəjə	وأجعلُ الشعرَ نايًا	6
	Would've been the ruin	wə joʊlobi: hətʔə:mən	وهل يُلتي حطام	7
	Of my grieved soul that I sparked	?ʕəltəhoʊ bi goʊwæjə	أشعلته بجوايا	8
	Fire is gutting it more;	ənd:roʊ toʊyelə fɪhi	النارُ توغل فيه	9
10	The wind scatters the remnant.	wəri:hoʊ tæðʔru: ælbəqə:jə	والريخُ تذرُو البقايا	10
	How sad the flute's under	mæ ʔtʕəs ən nai bain əlmoʊnə	ما أتعنُ الناي بين المنى	11
	The flanks of hopes an' ultimate fate	wə bain əlmənəjə	وبين المنيا	12
	It plays sadly and sings;	jəfdu: wə jəfdu: hæzi:nən	يشدو ويشدو حزينا	13
	Repeating my very grumble;	mɔrgə:ʕn jækwæjə	مرجعا شكوايا	14
15	Pleading whose passion is	mostʔəgə:ʕtefən mən t'əwainə	مستعظفا من طوبيا	15
	heartily folded so well	ʕælə hæwæhoʊ ət'əwə:jə	على هواء الطوايا	16
	As yet to cast a shade;	hætə jæləʊh xæjælən	حتى يلوح خيال	17
	From my boyhood, I knew it,	ʕæriʔtəhoʊ fi s'ibə:jə	عرقته في صبايا	18
	Approaching me and so did	jædnəʊ ʔlaɪə wə tædnəʊ	يدنو إلى وتكنو	19
20	My lips that the mouth kissed.	mən θəyrihi jæfətəjə	من ثغره شفتايا	20
	It's when my dream vanished,	ʔiðə bihi:mi: təlæfə	إذا بحلمي تلاشى	21
	my eyes drove fully alert;	wə əstaiqæðʔt ʕainəjə	واستيقظت عينايا	22
	I have carefully checked:	wə roʊhtəʊ ʔs'yi: wə ʔs'yi:	ورحت أصغى. وأصغى	23
	Nil but my echo to get!	ləm ʔifi ʔilə s'əda:jə	لم ألب إلا صدائيا!	24

2. Shelley's Poem: "When The Lamp is Shattered"

- When the lamp is shattered
The light in the dust lies dead -
When the cloud is scattered,
The rainbow's glory is shed.
- 5 When the lute is broken,
Sweet tones are remembered not;
When the lips have spoken,
Loved accents are soon forgot.
- 10 As music and splendor
Survive not the lamp and the lute,
The heart's echoes render
No song when the spirit is mute -
No song but sad dirges,
Like the wind through a ruined cell,
Or the mournful surges
That ring the dead seaman's knell.
- 15 When hearts have once mingled,
Love first leaves the well-built nest;

- 20 The weak one is singled
To endure what it once possessed.
O Love! who bewailest
The frailty of all things here,
Why choose you the frailest
For your cradle, your home, and your bier?
- 25 Its passions will rock thee,
As the storms rock the ravens on high;
Bright reason will mock thee,
Like the sun from a wintry sky.
From thy nest every rafter
Will rot, and thine eagle home
30 Will rot, and thine eagle home
Leave thee naked to laughter,
When leaves fall and cold winds come

Appendix B: A sketch portraying the two poems

Modified IPA Chart



Appendix C: IPA Arabic chart

CONSONANTS:

/b/ bank -- /d/ do + AmE /t/ better, pretty -- /dʒ/ judge -- /f/ food -- /g/ gold -- /h/ hot -- /k/ class --
/l/ Long -- /l/ Level -- /m/ master -- /n/ no -- /ŋ/ Sing, long-- /p/ put -- /r/ with trilling Italian grazie
-- /s/ sit -- /ʃ/ shoe -- /t/ tank -- /tʃ/ tree -- /θ/ think -- /ð/ there -- /v/ love -- /w/ wife -- /j/ You --
/z/ zero, these /ʒ/ pleasure.

VOWELS:

/æ/ bad-- /i/ need -- /ɪ/ win -- /ɑ/ father -- /ɔ/ all -- /u/ ooze -- /ɛ/ get -- /ʊ/ book-- /ʌ/ hot
(BrE)-- /ʌ/ run-- /ə/ about-- /ɜ/ Bird -- /ər/ Better-- /aɪ/ ice-- /ɪə/ ear-- /oʊ/ below-- /ɔɪ/
boy -- /aʊ/ now -- /ɛə/ air -- /aɪər/ tire -- /aʊər/ flower-- /əʊər/ employer

SPECIAL SOUNDS AND SYMBOLS:

- /ʔ/ Glottal stop (Voiceless). you can hear it in trying the word battle without /t/ baʔle
- /h/ Epiglottal Pharyngeal Fricative (Voiceless) as in Finnish tähti and Portuguese marca.
- /sˤ/ Emphatic dental (Voiceless) Heavier than /s/ sound in subway
- /dˤ/ Heavier than /d/ sound in duck and mud
- /tˤ/ Emphatic dental stop (voiceless) Heavier than the /t/ sound in but and cut
- /ðˤ/ Emphatic dental Fricative (voiced) Heavier than the /ð/ sound in mother.
- /ʕ/ Epiglottal-Pharyngeal Fricative/approximant (Voiced) as in Danish ravn, Dutch rad and Portuguese armando
- /ʁ/ Velar Fricative (Voiced) As in the /R/ sound in the French word jour, chauffeur and soir
- /q/ Uvular stop (voiceless) Heavier than the /k/ sound in cut
- /x/ Velar Fricative (Voiceless) as in the scot word loch and German auch

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Rescinding Orthodoxy, Resuscitating the Mother Tongue: Daughter Tongue interference in African Female Narratives

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The *Bildungsroman* remains one of the most remarkable contributions that German cultural arts have made to the ever growing vocabulary of international literary studies. The form offers a vibrant template to appreciate the relationship between human development, environment and the socio-cultural context in which the developmental process is negotiated. The *Bildungsroman* is associated with the growth process of a male character who achieves a harmonious relationship with his social surroundings after a more or less conflictive process of acculturation (Karafilis 63); the sort of novel in which the main protagonist develops his personality throughout the narrative in the key life stages from adolescence to maturity (Estébanez Calderón 99). Nadal M. Al-Mousa defines the *Bildungsroman* as a type of novel in which action hinges on the fortunes of an ambitious young hero as he struggles to live up to his poetic goals against the negative forces of prosaic reality. The typical hero in the novels of development is a male who “grows up in a humble family in the provinces, but, endowed with an adventurous spirit, leaves home to seek his fortune and realize his ambitions” (223).

The prototypical exemplum of the *Bildungsroman* protagonist is the German author Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s 19th century hero Wilhelm Meister, who embarks on a quest “[...] to seek self-realization in the service of art [...]” (Buckley, 9). The aim of the young artist’s quest is self-development and improvement through a series of challenges and trials encountered along the way as he journeys towards the realization of the self. The *Bildungsroman* genre encompasses the *Entwicklungsroman* (novel of general growth), the *Erziehungsroman* (novel of educational development) and the *Künstlerroman* (novel of artistic realization). Interestingly, my focus is on the *Bildungsroman*, or the novel of development, per se.

Feminist literary criticism is a veritable medium which has given room for alternative appreciation of the gender drama in the literary enterprise and business of intellection. Invariably, the most outstanding contributions of feminist literary criticism has been its assertion that literary genres, like most cultural products, explore not just a one-sided socio-historical and cultural orientation, but also a sexual one as well. The *Bildungsroman* becomes an ideal case in point. As noted above, the genre of the

Bildungsroman is primarily Western, the characteristics ascribed to it, both thematic and structural, have usually referred to the traditional male variant defined in 1913 by Wilhelm Dilthey:

A regulated development within the life of the individual is observed; each of its stages has its own intrinsic value and is at the same time the basis for a higher stage. The dissonances and conflicts of life appear as the necessary growth points through which the individual must pass on his way to maturity and harmony (qtd in Swales 3).

However, for the last several decades, the foremost reference on the British novel of formation has been Jerome Hamilton Buckley’s *Season of Youth: The Bildungsroman from Dickens to Golding*, published in 1974. The book presents a broadly taxonomic definition of the genre. Buckley contends that, the *Bildungsroman* is a novel that portrays all but two or three of a list of characteristics, among them “childhood, the conflict of generations, provinciality, larger society, self education, alienation, ordeal by love, the search for a vocation and a working philosophy” (18). Buckley’s seminal work gives the anatomy of the typical *Bildungsroman* as a narrative where:

A child of some sensibility grows up in a country or provincial town, where he finds, constraints, social and intellectual, placed upon the free imagination. His family, especially his father, proves doggedly hostile to his creative instincts or flights of fancy, antagonistic to his ambitions, and quite impervious to new ideas he has gained from un-prescribed reading. His first schooling, even if not totally inadequate, may be frustrating in so far as it may suggest options not available to him in his present setting he therefore, sometimes at quite an early age, leaves the repressive atmosphere of home, (and also the relative innocence), to make his way independently to the city (in English novels, usually London). There his real education “begins not only his preparation for a career but also and often more importantly his direct experience of urban life. The latter involves at least two love affairs or sexual encounters, one debasing, one exalting, and demands that in this respect and others the hero reappraises his values. By the time he has decided, after painful soul searching the sort of accommodation to the modern world he can honestly make, he has left his adolescence behind and entered upon his maturity. His initiation complete, he may visit his old home, to demonstrate by his presence the degree of his success or the wisdom of his choice (17-18).

From Buckley’s succinct anglicized structure of the genre, the growth of the protagonist occurs according to pattern; the sensitive, intelligent protagonist leaves home, undergoes different states of conflict and growth, is tested by crisis and love affairs, then finally finds the best place to utilise his/her unique talents. However, Buckley’s elastic thematic and taxonomic approach to the genre makes the concept lithe, corresponding well to the general free-floating use to which the term *Bildungsroman* has been put in the English-speaking world.

The early 1980s engendered new conceptual approaches to the novel of formation which radically transformed the discipline. Tobias Boes (2006) opines that several factors contributed to this new direction of the genre. One of such factors was the remarkable number of outstanding studies which made the fruits of German research available to English speakers for the first time (Bruford, Beddow, Miles, Swales). The second factor that contributed to this new direction of the genre was the impact of structuralism which encouraged comparatists to approach the genre no longer merely as an inductive and taxonomic construct, but to look rather at large-scale symmetries across European traditions. Thirdly, the impact of Fredric Jameson's *The Political Unconscious* presented a dialectical and historical dimension to genre criticism that contributed greatly to adjusting the rigid traditional structures. Jameson aptly contends that literary genres are "experimental constructs" (145) which are regularly renegotiated by new works that come into contact with them. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, feminist critics revolutionized the genre as they began to examine the phallogentric thrust of both traditional novels of formation and the literary criticism that dealt with them. By thus calling attention to the link between aesthetics and ideology, rhetoric and reality, these critics inaugurated a standard and tradition that was initially neglected in previous Anglophone *Bildungsroman* scholarship.

A book which occupies an inaugural and canonical position in this regard is the groundbreaking contribution, *The Voyage In: Fictions of Female Development*, edited by Elizabeth Abel, Marianne Hirsch, and Elizabeth Langland. This book indicated a paradigm extension or expansion, and not a shift, as some critics have noted. This study contends that the publication of *The Voyage in* only extends the paradigm because it considered specifically the issue of gender – the exclusion of female development in previous studies on the form. Though the authors carefully distinguished between the male and the female variants of the genre, their attempt to strike a polarity does not exhibit remarkable distinction from the male variant. The emergence of the female tradition only broadened the tradition. The polemics begins from the introduction of the volume, where the editors registered their disgust over critics' lack of consideration of the gender equation in previous Anglophone *Bildungsroman* scholarship. The postcolonial female *Bildungsroman* this essay deals with constitutes part of that extension.

Moreover, recent postcolonial African female narratives seem to have extended the form beyond just the dialectic of progress and fulfilment. The Postcolonial African female *Bildungsroman* does not only articulate the burden of growing-up for female characters; it has equally reacted against and subverted it in order to assert alternative views of subjectivity and ways of becoming adult. These narratives demonstrate how female characters face their own inner turmoil and negotiate ways of bending the barriers of tradition without completely violating or destroying them. Although the *Bildungsroman* theoretically evolved from the West, the experience of growth is incontestably universal. I therefore, attempt to argue that the form cannot be confined to a masculine tradition which celebrates the process of becoming of a male protagonist,

but it has also become a template which vibrantly signifies the distinctions between the growth processes of both male and female protagonists and most importantly, it foregrounds the female subject in the process of *womaning*. *Womaning* in this context gives expression to the complex and cumulative process of growing up for the girl-child. The term articulates the numerous stages the girl-child undergoes to become a woman in a patriarchal space. Furthermore, it underpins the variety of ways the girl-child struggles to find her voice and claim space for herself as a woman. Interestingly therefore, the term becomes the calibrating indices with which to ascertain how successful the female protagonists in these texts negotiate their growth process from girlhood to womanhood. Invariably, the *Bildungsroman* for the female writer becomes a collective trajectory of ideological training entrenched in the narrative shaft of individual growth.

This essay among other things, examines how the authors of purposively selected narratives explore trope of the daughter as a strategy for drawing attention to the burden of growing up for the girl-child. The essay equally appraises the daughter as agency in the process of identity formation in postcolonial African women's narratives. This will in turn help to foreground the various rebellious strategies the protagonists of these narratives employ to locate, retrieve their voices and claim space to render themselves visible and liberate their mothers from burdens of tradition. Azuah's *Sky High-Flames*, Adichie's *Purple Hibiscus*, Dangarambga's *Nervous Conditions* and Atta's *Everything Good Will Come* form the basis for textual analysis.

The African female *Bildungsroman* falls into the compass of texts described as novel of "self-discovery" (Felski, 133), even though there are slight or slim distinctions from the traditional variant which charts the story of a young man leaving the periphery and going to the metropole which dazzles as a perfect ideal of universal modernity. The African female *Bildungsroman* has four distinct characteristics. To understand why the novels chosen for analysis fall within the geometry of the African female *Bildungsroman*, the essay defines the paradigm and makes glaring the traits that make up this variant. Although Pin-chia Feng argues that both the male and female *Bildungsroman* share in the belief that there is a "coherent self, faith in the possibility of development, insistence on a time span in which development occurs, and emphasis on social context" (11-12), the female development is characterised by socio-cultural closure where her developmental progression is rather clouded and stunted.

Society in the narratives chosen for analysis, denies the girl-child those photosynthetic positionings and opportunities through which she can generate energy from the outside to animate her growth process. For the girl-child to grow up, she builds up from the inside rebelliously in order to transcend her gender limitations because of her desire for freedom, self-fulfilment and dignity on the one hand and attaining her goals as an individual on the other. The insistence of growing up independently outside the patriarchal acceptable standards makes these female characters negotiate their identity outside the ideal and construct their identity in an 'in-between space. The most controversial challenge the girl-child encounters in her

growth process is her struggle to overcome the patriarchal dictates of her society which has been designed to curtail her ambitions. This pre-designed developmental graph of the girl-child eventually makes her grow apart from the society.

The restrictive arrangement turns them into nuisance¹ because they rebel against the dominant order and negotiate their existence outside the popular phallogcentrically defined centre of morality. Thus the major concern of these female narratives of growing-up borders on how the power configuration defines the relationship of both sexes in familial and civic spheres. Simply put, it defines how the powerful relates to the powerless. This will bring to the foreground the operations of systems of power relations as well as the practices of their textual resistance to them. The systems of power relations, in this context, refers to (neo)-colonialist and patriarchal discursive practices, which are embedded in the textual space of these writers' prose and polemic, on the one hand, and also operate on the production and reception of their writings, on the other. As Clifford J. Kurkowski (2005) argues, "the transformation of a character is an important element in the African-American female *Bildungsroman*" (6). This transformation is not sudden or galloping, but rather incontrovertibly programmatic and uncompromisingly progressional.

The growth process of the girl-child begins with an inarticulate provocation of an awakening, when the character becomes aware that her condition of life is a limitation to the aspiration of a better future. She begins to exhibit tendencies of her resentment for and discontent with her circumstance, which she hopes to transcend. The reference to circumstance in this context could be spatial and at the same time psychological. The recognition of this awareness of a salient awakening prompts the character to question her values as a human being or a victim, her social status and her gender. Secondly, the main character gains self-awareness through her relationships with a network of women, who guide and support her in becoming self-reliant in a society ruled by phallogcentric standards. This network provides the character with moral guidance in the face of gender adversity. Thirdly, the character explores her femininity and begins redefining her identity as she journeys into adulthood.

Finally, as the character reaches a point of maturity and independence, she concludes her transition or journey of self-discovery². The character reaches this pinnacle with the help of women who guide and guard her. It must be noted that some female *Bildungsromane* follow this paradigm more closely than others; it is not an exact blueprint, but in order to easily commit the structure of the African female *Bildungsroman* to memory, the shorthand description of this variant is that it is a novel of formation or "awakening" that maps and traces the development of a female protagonist through the rite of passage: from childhood innocence and ignorance through various experiences, usually involving a spiritual crisis into maturity and eventual recognition of her role in the social system.

Besides exploring the mother-daughter relationship in these texts, the essay essentializes how daughters rebel against the moral-ethical codes of their various societies in order to come to terms with challenges of *womaning* and constructing identity for themselves. The strategic rebellion of the daughters is what I call daughter

tongue interference – the refusal to allow the mothers' stories to be re-enacted in their lives. These strategies take different shapes and shades. However, it is end result derivable from the rebellious strategies that is of utmost importance for our analysis.

Sky-High Flames begins with a startling announcement of the exigent and exacting responsibilities of occupying the marginal privileged position of the eldest daughter and child of an African family in a rustic pastoral community:

I was almost driven to hate my parents. My father never approved of anything I did. He felt he knew what was best for me, and my mother picked on me like a bird with a sharp beak. As the first daughter, I've always had to cater to everyone's needs but any minute spent by myself was called daydreaming. Maybe my father was impatient because he had two wives. He was either settling a quarrel or wondering what they were up to. They kept him busy. The first he inherited from his father. My mother, he married out of love. Maybe my mother was afraid I would fail her as a first daughter if she were not harsh with me. But for whatever reason my parents were the way they were, I couldn't wait to leave home and attend high school (7).

The protagonist Ofunne, is trapped within the familial base, where her growth process suffers arrested development. Ofunne's home is not without problems, there are serious tensions within and as such her parents spend more time ensuring that the tensions do not lead to rupture. However, from a very tender age Ofunne's destiny has been decided. She is to remain docile in the domestic domain where she has to understudy her voiceless mother in order to survive as a wife and mother. Her upbringing is strictly domestic in order that she becomes reticent to adequately fit into the office of an object or a mere ornamentation in her future home. Parenting, for Ofunne's parents is geared towards creating a daughter who is likely to lead a moronic marital life in the future. Her parents would do anything to ensure that the route to her destiny is not altered in any way.

She becomes ensnared at a very tender age. Although her parents' plans for her to become a fulfilled woman are a recipe for her disaster, she pragmatically and psychologically maps out strategies for her liberation from the imposed lethargic state that her parents intend to plunge her into. The leeway from her entrapment is education. According to F.M.L. Thompson "an education was a passport to respectability and a necessary ticket for entry into many trades" (136). Hazal Carby (1987) amplifies Thompson's position on the importance of education for the girl-child when she opines that education of females with prompt social changes can move women into a different sphere where they are no longer subject to domestic positions which outrageously demonstrate their inefficient use of human resources, which in turn leaves their potentials grossly unutilized. Ofunne as a girl-child already understands societal biases against her feminine status and that as a girl her existence is biddable. She also knows that education is necessary for the girl-child, as it equips her with the appropriate knowledge and skills necessary to creating self-identity and contributing to societal development.

Azuah uses the *Bildungsroman* to articulate the importance of bonding as strategy for transcending the dictatorial temperament of patriarchy in both familial and civic sites, and the dangers of the experience of separation as obstacle for successful *Bildung*. This is so because Ofunne suffers most when removed from the midst of other women. Azuah's appropriation of the form equally reveals how women can negotiate their existence around the margins, without compromising their sexuality. The protagonist, Ofunne continues to disappear as she develops. This is as a result of her background; she is from a family that can barely afford regular meals. Thus when the opportunity comes to off load her into matrimony, her father does not hesitate. The unfortunate marriage eventually marginalizes her completely because she is deprived of any space for self assertion. As her crisis deepens in the only space left for survival – the kitchen, she rebels against the popular norm of tradition by refusing to be defined as a successful woman by matrimonial standards. She beats up her mother-in-law and liberates herself from the suffocating borders of marriage. By this assertion of her desire for freedom her growth process runs counter to the traditional form of the *Bildungsroman* because she grows against the very standard by which her society defines the successful African woman. Rather than been socialised her identity stands in opposition to the moral-ethical standards of the society. Beating a mother-in-law is a taboo, but the act itself is what eventual frees her from the Okolos. Ofunne is tormented by an existential discontent and disruption of selfhood, stemming from her privileged marginal position as eldest daughter. Invariably, she counters the process of her integration into a society that threatens her wish for self-assertion and self-definition.

Ofunne's *Bildung* may be confused as a failed growth process, because she seems to fail at every attempt to liberate herself from the phallocentric dictates of her society. However, her refusal to be beaten down and the willingness to start afresh every time her growth process is curtailed by patriarchal forces is an eloquent expression for the continuous search for a viable self. Azuah gives voice to the ordinary experiences of a young African girl, by letting Ofunne tell her own coming-of-age story, thus articulating the subjective experiences of the female "I" who resists entrapment within socio-cultural norms and expectations. The narrating "I" stands in a dialectic relationship to her socio-cultural context, and it is through the very act of constructing and telling her own story that Ofunne resolves the contradictions that inform her life. Her quest for education, that is, her search for a viable self, becomes a leitmotif throughout the novel. It is significant that in the course of the story the initial "we," Ofunne's sense of herself as being part of the collective identity of her family, gives way to the subjective "I" who begins to audit and edit herself from the context of her community.

Adichie's *Purple Hibiscus* begins in *media res*, realized through flashbacks. The novel eloquently maps the physical and psychological development of the protagonist, Kambili, and her brother, Jaja. However, Kambili occupies the focal point of this evolutionary process. From childhood, Kambili's growth process is not dynamic, but fogged up. The development of the protagonist and her brother designate their

struggle to define themselves beyond the stiffened and funless world their Calvinistic father has designed for them. Their fussy mercantile father builds a world that lacks ventilation that will guarantee a steady relationship with the outside when the inside becomes too suffocating. The narrative is woven around Palm Sunday, yet the development of the protagonist and her brother has a quadrilateral dimension; their father's mansion at Enugu, school, church and Nsukka. Nsukka has the most amazing effect on their developmental process. Adichie describes her setting with unpretentious fidelity.

The Achike children are very typical of children from the aristocratic class, yet they are empty psychologically. The family again, like in *Sky-High Flames*, becomes the foundation on which the protagonist and her brother must construct their identity and negotiate their growth process. Kambili is alienated socially, culturally and psychologically from everyone around her – except her brother, she easily loses perspective and focus. Kambili is not just divided through the unconscious or alienated by the 'myth of the modern' – the loss of natural self; she is fragmented most importantly through emotional sensation and psychological drive and what Mary Lou Emery describes as eclipsed "geo-cultural locations" (16).

The journey towards the retrieval of her voice and dignity as a person begin with what would have been a permanent ritual of silence during Christmas celebration, if her aunt Ifeoma had not shown up with her family. The conservative mindset and authoritarian personality of their father makes them observe as abominable anything he labels as evil, without any rational or dialectical questioning. Kambili's doughty aunt, Ifeoma, becomes a symbol of iconoclastic identity and a de deauthoriser of patriarchal and despotic establishments. Though a Catholic devotee like Kambili's father, she creates the leeway that gives her brother's family ventilation from domestic captivity. In addition to her strength of character, Ifeoma is a thoroughbred, not by class placement derivable from education and social status, but by carriage. Ifeoma has the ability to transcend geographic and social borders. If Kambili has to grow stably she has no choice other than to see beyond her father's religious fanaticism and her mother's docility, which is indicative of the hollowness of the unfounded notions of traditional African maternity.

Following Kambili's acknowledgment of her limitation as a child, which marks the beginning of her awakening, she begins the struggle of overcoming the burden of her voicelessness. This awakening leads to the introduction of the second characteristic of the African female *Bildungsroman* – guidance from a network of strong women. Her mother lacks the propensity to protect her from Eugene's incessant battery even when it is without justification. What Kambili's mother does is merely to nurse her back to health after regular battering. Her character is weak and for Kambili to grow up a stable woman, she needs more than a nurse. The character of Ifeoma has three-fold effects on Kambili. She is, first of all, the maternal figure that offers guidance. She helps Kambili distinguish between right and wrong through her religious belief, and helps her find her rhythm and balance in a society that is choked by the asymmetric gender

configuration. The process of creating her own voice begins with Kambili freeing herself from her father's schedule and allowing herself to be involved in conversations initiated by her new found friends, especially Father Amadi. Ifeoma's presence in Abba during the Christmas celebration is ventilating, because it initiates the process of her liberation.

As Kambili prepares to return to Enugu, Amaka gives her the incomplete painting of their grandfather she had been working on when he died – the painting symbolically becomes an item she earnestly desires but cannot have. She handles the painting with reverence as their father takes them home to Enugu. The painting becomes the link between her aunt's world and Enugu.

Eugene notices remarkable changes in his children as they settle down after their return from Nsukka. One of such changes, though unprecedented, is Jaja's unpretentious demand for the key to his room. Jaja throws caution to the winds and demands for the key to his room, even when it is unnecessary. However, Jaja's attitude, by his father's interpretations, is now one of hostile belligerence that is symptomatic of psychosis – the sudden turn of events is indeed incredible. Kambili who usually complies with her father's dictates suddenly refuses to adhere to his instructions. Eugene becomes astounded by this demand and decides to take pragmatic and overt steps to ensure he un-teaches his children that have learnt new ideals from their travels. This demand provokes a cleansing ritual, which will purge and purify Jaja and Kambili of the sinful dust of Nsukka and the paganistic temperament of the air of Ifeoma's home. Eugene bathes Kambili's feet in hot water, amidst screams of pain.

The cleansing ritual yields less-than-proportionate returns because it does not produce the contracting effects Eugene desires. The children bring two items from their aunt's Nsukka home; Jaja brings seeds of purple hibiscus while Kambili brings the uncompleted painting of their grandfather. Both items represent freedom from the rigid and despairing lifestyle of their father's world. With these items they are to sustain a steady link with their aunt's airy world en-route liberation.

With these prized possessions they hope never to plunge into the border of frustration, disillusionment, alienation, and the existential solitude of the world they know too well. The items will help them cram the vacuum created in their lives and help them sustain a stable relationship with their aunt's world. Her father suddenly discovers Kambili's painting as she and her brother are admiring their grandfather. Like the extremist that he is, Eugene takes the painting from his children who claim ownership of it at the same time. Stunned by this development, Eugene destroys the painting; Kambili is unable to hold back; she is not ready to watch her father tear something she holds sacred from her just like that – she has remained silent all her life. Having regained her voice, she is unwilling to merely watch her father as he attempts to truncate the stable transition of her development, which the painting will help her realize even within the circumscribed radius of her father's control. Her response to her father's assault is therefore characterized by an enthusiastic silence which is uncompromising. The painting symbolizes freedom, and at the same time she remains

of her grandfather, a character rife with cultural and philosophical agency, who she never had access to before his demise.

Although Kambili's actualizing tendency reaches high frequency when she meets Father Amadi, the destruction of the painting becomes the catalytic event that spurs her to revolt against her lot. Audre Lorde states in *Sisters Outsider* "the true focus of revolutionary change is never merely the oppressive situations which we seek to escape but that piece of the oppressor which is planted deep within us" (123). After her first return from Nsukka, the memories of the home at Enugu are sad, destructive and even poisonous. In Kambili's psyche, living at home wears down her ambitions, dreams and hopes for the future. For Kambili and her brother, Jaja, the home front represents a destructive force in their lives, not a supportive base; it is an assaulting and limiting space.

Kambili's future at home with her father is threatened because she is powerless and hopeless in that space. She has to move outside the limiting boundaries of her home to be able to change her situation and take control of her own life. Moving outside may not be physical; she could be in her father's house and yet reject his baseless and biased moral codes. Immediately Eugene destroys the painting Kambili decides to fight for the sustenance and furtherance of the identity she constructed for herself while at Ifeoma's. Kambili instantly recognises her choiceless position. This occasion eventually becomes the deciding moment of her existence. She temporarily snaps and escapes the realities of the moment; she leaves the physical presence and lurches into a metaphysical space of her own or what Virginia Woolf describes as "A Room of One's Own"³, a space where her father's laws are not operational. In a schizophrenic frenzy, she experiences freedom for the first time.

Rose Ure Mezu (1997) argues that, "In psychosis, the ego is ever under the sway of the *id*, ready to break with reality" (136). Kambili throws caution overboard because her father has violently re-opened a crack in her psyche she has fought hard to caulk. This occasion proves beyond reasonable doubt that it takes courage to escape patriarchal domination. Deleuze and Guattari echoing Maurice Blanchot, opine that "Courage consists, however, in agreeing to flee rather than live tranquilly and hypocritically in false refuges" such as morals, homeland, and religion (341). Kambili realizes that the disconnection from her father's power and authority will afford her the opportunity to move beyond her home to new connections and geographies, which will in turn facilitate new possibility for growth.

As Kambili begins to string the pieces of the painting with an utmost sense of freedom and observes her father with a defiant air of unequivocal expression of rejection, condemnation and disintegration of the unproductive upbringing that he has given her, the furtiveness with which she handles the work of art contradicts everything her father stands for. He becomes stunned at the confutation of his conservative religious standards – an occasion on which he is completely subdued by the first shocking witness of the result of his rigid religious matrix. Kambili's handling of the torn pieces of the painting symbolises the collapse of her father's autocratic

system. Rather than realize and admit that his philosophy is inhuman and inefficacious, with a doleful expression on his face Eugene degenerates into an uncontrollable fit of anger and beats Kambili into a state of unconsciousness to the extent that she is brought to the point that the final rites (“extreme unction”) are administered to her. The trip to Nsukka thus comes to have a domino effect socially in the developmental process of Kambili and Jaja.

Through this incident Kambili succeeds in breaking out of the social and religious silence of her father’s authority; it is a definitive statement of rebellion against the phallogocentric and autocratic set up. The liberational quality of Kambili’s voicing is cathartic as she takes total control of her expression, whether voiced or silent. After the death of her father and the incarceration of Jaja, she becomes the head of the home, since her mother suffers a nervous breakdown resulting from her poisoning Eugene. In the concluding chapter, she plays Fela tapes without any form of fear of contravening standards. Fela, Nigeria’s Afro-beat maestro was a bohemian artist. He is a symbolisation of freedom of speech, fair play, justice and defiance of highhanded authority. His bohemian lifestyle and the lyrics of his songs pitted him against a succession of Nigerian governments. While alive, he suffered incessant incarceration. On Kambili’s first visit to her aunt’s at Enugu, the kind of tapes Amaka plays is despicably abominable to Kambili. Since she is now free, not because of her father’s death but because she has reached the pinnacle of her development, she can easily discern between good and bad. She need not be goaded to make decisions; she is now capable of private thought.

Tsitsi Dangarembga’s *Nervous Conditions* is set in Rhodesia shortly before independence. The narrative maps the trajectory of a girl-child, Tambu(dzai), from peasant-culture of illiteracy to the exclusive white boarding school which secures her future status as provider for her father’s branch of the Sigauke family. The genre of *Nervous Conditions* is not unfamiliar: like the other texts in the study, it charts the growth process of the protagonist and foregrounds how she acquires the knowledge and position necessary to take control of the narrative of her life.

Nervous Conditions, a coming-of-age narrative realized through memory and family romance can be read as an example of a text that eloquently captures the intricacies of what it means for an African female to grow up in the cultural and textual space the colonial power forecloses. The novel brings to the foreground tensions of growing up in the age of empire. To understand Tambu and Nyasha’s development as “Policed Daughters”, their growth pattern shall be appraised from a bifocal dimension – colonial assimilation and cultural socialization. The former will make a hybrid out of them, while the latter will make them dopey. Thematically, the narrative centres on two girls growing up in Zimbabwe. Our basic interest in the narrative is the mapping of the growth process of Tambu. However, this cannot be adequately addressed as stated earlier if Dangarembga’s analysis of bicultural influence and its harmful effects are not discussed. The cousins, Tambu and Nyasha are contrasted – the one only educated in Africa and the other a product of colonial education partly in Africa and partly in England. To

comprehend the growth process of Tambu and Nyasha, especially Tambu’s loss of voice and identity when she moves into the mission, the socialization process, which is two-dimensional, shall be foregrounded.

Like the protagonists in the two texts already discussed in this paper, Tambu displays her sense of awakening at a very tender age. She realizes that the only route out of her marginal status is education. For Tambu, the pursuit of a British education is her only hope of escaping her two biological subaltern roles – blackness and womanhood. The novel begins with the startling statement by Tambu, who unequivocally states that, “I was not sorry when my brother died” (1). One will wonder why a girl would show no remorse at her brother’s death. She does not celebrate Nhamo’s death, but she only resents his arrogance. The narrative examines the difficulties Tambudzai, the female protagonist, experiences in comparison to her elder brother, Nhamo, who revels in his privileged position over the rest of his family. After her unperturbed sensational announcement of her unfeeling of her brother’s demise, she equally notes that she owes nobody an apology for her callousness or her lack of compassion. This inequity in education, over which she is very angry and, therefore, refuses to grieve when her brother dies, is, as her father tells her, “the same everywhere”.

The depth of Tambudzai’s resentment for her brother is difficult to understand, given the importance relationships assumed within the structure of African societies. Yet, the author, Dangarembga, begins her novel with this unusually venomous tone from a young thirteen-year-old girl. Psychologically, the reason Tambu vents her spleen on her brother is understandable. She could not help feeling monstrously piqued by her brother’s egoistical demeanour. This open displeasure over her brother’s attitude splendidly demonstrates the knowledge of her plight and vibrantly registers her awakening. Ordinarily the gulf socially and culturally created between both sexes seems unbridgeable. However, Tambu’s grandmother, before her demise gave her the strategy of crumbling the space when she narrated to Tambu, Babamukuru’s diligence with the “Wizard” and his eventual escape and triumph. That story runs in her memory, and it becomes the touchstone with which she measures everything she does.

Tambu is determined to overcome her marginal status, regardless of the fact that there are concerted efforts to make her accept her lot. These efforts are not only orchestrated by the patriarchal order in their calculated attempt not to only tame, but to completely subdue her wild, unnatural, unbridled spirit. The women also try to reduce her determination to attain her goals. This is where the gender tensions and Tambu’s conflict with her brother are set. The conflict between the siblings stems from Nhamo’s choice as the one from their father’s branch of the family who should be given western education. Tanure Ojaide misses the point when he contends that, Nhamo “is so arrogant that when he is favoured over the older and more diligent Tambu [. . .]” (120). Nhamo is the older of the two, but the fact remains that his choice is based on the premise of male superiority – that he is a male and not because he is strong-willed and more determined. Nhamo’s choice over Tambu does not only give him a head-start over her, it bares his sister’s plight when he callously remarks that,

“Because you are a *girl*” (21). While Nhamo is cheered on, Tambu is talked down and jeered at for her unimaginable and wild ambitions.

Ironically though, Nhamo’s school fees are raised by their mother, Mainini, through the sales of vegetables, and other agricultural produce. She does not see the importance of providing education for Tambu, her hardworking daughter. Tambu has to stay at home and learn the basic education that is of consequence to the girl-child’s moral education, which is encapsulated in the cultural tenets of the people. After all, as her father asks, “Can you cook books and feed them to your husband?” He admonishes her to “stay at home with your mother. Learn to cook and clean. Grow vegetables” (15). Her mother’s admonition and advice would have been the final straw that breaks the camel’s back if Tambu’s ambition were not founded on a steely and resolute heart. Tambu refuses to accept the standing order, the stereotype gender roles, which make women accept their positions as the weaker sex and overplay their femininity. Tambu’s history has been scripted from her gender and for her to de-scribe this popular script she must grow against the grain and become a nuisance like the other female characters already treated in this study. Though Mainini seethes with an inner rage at her social condition, her fatalistic acceptance of the female condition and status places her in the category of caged women. Rather than choose her mother as role model, she chooses Maiguru her uncle’s wife. Her choice of Maiguru as role model symbolises her yearning for education.

Lucia seems to be the only woman who understands how formidable female-bonding and self-help are. Her actions eloquently contrast sharply with those of Maiguru who, in spite of her education, lacks critical positioning and sense of solidarity. Her elder sister, Mainini, is willing to endure the burdens of matrimony regardless of her husband’s emasculated identity. Through Lucia, Tambu learns the act of self-confidence and the importance of sustaining an ideal, even if everybody negates it. She is like Ifeoma in *Purple Hibiscus*. Her character becomes an inspiration for Tambu as she journeys towards realising her goals of education and self-discovery.

By refusing to accompany the others to her parents’ wedding ceremony, Tambu’s identity emerges and confronts society, an identity that is familiar to women like Lucia and Nyasha, but seems strange and foreign from the outside. She assumes a socially “uncanny” figure, the embodiment of what her culture tries hard to bury, but cannot wipe out. At this point of her intellectual epiphany, she is willing to throw away all material benefits she enjoys at the mission, including her privilege to acquire education. Babamukuru threatens to withdraw his financial aid to her, yet she holds her ground even firmer. Although Tambu experiences conflict when she wants to translate her emotions into expression, she wants to shout out, “Do not take me at all. I don’t want to be in your stupid wedding [. . .] instead (she) says quietly and politely “very well” (164); her absence from the wedding is not only an act of defiance, but the demystification and debunking of patriarchal codes which Babamukuru represents. This incidence amplifies Tambu’s development as that of appearing to disappear, the kind of development which aptly demonstrates the growth process which Rachael Blan DuPlessis describes as liminality fluid⁴ and a constant transition.

The bonding process in *Nervous Condition* is intriguing because of its symbiotic propensity. Though this symbiotic bonding process does not offer proportional space for characters to grow in, it furnishes them with the possibility of re-evaluating and editing themselves, especially characters like Maiguru and Lucia. The thrust of *Nervous Conditions* does not only map the process of the protagonist’s attainment of wisdom, but the mentor figure. Babamukuru is Tambu’s benefactor, but Maiguru is her model and by extension her mentor figure, because Tambu chooses her from the outset and her life as an educated woman is inspirational for her. Maiguru’s transformation and regeneration shoot from Tambu’s rebellion. Dangarembga represents this complex process in which the adolescent and adult characters constantly reconstruct themselves as they come to terms with place, past memories, present experience and insight from their interactions. Maiguru, for instance, garners insight about the importance of voicing and resistance through Tambu’s act of defiance and Lucia’s assertiveness respectively. Through bonding these women reveal what Tim Crook (1999) describes as “secret private thoughts” (2). Just as Maiguru learns from Tambu’s rebellion, sharing her fears and joys with Tambu is therapeutic for Nyasha. It provides her with the kind of healing no other character can offer. Invariably, Nyasha’s nervous breakdown becomes total when Tambu leaves.

Romary Moyana suggests that what is being described in this excerpt is a “process of becoming” (25). The dynamics of Tambu’s development is fascinating, though she is equally an actor and a victim in her own story because she slowly reaches some painful conclusions about her family, gender roles, the evil of colonization, and above all, the novel is a thought-provoking and brilliantly compelling debut about the burden of growing up a woman. Destined as a woman not to aspire beyond the limitation of her subservient domestic roles, Tambu liberates herself by transcending the social and traditional space constructed for women. She achieves this through awareness and courage. Her triumph becomes a positive statement for women and the society at large, especially the reader who accompanies her on this journey. The reader can garner inspiration from Tambu’s story where she overcomes a patriarchal society, colonization, poverty, and racism to establish a sense of self-confidence. To traverse her geography in order to attain self-realization, self-identity and independence, Tambu encounters an awakening of her femininity with the help of a network of women who offer her guidance and education. These building blocks help her transform into a mature, independent woman.

In Atta’s *Everything Good Will Come* we meet a protagonist who is unstable and almost voiceless at the familial base because of the constant policing of the mother and a father who wants her liberated from the burdens of maternity. The novel charts a continuous re-awakening of the protagonist Enitan. As the narrative begins, one notices that Enitan is a loner in the home and very knowledgeable, and she exhibits traits of awakening like the protagonist of the three previous novels already treated. She muses:

From the beginning I believed whatever I was told, downright lies even, about how best to behave, although I had my own inclinations. At an age

when other Nigerian girls were masters at ten-ten, the game in which we stamped our feet in rhythm and tried to outwit partners with sudden knee jerks, my favourite moments were spent sitting on a jetty pretending to fish. My worst was to hear my mother's shout from her kitchen window: "Enitan, come and help in here" (11).

Her mother, like every traditional African woman tries to make Enitan an understudy. She tries to domesticate her daughter in the private sphere where she will be confined by tradition and gender to limited roles. The mother, like the mothers in the narratives already treated, becomes the agent of the socialization of the female-child into her traditional docile roles, preparatory for adult life. She tries to provide an ever-present and powerful role model of mother-as-feminine-ideal and actively works to repress Enitan by encouraging her to accept and imitate her behaviour. Enitan's mother becomes the agent that polices her activities as a child. In contrast to the other novels, she is not only an instrument of socialisation, she ironically becomes the police. The father who should have been the agent of policing becomes the agent of her liberation from being a kitchen martyr. He will ensure Enitan is completely liberated from the life of total domesticity. By this scheme, the father intends to masculinize her, which will in turn make her a hybrid. Her identity becomes a collage of both genders. Biologically she is a female, psychologically she is male. This is how Atta uses hybridity and irony to construct her own *Bildungsroman*. Enitan's father wants his daughter to become a liberated female but ironically does not allow his wife enough yardage in the home.

Invariably, Enitan's development is likely going to be chaotic. This chaos will stem from the possibility of growing stably in a house where the parents are most of the time torn apart by matrimonial feud, and most importantly, the consequences she must brace up to against becoming properly feminized. The latter exposes and legitimizes the process by which women collide in repressing each other; especially through mother-daughter relationships. John Bowlby emphasized in his book, *Child Care and the Growth of Love*, the importance of the mother-figure as provider of affection and security in the healthy development of the child. Children who were denied the close and constant relationship provided by the mother at home were, according to Bowlby, in emotional and psychic, if not physical, danger. They also, he argues, pose a threat to society, since Bowlby posits a relationship between juvenile delinquency and lack (or loss) of mothering through the breakdown of the family. The Bowlbyan paradigm is very significant to the reading of Enitan's psychological and physical development.

However, feminist readings of Freud's theories will identify different patterns in the dynamics of parent-child conflict. A good example is Nancy Chodorow's study, which argues that the pattern of the Oedipal drama is the same, whatever the sex of the child. All children, she contends, are in love with their primary care-giver, who is usually the mother. Therefore, it is the relationship with the mother, and the process by which separation from her is achieved that is primarily responsible for whether a child grows up to be masculine or feminine. As noted earlier, Enitan's development is likely to be chaotic. In contrast to other female *Bildungsroman* protagonists whose gender identity is formed within the psychodynamics of the family, Enitan's development is

marked by discontinuity. She has to define herself against her mother, not as feminine, while the other female protagonists discussed earlier develop in connection with their mothers. Since the mother usually stands as the basic care-giver, Chodorow (1998) maintains that, "the basic feminine sense of self is connected to the primary care-giver, while the basic masculine sense of self is separate" (169). Enitan's developmental process finds mooring in the latter.

From the Chodorow's paradigm, it becomes glaring that it is more difficult for a boy to become masculine than for a girl to become feminine. On the basis of this argument, a boy learns to be masculine in opposition to his mother and to her body, while girls only have to realize that they are like their mothers. However, Enitan's father wants a reversal of this psychodynamics for his daughter, in order to break the cycle by which the existing patriarchal society reproduces itself. He decides to change the "connection" in the relationship between Enitan and her primary caregiver – her mother. This reversal adjusts Enitan's social destiny and not the biological destiny, because every other character in the text discovers that Enitan is not a domesticated female. Invariably, she is not a man; neither is she a complete female by societal standards.

As the novel climaxes, one discovers that Enitan has evolved into a formidable character, who occupies a borderless space, where women take on an identity that is seen as threatening to society especially the patriarchy and brutish Nigerian government. As the woman moves away from the confines of the home, she enters into a borderless existence, the image of the female as the emblem of home becomes a strange, foreign figure. The borderless space in this context exists for women who decide to liberate themselves from the strings of the phallogocentric dictates of the society. Enitan successfully enters into this space and negotiates her existence. Within this space she takes decisions privately without the influence of her husband, father and society. Women who occupy this space usually reject any attempt at culturally remaking symbols, values and standards which maintain or strengthen the patriarchy. This is why Enitan is labeled mad at the concluding chapter of the novel. Not only does her identity become drawn as dangerous, Enitan's mouth becomes very powerful as well – Enitan uses her mouth like a lethal weapon turning her words into bullets and firing out at those who threaten or attempt to arrest her advancements or development. The awareness that she is a liberated woman makes her occupy her space both at the familial base and the socio-civic spheres adequately well.

The several awakening and the energy in female bonding help Enitan grow up into a woman with a formidable identity. As she informs Niyi of her intentions to join the coalition in order to agitate for the release of detained individuals, she retrospects as her husband refuses to allow her to be a party to the struggle: "From childhood, people had told me I couldn't do this or that, because no one would marry me and I would never become a mother. Now I was a mother" (330).

Although, Enitan in the end fulfils her biological feminine identity, she achieves this by assuming the status of a wife, and becoming a mother. She is equally socially masculine because she undertakes masculine ventures. Becoming a front-liner in the liberation struggle, a vocation strictly male-preserve, substantiates the above claim. It

is not her becoming a wife and mother that makes Enitan a heroine of the female *Bildungsroman*. Her several awakenings, her revolt against the patriarchal order within the domestic confines and the national level, her intellectual epiphany and her realization of the inverse correlations in her society, translate her from ignorance into cognition, making her a heroine in the female *Bildungsroman* tradition. From close reading of texts, this essay points to a new direction about mothers and mothering.

The narrative design of these texts demonstrates that family relationships in postcolonial African societies exhibit numerous tensions, conflicts and psychological problems. The topicality of the mother-daughter tension is not only vibrantly explored in these novels, but becomes the point where the familial conflict is set. Monica Bungaro attributes these tensions to the “result of new opportunities, new interests and new dilemmas created by increasing gender and class stratification across Africa, but especially across generations of Africans” (67). These generational tensions easily manifest in the conflict between mothers and daughters. These conflicts seem to blatantly foreground women’s rejection of existing cultural standards, especially the obligation of women in the society.

The mothers in these four novels are debilitated and overwhelmed by the patriarchal order of the familial base so that they do not see the need to liberate their daughters from the leash of the phallocentric underpinnings of their respective societies. However, as the daughters’ identity begins to form through different rebellious strategies they deploy in order to come to terms with the burden of growing up female, the mothers’ already compromised position is salvaged. The strategic rebellion of the daughters is what I call daughter tongue interference – the refusal to allow, the mothers’ stories to be re-enacted in their lives.

The daughters dismantle the cultural script drafted by an order which lives no space for a rounded growth process for the girl-child. However, as they grow up resist it, the debilitating and restricting cultural norms that demand women “grown down rather than up” (Pratt, 168) are destroyed. In the process the daughters create another text that subverts the traditional female quest story of the thwarted or impossible journey or arrested development that inevitably leads to socio-cultural entrapment of the female hero. Narrating their own *Bildungs* story, the narrating “I” engages in the subversive act of replacing the cultural text with her own. This aspect of the narratives lend a poetic dimension to this postcolonial African quest story: the protagonists’ search for a feminine self is at the same time a quest for self-expression for a liberating self-creation that dismantles traditional male-defined myths and texts that have locked the African woman into confining stereotypes.

These narratives are a type of chronicles which consider the feminine viewpoint of the novel an ideal method for studying women’s struggles. This combination of fiction/ testimony/feminine perspective can perhaps best describe these female writers’ works which, despite its singular protagonist-narrator, is more a collective story – a genealogy of female confinement especially mothers and collapsing of the patriarchal façade with the agency of the daughter, than an individual one. While some have claimed that women’s interest in the *Bidungsroman* as a genre reflects a desire to

universalize female personal history, these narratives appear to legitimize a group history narrated from the perspective of a female child. Interestingly therefore, some critics Esther K. Labovitz argue that the male *Bildungsroman* has reached the end of its relevance, the *Bildungsroman* continues to serve, as Mari-anne Hirsch and others have recognized, as “the most salient genre for the literature of social outsiders, primarily women or minor-ity groups” (300). The burgeoning of the form within the context of the African novel in the last two decades signifies its viability as a narrative form that articulates the experiences of historically marginalized peoples, who perhaps “for the first time find themselves in a world increasingly responsive to their needs” (Abel, Hirsch, and Langland 13). Considering the arduous journeys these protagonists undertake before reaching the self, the *Bildungsroman* therefore, performs the function of a “genre of demarginalization” (Slaughter 1411).

Mothers feature strongly in the texts, regardless of the fact that they are portrayed as reticent, submissive or compliant. Kambili’s and Tambu’s mothers fail to protect the protagonists from their father’s abuse and negligence of paternal responsibilities respectively and their socialising projects that inhibit their children’s becoming. They, equally fail to guide their charges on their respective routes to personhood. Enitan’s and Ofunne’s mother, in contrast, are complicit with patriarchy, vehemently bent on socialising Enitan and Ofunne. From analysis of texts it becomes glaring that the mother’s voice or what I call the mother tongue – though they may not be completely of complicity – is of immense importance in the healthy upbringing of a child. The disproportionate power relations between the mother and father figures lead to the silencing of mothers with regards the nurturing of their children, which, in turn, inhibits the child’s growth process.

The most striking similarity between the texts is the absence of closure. Closure for these emergent writers is, almost, impossible, since the social context in which their protagonists negotiate their identities are in a state of permanent transition. Significantly, identity negations lack definite closure. An attempt at closure will result in the denial of the individual the liberty to negotiate any other possible course that may lead her to a desired identity. The three novels end with protagonists about to journey on – journeys that will open up new opportunities for them. Ofunne abandons matrimony after beating up her mother-in-law and strips before Onishe, a potent marker of submission to a supernatural force for strength and the desire to start afresh; Kambili resolves to visit Auntie Ifeoma and her family in the United States; Tambu gets admission to an elite college and Enitan abandons her husband like Ofunne to live on her own. Although their destinations may hold much hope for them, they foreground the primacy of infiniteness of the politics of identity formation.

The female African *Bildungsroman* serves as a modern framework of artistic expression within the broad spectrum of African narratives to account for the African experience. This variant is not only African in temper and characterization, but also abrupt in its ending, communal in orientation, subversive in content and open-ended in structure, a signification for the idea that human development and identity construction cannot be fixated and that the process of its negotiations is continuous.

Invariably, the traditional *Bildungsroman* has been potentially feminized within a postcolonial context to appraise narratives of growth. These narratives celebrate a lifelong journey of self-fulfillment and social responsibility. These postcolonial African female writers offer immense hope for altering and reordering the existing patriarchal ordinances both at the familial and civic spheres so that all women can establish their voices and places – for themselves and for others.

NOTES

- 1 My use of “nuisance” in this study is not an indication of a negative attribute. The word demonstrates the extent to which these female characters go in order to transcend their limitations as females in a system where their identity is defined by gender. Refusing to be subjected to the space mapped out for them by their societies makes them fall outside the parameters of the ideal. Thus, they negotiate their way outside the centre of morality because the establishment that does the mapping defines the moral order and the standards for othering. It equally details the moral choices the protagonists have to make in order to find and reach the self.
- 2 Completing the journey of self-discovery does not indicate that the female protagonist has finally reached the end point of her journey of self-discovery; it only indicates that she has attained a point where she has become capable of making independent decisions unguided.
- 3 Virginia Woolf. *A Room of One's Own*. London: Hogarth Press, 1989 (1929).
- 4 This is a growth process where the initiate remains permanently in a particular phase which is usually not childhood or adulthood. Africa's growth indices give expression to the idea of liminality fluid. This is so because it appears African continues to remain in a permanent state of transition.

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Rethinking Multiculturalism in *New Dubliners*: An Outsider's Perspective

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I. Introduction

I will never forget what happened that day when I was walking through Stephen's Green. As I was strolling with excitement through St. Stephen's Green in Dublin downtown, a boy came and asked me, "Do you speak English?" Without second thoughts, I said "Yes," wondering what good news he would like to share with me. Then he pointed to one of the boys playing around and said, "Do you see that boy over there?" To be frank, I was kind of surprised because I could not see anything wrong with those kids. So I said, "Yes" again. However, I was terribly stunned on the spot when he went on saying with an innocent voice, "You have to be careful. He is a racist." You might think I would have been grateful to the boy for his kind reminder, but actually, I was not. I did not appreciate the reminder because when the boy talked to me, he grinned and made faces at me. At that moment, I knew they meant to play tricks on me, an Asian in appearance like me. I knew that these kids were harmless, but I just could not help feeling scared, harassed and even terrified at that time. This was the first time in my life that I found myself so helpless and alienated. From that moment on, a series of questions kept lingering in my mind: What's wrong with contemporary Ireland, a land that has been well-known for mass emigration for centuries? Irish people must have known very well about being guests in other countries, but are they really ready for being hosts in the twenty-first century as more and more immigrants from around the world choose to settle down in this beautiful, mythical land?

For centuries, people in Ireland have been beset by antitheses such as British/Irish, Protestant/Catholic and colonialism/de-colonization due to Ireland's special relations with England. As a consequence, a tenacious Irish identity distinct from non-Irish identity has been formulated. The efforts made by cultural nationalists such as Yeats and Lady Gregory are a case in point. With the rehabilitation of indigenous Irish culture in mind, these cultural zealots strive hard to channel nationalism into the construction of artistic perfection and to kindle Irish people's awareness of Irish-ness as opposed to the encroaching British imperial culture. However, unlike the essentialism salient in the past, Ireland in the twenty-first century is characterized by its more multicultural facades. Sabina Sharkey's concept of "a plurality of Irelands," (2003, 118) coupled with Declan Kiberd's metaphor of Ireland as "a quilt of many colors," (1996,

653) testifies to the multiculturalism of contemporary Ireland. But, as multicultural as it may appear, Ireland as a member of the European Union seems to be tightening its ties with other European countries, while immigrants from non-EU countries tend to be disregarded or even discriminated against in various ways. Such a Europe-oriented penchant is also evidenced in everyday practices and contemporary Irish literature.

This paper aims to investigate this Europe-dominated mentality and how non-EU outsiders are unfavourably constructed and excluded in *New Dubliners*, a short story collection published in 2005 in honour of Joyce's writing of *Dubliners* a century ago. The research is expected to help lay bare the xenophobia latent in stories like Roddy Doyle's "Recuperation," Joseph O'Connor's "Two Little Clouds," Colum McCann's "As if There Were Trees," and Frank McGuinness' "The Sunday Father" from an outsider's perspective. These stories are chosen because among the eleven stories in the collection, they best relate to the discussion of multiculturalism in contemporary Ireland. Hopefully, the discussion will contribute to rethinking and redressing the idea of multiculturalism in contemporary Ireland.

II. Ireland vs. Outsiders

As the farthest part of Western Europe on the Atlantic Ocean, the strong desire to get connected with outsiders is unceasing. In fact, the recourse to rescue from other lands recurs in Irish literature and culture. In the aisling writing tradition, Ireland is invariably envisaged as a beautiful woman awaiting rescue from foreigners. In Aogán O Rathaille's "Brightness Most Bright," for example, the fair lady, deprived of her native land and enslaved by alien forces, is desperately in need of help from outsiders. For the subordinated lady, "no relief can reach her until the heroes come/ back across the main" (Murphy 1987, 45). Likewise, the dark lady's misery in James Clarence Mangan's "Dark Rosaleen" will never last long, for along with rescue from afar as embodied by "the priest" and "the wine," and "the Spanish ale" comes hope of regaining the usurped Irish throne (Murphy 1987, 114). In addition, such a reliance on foreign aid is evidenced in the 1916 "Proclamation of the Irish Republic," a joint announcement by Thomas J. Clarke, Patrick H. Pearse and others, in which the nationalists habitually turn to Ireland-as-mother to arouse their countrymen's commiseration and gain their support for a new revolutionary effort: "supported by her exiled children in America and by gallant allies in Europe, but relying in the first place on her own strength, she (Ireland) strikes in full confidence of victory" (Murphy 1987, 230-31). Although undoubtedly, Ireland's domestic forces like the Irish Republican Brotherhood are vital to the emancipation of the symbolic motherland, nothing great can be achieved without sponsorship and support, spiritual as well as material, from abroad. As stated in the proclamation, Irish expatriates in America and enthusiasts from Europe are needed to help make Irish liberation possible. This smacks of the spirit latent in the hag of Beare writing tradition prevalent in Irish literature, in which the hag desperately awaits the coming of outsiders to rescue her from the control of her lord and master. Therefore, the Irish mother keeps summoning rescuers from abroad as well as from home for the benefit of the nation.

Images of foreign aids are never absent in modern Irish literature. It is the French forces that are supposed to rescue the distressed lady, the personification of Ireland, in Yeats' *Cathleen Ni Houlihan* for the restoration of her green fields. In John Millington Synge's *The Playboy of the Western World*, what Shawn Keogh has been wistfully waiting for is "Father Reilly's dispensation from the bishops, or the Court of Rome" so that he can consummate his marriage to Pegeen Mike (2000, 70). Moreover, in *The Country Girls' Trilogy* written by Edna O'Brien, the female protagonist, Cathleen, endeavours to shun away from her suffering by engaging in a series of jail-break love affairs with foreigners, especially middle-aged men from France. Mr. Gentleman, for instance, is said to be an elegant, French-speaking solicitor. He is somewhat mysterious and unapproachable for the provincials in the country. "He was French, and his real name was Mr. de Maurier, but no one could pronounce it properly, and anyhow, he was such a distinguished man with his gray hair and his satin waistcoats that the local people christened him Mr. Gentleman" (1987, 12). Moreover, her next lover Eugene Gaillard, a half-French documentary film maker, is a god-like figure with "his strength, his pride, his self-assurance" (1987, 335). Taken together, the images of foreigners abound in Irish literature, yet the portrayal is dominated by people from Europe (Spain, Italy, France) and America, with a cloak of invisibility thrown upon people from other countries and cultures. This is understandable when considered geographically and religiously, for geographical proximity, emigration history and Catholic religion naturally bind the Irish, French and Spanish together, but this Eurocentric mentality simultaneously renders Irish people less well-informed about people and culture from other parts of the world. In the wake of such ignorance, misunderstanding, conflict and confrontation are inevitable when Irish people are faced with the people and cultures of these non-European aliens.

III. Xenophobia in *New Dubliners*

The prosperity boom in the last two decades of the twentieth century brought Irish people significant changes, socially, culturally, and economically (Paseta 2003, 146). The flow of immigration to Ireland was rarely problematic amid the economic explosion in the nineties. However, with the decline of the Celtic Tiger in the following years, immigrants (especially those from non-EU countries) became easy targets for rising unemployment. This sort of hatred, coupled with a certain racism, prompts xenophobia in Irish people. As Terence Brown maintains, emigration has been part of Irish life, yet immigration since the nineties is "a situation which it (Ireland) had scarcely prepared itself" (2004, 385). Traces of the immigrant cultures can be found in Roddy Doyle's "Recuperation," in which some oriental cultures like kick-boxing and martial arts are introduced as something new, yet a certain doubt is simultaneously cast when the character in the story wonders "what kick-boxing is like, what kick-boxing parents are like" (2005, 22). Moreover, in the story, an African is said to be walking between the cars selling the *Herald* at the crossroads every day, yet the main character has "never seen anyone buy one" (2005, 23). Both cases demonstrate that non-EU cultures or immigrants do exist in contemporary Ireland. However, they are more often than not

caricatured and downgraded because they are either inferior or useless. This phenomenon contradicts the essence of multiculturalism, which promotes the concept of "recognizing and accommodating different cultural beliefs, practices, traditions, languages or lifestyles" (Murphy 2012, 14).

Likewise, images of non-EU immigrants recur in Joseph O'Connor's "Two Little Clouds." This short story features the transformation of Ireland's economy, culture and society around the turn of the twenty-first century, epitomized by the success of the main character, Eddie Virago. However, interspersed in the success story are episodes of immigrants working and living in contemporary Ireland. For example, in a hotel lobby, "Chinese waiters in white were handing out glasses of wine" to customers (2005, 6). The portrayal of these Chinese waiters testifies to the fact that modern Ireland tends to be more culturally diversified. However, many things related to these immigrants are unfairly presented. Eddie's comments on Nigerian immigrants showcase such a negative viewpoint:

It was just—you know—these immigrant fellas. They were *different* somehow. Not like us bog gallopers. Their *culture* was different, their music, their food. Nothing wrong with it, of course. All very colourful. But these Nigerians, for example—what could they say? (2005, 9).

Although Eddie asserts that he is by no means a racist, this remark about Nigerian immigrants betrays his mild racial discrimination. As a cultural essentialist, he fails to identify with other cultures. This episode echoes Homi Bhabha's idea that "it is actually very difficult, even impossible and counterproductive, to try and fit together different forms of culture and to pretend that they can easily coexist" (Rutherford 1990, 209). For Bhabha, cultural diversity has been widely promoted and has become the basis of multicultural education policies in many parts of the world. But when it comes to cultural differences, the dominant culture (or host society) is inclined to be more reserved, saying "these other cultures are fine, but we must be able to locate them within our own grid" (Rutherford 1990, 208). As a consequence, while cultural diversity has been widely promoted, respected and even accepted, the true embracing of cultural differences has only been a dream to be realized in the future. However, multiculturalism is not only about cultural diversity, but it is also about "culturally embedded differences" (Parekh 2000, 3). To a certain extent, Eddie's case demonstrates that no matter how multicultural contemporary Ireland appears, it is far from easy to make a compromise between traditional Irish culture and other immigrant cultures. According to Bhabha, a certain discrepancy does exist between "cultural diversity" and "cultural difference" in the apparently multicultural world. This incongruity mostly comes from the host society's cultural chauvinism, regarding its own culture as supreme and universal. But the reluctance to face up to change and difference is doomed to fail, for one's cultural identity is never constant but always becoming. As Stuart Hall proposes, "difference and rupture" as well as "similarity and continuity" make up the driving force of one's culture (1990, 226). In other words, according to Hall, while people from different cultures stick to their history, tradition and culture, they have to be open to other new elements, however different or alien they may be.

Frank McGuinness' "The Sunday Father" is not meant to be a story about migration; nevertheless, references to non-EU immigrants in Ireland are embedded in the story. The cynical narrator is back to Ireland for the funeral of his father, who happens to die on the same Sunday as Princess Diana. He raves at the taxi driver on his way back to Dublin, saying "Fuck it, are we in Moscow, in Petersburg, in Odessa? Why are you speaking, my good man in that oddly Slavonic fashion?" (2005, 131). This grievance alludes to the main character's intolerance of the driver's accent, which differs from his. The driver is growled at simply because his English is not pure but mixed with his native tongue. Blatant racial discrimination is laid bare later in the dialogue between the two female characters:

- What's your question?
- When I take the number 7 bus it's full of Chinese—
- What about them? (Honorina begins to fear Rialto is a racist.)
- So many Chinese people on that one bus, the widow observes.
- What's your problem?
- The bus can take eighty-one people—
- What is the problem with you?—
- How can billions of Chinese fit in to the one double decker?
- Is that what it seems like to you? Do you see them in their billions?
- I do. (2005, 147)

The vision of billions of Chinese packed into one double-decker bus is obviously an exaggeration, but it significantly highlights Rialto's (or some Irish people's) fear of the invasion of locust-like Chinese in contemporary Ireland. This Chinese-phobia mindset as reflected in Rialto corresponds to Declan Kiberd's comment that in Ireland, "many politicians seem to fear 'flood,' 'invasions,' 'swamps' of immigrants (the language always suggests a loss of control)" (Kiberd 2005, 311). In addition, according to Tom Inglis, many Irish people look upon immigrants as a threat and dismiss the possibility that these aliens could become truly Irish (2008, 110). But, as Kiberd suggests, normally immigrants contribute to rather than endanger public wellbeing. However, pitifully some Irish tend to dismiss the "unseen benefits" (new kinds of medical therapy, for example) brought by immigrants (2005, 311). In fact, in a study conducted by Alan Barrett and Adele Bergin, it was found that, contrary to common-sense perceptions, immigration to Ireland is generally good for Irish people because it helps to increase GDP and reduce inequality of earnings (2007, 82).

The most unsettling story in *New Dubliners* is Colum McCann's story, "As if There Were Trees," in which physical violence against immigrants prances upon the stage. Half of the story centres on Jamie's misery caused by his unemployment, paving the way for his killing of the unidentified Romanian labourer near the ending. As depicted in the first few paragraphs, Jamie, his baby and his horse are all haggard with their ribs exposed to outsiders. Helpless and hungry, they are lethargic trying to get fed, which triggers the narrator's great sense of sympathy. As the narrator remarks, "There's nothing worse than seeing a baby hungry. She was tucked in against Jamie's

stomach and he was staring away into the distance" (2005, 53-54). Obviously, Jamie's unemployment is the root of all misery. He has to take care of his baby on his own, but he is not up to the task, especially after being laid-off. This episode depicting the wretchedness shared by Jamie, his baby and his horse paves the way for the sympathetic understanding the narrator gives to Jamie in spite of the murder Jamie commits against a Romanian later in the story.

Xenophobia is foreshadowed in the episode when the narrator, who works in a pub called The Well, says: "We don't serve the foreigners or at least we don't serve them quickly because there's always trouble" (2005, 55). A comment made by the narrator's husband, Tommy, clearly illustrates the heart of the matter: "Tommy said they were lucky to walk, let alone drink, taking our jobs like that, fucking Romanians" (2005, 59). The resentment of the Irish over Romanian immigrants is self-evident in Tommy's remark. Tommy is so angry because, as indicated in the previous episode, he was laid off not long ago and is now looking after his children at home. In a sense, the non-European immigrants should not be allowed to walk or drink because their participation in the job market endangers the survival of local Irish people. What is worse, the antipathy towards these non-European immigrants is so great that Jamie, the jobless single father, furiously kills a guest labourer from Romania. The narrator, however, justifies and identifies with such an act of atrocity after witnessing the murder.

There were people out looking in the corridors now and they were hanging over the balconies watching. They were silent. Tommy was there too with our young ones. I looked at Tommy and there was something like a smile on his face.... Tommy was crushing the Romanian's balls and he was kicking the Romanian's head in and he was rifling the Romanian's pockets and he was sending him home to his dark children with his ribs all shattered and his teeth all broken and I thought to myself that maybe I would like to see it too and that made me shiver, that made the night very cold, that made me want to hug Jamie's baby the way Jamie was hugging her too. (2005, 60)

The reticence of these spectators is really dismaying, insinuating that racism is not so much an individual response as a collective unconscious latent in many Irish people's psychology. In a sense, although they do not participate in the killing of the Romanian, these spectators are to a degree the accomplices perpetrating the crime. Pitifully, even though the narrator feels insecure witnessing the violence against the Romanian, he feels like hugging Jamie's baby instead of saving the immigrant victim from further abuse. As a matter of fact, this impulse to hug Jamie's baby derives from the narrator's identification with his Irish compatriot because, after all, they are much more similar, both physically and culturally. This example again reinforces the tenacity of the Irish identity and the difficulty of enacting multiculturalism in contemporary Ireland. It echoes Gary Younge's observation that the Irish, who used to take pride in their heart-warming welcome to strangers, are treating people of colour very differently in contemporary Ireland. This is evidenced in a 2002 Irish government report, which shows that black pregnant women were targets of abuse in the streets and hospitals

because supposedly they were having babies to secure Irish citizenship (2010, 127). In addition, a referendum held in 2004 nullified the automatic right to Irish citizenship for anyone born in Ireland, because Irish people managed to stop black people from settling or having the right as Irish citizens (Fanning 2007, 21; Younge 2010, 128). The story of Jamie and the Romanian significantly reiterates the difficulty of actuating multiculturalism in contemporary Ireland.

IV. Conclusion

The Irish have been confronted with defining Irish-ness for centuries. Irish literature, especially in the twentieth century, has been beset by ambiguity, by the antitheses of British and Irish, Protestant and Catholic, English and Irish, and colonialism and nationalism. These ambivalences correspond to the duality of Irish-ness proposed by Seamus Heaney. According to Heaney, the either/or mentality is far from common in Ireland, while “both/ and” logic permeates in the everyday life of the Irish (1990, 21-23). In a nutshell, self-conflicted in one way or another, Irish people have been forced to make compromises amid the continuously contradictory systems and hybrid cultures.

Contemporary Ireland is situated in a relentlessly globalizing world, one where notions of “nationhood” and “national identity” as well as gender and sexual identity are being increasingly rethought and redefined. The European element surging in Irish society in the last few decades, for example, is challenging grass-roots Irish identity (Kiberd 1987, 97). Over the last decade, this “increasingly Europeanized republic” faces still another challenge—the rise of immigration (Eagleton 1998, 131). The duality of Irish-ness makes clear the Irish’s ability to thrive amid incessant conflicts and compromises. Hopefully, this very attribute characteristic of the Irish can help create what Bhabha calls “the third space,” a hybrid culture that allows people from different cultures to emerge, coexist and prosper alongside each other (Rutherford 1990, 207-21).

However, integrating people from different cultural backgrounds is easier said than done. About six months after I left Dublin, some bad news came to me. David, my best friend from Asia who was employed in a Dublin-based international business, was attacked by a couple of Irish young men and suffered concussion. He was taken to hospital and was hospitalized for a week before he could get back to work. This was not surprising news to me because I had a similar experience when walking near Parnell Street in Dublin in broad daylight. I found some stones being pelted against the windowpanes close to me. When I turned around, I saw some teenagers about thirty metres behind me. I felt afraid every time I walked near the same alley. Irish people have been well-known for their hospitality, but are they really ready to accommodate non-white immigrants? It seems to me that Irish people still have a long way to go before knowing how to get along well with non-EU immigrants and learning to appreciate and accommodate these foreign cultures.

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The Word as Such: Nietzsche and Mandelstam's Poststructuralist Poetics

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Although the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche had a widespread influence on Russian artists and intellectuals in the early years of the twentieth century, only recently have scholars begun to examine the impact of the German philosopher on one of the most gifted Russian poets at the time, Osip Mandelstam. This is not because Mandelstam did not read Nietzsche or was not interested in his ideas, but because he did not always explicitly acknowledge Nietzsche's impact, generally avoiding direct mention of Nietzsche's name. This practice on the poet's part, however, does not obscure the fact that Nietzsche's ideas—especially those from *The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music*—can be located throughout Mandelstam's early essays and can clarify how his view of language anticipates features of Western theoretical discourse that emerged in the latter half of the twentieth century.

Under Nietzsche's influence, Mandelstam's acmeist poetics diverged from Russian symbolist aesthetics in the early 1910s in order to embrace a dynamic account of language that borders on structuralist and poststructuralist thought. While the symbolists understood language as a vehicle of spiritual transcendence, Mandelstam highlighted the structural and temporal instabilities in poetic language, implying that these factors spontaneously give rise to new forms of poetic expression. Mandelstam's understanding of language—strongly reminiscent of aspects of the work of both Saussure and Derrida (although the poet had no apparent means of knowing Saussure's teaching)—is articulated not only in "Conversation about Dante," but also in his early essays "The Morning of Acmeism" (*Utro Akmeizma*) and "On the Nature of the Word" (*O Prirode Slova*). All these works feature the Nietzschean struggle between Apollo and Dionysus, unity and chaos, order and disorder. Through a fresh look at Mandelstam's early essays written in response to the symbolists and Nietzsche—whom the symbolists considered as their spiritual forerunner—I propose to demonstrate how Mandelstam arrived at a realization about language that lasted throughout his career and that became popular in the Western world in the 1960s.

Several recent studies have treated Mandelstam's poetry as a dynamic process based on Nietzsche's Apollonian and Dionysian principles as forces existing in nature, society, and the individual. Elena Glazov-Corrigan, Clare Cavanagh, and Elaine Rusinko

have presented a compelling reading of Mandelstam's struggle with tradition in search of an original poetic voice. Rusinko focuses on Mandelstam's revision of symbolist principles—which were primarily derivative of Nietzsche's fascination with Dionysus—in adherence to Nietzsche's Apollonian pole; she argues that acmeism "contributed an original interpretation of Nietzsche that emphasized the Apollonian principle over the Dionysian in style and philosophy."¹ This view of acmeism as an alternative to the Dionysian unruliness and madness of the symbolists has become mainstream among scholars of Russian literature from the Modernist period. The most prominent acmeist journal in the early 1900s was also evocatively titled *Apollon*, openly manifesting its affiliation not only with the Greek tradition, but also with Nietzsche's discourse on that tradition as expressed in *The Birth of Tragedy*.

Consequently—owing to their call for poetry marked by clarity, simplicity, and material tangibility—acmeist poets like Nikolay Gumilev, Anna Akhmatova, Mikhail Kuzmin, and especially Mandelstam have often been perceived as renegades from Russian literary modernism.² With his definition of acmeism as "nostalgia for world culture" and his continual references to figures from the Western literary canon, Mandelstam is often classified as a defender of tradition—albeit one whose understanding of tradition is complicated by his own cultural displacement as a Russian, born in Poland to a mother raised in a traditional Jewish family and father well-versed in the secular German idealist school of philosophy.³

Looking at the problematic relationship between Mandelstam, the Russian symbolists, and Nietzsche, which unfolds in the context of Russian literary modernism, Cavanagh challenges the contention that Mandelstam was a traditionalist. She claims that the poet was motivated by a conscious struggle to replace a literary and cultural tradition that he inherited—including that of Nietzsche and the symbolists—with a culture of his own choice and making. Mandelstam, in Cavanagh's view, resembles what Harold Bloom calls "the strong poet," or a poet of the capable imagination, who is, in her words, "acutely aware that a resurrection of past values, is by necessity, a revaluation of values, and that the past is brought to life again within the present only by way of an intense, intentional creative act."⁴

Glazov-Corrigan, on the other hand, links Mandelstam's later poetics to "the concerns of postmodern poetics," such as the interplay between presence and absence that was one of Jacques Derrida's main concerns.⁵ While acknowledging Mandelstam's proximity to poststructuralist ideas, she interprets his later work primarily as a challenge to poststructuralist thought, which is, in her words, largely concerned with images that feature the "decorative, rhetorical, and the political," thus establishing a perhaps artificial divide between poets and theoreticians, or poets and their own biography or lived experience. In this sense, Glazov-Corrigan interprets Mandelstam's poetics as a proleptic alternative to poststructuralism that allows for a renewed understanding of the poet's individual creative merit.

These perceptive analyses, explicating Mandelstam's reception of Nietzsche's first book, provide the inspiration for this study, which aims to situate Mandelstam's

acmeist poetics in relation to poststructuralist discourses about language. In this sense my project is spurred by Glazov-Corrigan's perception of Mandelstam as a poststructuralist poet-theoretician, and it attempts to demonstrate how some specific instances in Mandelstam's early essays exhibit such poststructuralist tendencies, leading to a revised understanding of acmeism. Consequently, I intend to add to the understanding of Mandelstam as a precursor of the poststructuralist view of language as an active meaning-making force that is subject to structural relations and the passage of time rather than the poet's conscious or intentional control. This is an aspect of Mandelstam's work that has yet to be closely examined and that will shed light on an alternate understanding of acmeism—at least as promoted by its most prominent advocate, Mandelstam—not simply as a return to the cultural values of the past, or as a re-inscription of literary tradition into the language of modernism, but as a herald of later 20th-century theorists' attention to the essence of language as an active expressive agency, rather than a vehicle for transmitting ideas and meaning.

Mandelstam's Acmeist Manifesto:

In "The Morning of Acmeism," Mandelstam defines acmeism as appreciation for the reality of everyday existence (versus an intangible spiritual world) and the materiality of language, focusing attention on the word as an almost concrete, tangible entity, which he calls "the word as such" (*slovo kak takovoe*). The figure of the poet, in this view, appears simply as a craftsman or an architect, who uses words as building material to construct aesthetic and durable masterpieces of poetry, resembling the majesty of the Medieval Gothic cathedrals.⁶ Thus, Mandelstam seems to adopt the bold manner of modernist manifestos in proclaiming that:

The sharp edge of Acmeism is neither the stiletto nor the sting of Decadence. Acmeism is for those who, inspired by the spirit of building, do not like cowards renounce their own gravity, but joyously accept it in order to arouse and exploit the powers architecturally sleeping within. The architect says: I build, that indicates I am right (*ya stroyu—znachit' ya prav*).⁷

Perhaps intentionally echoing Descartes' *cogito ergo sum* with a marked difference, the last sentence in this definition of acmeism indicates Mandelstam's emphasis on the material world. Mandelstam embraces physical existence, unlike the "cowards" who reject it in favor of mystical fantasy: this derogative epithet and Mandelstam's references to the "stiletto" implicitly criticize the Symbolists' aesthetic escapism, as well as Descartes' abstract rationalism with its severing of mind from body.

Mandelstam's definition of acmeism as the celebration of physical reality and the poet's role as a craftsman have been often perceived in a rather limited way as the poet's yearning for past cultural ideals or traditional form in poetry.⁸ While it is certainly true that acmeism contains an element of "nostalgia for world culture," placing too much emphasis on these explicit statements may restrict our vision of Mandelstam's exceptionally sophisticated view of language and material reality. Mandelstam's emphasis on matter, however, does not commit him to viewing reality as stable and fixed: instead, it is more like a Heraclitean flux.

The acmeist world of Mandelstam is a Heraclitean world that is not only continuously changing—its very atoms or building blocks are only apparently stable and self-identical, while being subject to internal tensions, including the force of gravity.⁹ In the above quoted segment, Mandelstam demands that acmeist poets should "joyously accept [their own gravity] in order to arouse and exploit the powers architecturally sleeping within." It is on this level of invisible but perpetually active forces that the Nietzschean struggle between Apollo and Dionysus, regularity and disarray, takes place. With this understanding of material reality as volatile and mutable, Mandelstam claims in "The Morning" that the Acmeists' highest commandment (*vysshaya zapoved' akmeizma*) is "Love the existence of the thing more than the thing itself, and your existence more than yourself." Materiality for Mandelstam is never a composite of things that we can know and describe; we can never know the "things in themselves," but, as he insists, we are highly sensitive to their existence.¹⁰ This understanding of reality adds a spin to the otherwise simple definition of acmeism, and I am going to examine more closely the complications in the characterization of acmeism that result from Mandelstam's deliberation on Nietzsche, who had also recognized if not existence, then "life" as the most valuable asset or force that human beings possess.¹¹

The recognition of the importance of language as an expressive medium, whose very materiality deserves to be examined, takes place in Mandelstam's involvement with the ideas of Nietzsche's early work. Mandelstam's endorsement of Nietzsche's Apollo and Dionysus against the Symbolists—as forces that reveal the structural dynamics and instability of the poetic text and language in general—is a gesture that prefigures the attention given to the structural aspects of language by Poststructuralist thinkers of the twentieth century.

The systematic rhetorical study of language has undoubtedly been the common thread in the work of diverse poststructuralist thinkers such as Paul de Man, Jacques Lacan, Gilles Deleuze, and Jacques Derrida. These thinkers have often insisted that the meaning of worlds that we create for ourselves, both public and private, are contingent upon the structural relationships and rhetorical figures within language. Allowing for a close analysis of the way language creates meanings for us, poststructuralists, thus, make us realize that our lives are constituted by stories inherent to the linguistic structures that we inherit. Instead of looking at the interpretation of what it means to be human, or what gives meaning to our existence, poststructuralists call for a rhetorical analysis of language to identify the structures that propel such questions in the first place.

Like these thinkers, Mandelstam emphasized the importance of language as an active creative medium, rather than a vehicle for transmitting information. In his essay "On the Nature of the Word" Mandelstam explicitly criticizes the symbolists for their overt emphasis on music and their underestimation of language in their understanding of poetry. Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy* had established that hierarchical relationship between music and poetry, and in this sense, Mandelstam's polemic seems to implicitly

criticize Nietzsche for his initial dismissal of language as secondary to music. Ironically, Mandelstam is defending language as a medium in itself—a medium that is not a transparent tool for representing ideas or feelings—against Nietzsche, the forefather of poststructuralist thought, which considers language as a set of literary figures constitutive of our reality.

Nietzsche in Russian Culture

Even in pre-communist Russia, Mandelstam seemed to be acutely aware of the limits encompassing poetic thought and expression. He was aware that these limits are not simply rules—poetic, cultural, or juridical—that demand his conformity, but unconscious allegiances to one's poetic masters, manifesting themselves in what Harold Bloom would call anxiety of influence.¹² It was by addressing his anxiety of influence toward his established contemporary Vyacheslav Ivanov that Mandelstam re-visited Nietzsche to assert himself as the German thinker's more legitimate heir.

The link between Mandelstam and Nietzsche is not surprising because discussions of the philosopher's work—and particularly *The Birth of Tragedy*—had been prevalent in Russian literature and art in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. The popularity of Nietzsche in Russia at the turn of the twentieth century became so pervasive that most leading schools of literature and art based their political agendas and artistic principles on Nietzsche's philosophy. Despite their ideological differences, writers belonging to literary movements as diverse as symbolism, futurism, and even socialist realism—whose guardians officially banned Nietzsche's ideas—all defended their positions using different aspects of Nietzsche's work, attempting to be his true disciples.¹³

As an active participant in the intellectual life of the early years of the twentieth century, Mandelstam was familiar with such discussions and had clearly read some of Nietzsche: he explicitly refers to *Zarathustra* in a letter to his respected rival Vyacheslav Ivanov.¹⁴ Moreover, most of Mandelstam's early essays include abundant references to Apollo and Dionysus in the sense that Nietzsche attributed to them in *The Birth of Tragedy*. A key influence in Mandelstam's reading of Nietzsche's first book was Ivanov, who considered himself a poetic disciple of Nietzsche's Dionysus. As Jane Garry Harris has pointed out, Mandelstam's reception of Nietzsche was most probably filtered through two main channels: Faddei Zelinsky, who taught Nietzsche's early work at St. Petersburg University between 1885 and 1921,¹⁵ and Ivanov himself, who for most of his life was obsessed with Nietzsche's emphasis on music in *The Birth of Tragedy*.¹⁶

Mandelstam's Defense of Language over Music

While the Russian Symbolists had sanctified Nietzsche as a prophet of the mythical power of music and poetry to convey unspeakable spiritual essences, Mandelstam focused on Nietzsche's appeal for struggle and dissonance to show how the tensions within poetic language allow for a different understanding of poetry from the one the Symbolists had envisioned. Mandelstam's recourse to Nietzsche, however, can scarcely be identified with precision as leading back either to specific passages from Nietzsche's original work or to Ivanov's reflections on the philosopher. It is clear

that Mandelstam is creating his own Nietzsche, one that challenges the works of the Symbolists, and perhaps even the early works of Nietzsche himself. Counter-intuitively, Mandelstam bases his Poststructuralist affinities not on Nietzsche's understanding of language as a "mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and antropomorphisms"¹⁷—which is perhaps the most widely recognizable and most often anthologized statement by Nietzsche on language, prefiguring poststructuralist thought—but on a critique of Nietzsche's early dismissal of language in *The Birth of Tragedy* as a weak derivative of music.¹⁸

Nietzsche's Dionysus stood for the non-imagistic art of music, which allowed for an immediate expression of "the world will" (*Weltwille*)—or the drive behind all being. Poetry, on the other hand, represented by Apollo, was "dependent" on "the spirit of music," (*Diese ganze Erörterung halt daran fest, dass die Lyrik ebenso abhängig ist vom Geiste der Musik*),¹⁹ and the images and concepts associated with language were superfluous for the understanding of being. In Nietzsche's words, the whole discussion in *The Birth of Tragedy* "insists that lyric poetry is dependent on the spirit of music just as music itself in its absolute sovereignty does not *need* the image and the concept, but merely *endures* them as accompaniments."²⁰ Nietzsche implies here, through his own emphasis, that the images and concepts in poetry—which are made up of words, and therefore partake in the orderly Apollonian principle—have a corrupting or a parasitical effect on its music, whose power seems to be lessened as a result of its involvement with language. Nietzsche's assumption is that poetry appears as an imitation of music rather than a verbal composition whose linguistic nature produces its own music.

Along these lines Nietzsche seems to launch an attack on language by claiming that "Language [*Sprache*] can never adequately render the cosmic symbolism of music, because music stands in symbolic relation to the primordial contradiction [*Urwiderspruch*] and primordial pain [*Urschmerz*] in the heart of the primal unity [*des Ur-Einen*] and, therefore, symbolizes a sphere which is beyond and prior to all phenomena."²¹ Such statements suggest that Nietzsche, at least at that point in his career, treated language as metaphysically inferior and chronologically posterior to music, much as Saussure treated writing as temporally deferred from and inferior to speech. In a letter to his sister, Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, which appears in her introduction to *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, Nietzsche suggests that—despite the book's title prophesying the importance of language—"It would even be possible to consider all *Zarathustra* as a musical composition." As the philosopher recalls, "At all events, a very necessary condition in its [*i.e., Zarathustra's*] production was a renaissance in myself of the art of hearing."²²

Vyacheslav Ivanov was captivated by the power of music thus described and embraced Nietzsche's understanding of language as hierarchically inferior to music. Ivanov rendered Nietzsche's ideas in his own words, claiming that, "It was necessary that Dionysus be revealed in music (the mute art of deaf Beethoven, the greatest proclaimer of the orgiastic mysteries of the spirit) before he could be revealed in the

word.”²³ Ivanov, moreover, complements Nietzsche’s idea of the “world will,”²⁴ by suggesting that “the supreme testament of the artist is not to impose his own will onto the surface of things; rather, he must intuit and proclaim the hidden will of essences.”²⁵ Ivanov thus viewed poetry as an attempt to express this “hidden will of essences” manifested in a “multivoiced eternal word [which] sounds forth in nature for those who are able to hear it.” Any poetic effort to imitate that eternal word, however, is inferior to the original, and thus, poetry can never live up to its imitative task.

In an attempt to overcome the poetry of his contemporaries the symbolists, as well as Nietzsche’s condescending view of poetry and language, Mandelstam presents his poetry as a productive struggle with both of his major influences.²⁶ Mandelstam’s departure from Ivanov and Nietzsche manifests itself most explicitly in the poet’s foregrounding of the structural aspects of the word as opposed to its musical or phonetic aspects. Thus, as Mandelstam asserts, “For the Acmeists the conscious sense (*soznatel’nyi smysl*) of the word, the Logos, is just as magnificent a form (*prekrasnaya forma*) as music is for the Symbolists.”²⁷

The Structural Struggle between Apollo and Dionysus

In Mandelstam’s innovative view of language as constitutive of wrestling formal elements, Nietzsche’s Apollonian and Dionysian principles seem to be ever present. Thus, Mandelstam declares that the acmeists “introduce the Gothic element into the relationship of words (*v otnosheniya slov*), just as Sebastian Bach established it in music.”²⁸ The Gothic element, expressed not in music—which both Nietzsche and the symbolists had favored—but in “the relationship of words,” includes the continuous struggle between the formative and destructive forces, which Nietzsche associates with Apollo and Dionysus.

For Mandelstam writing poetry was analogous to erecting culturally and spiritually significant buildings, like cathedrals and monuments, such as Hagia Sophia, Notre Dame, or the Admiralty in St. Petersburg.²⁹ Mandelstam likens poetry to such monuments not because poetry rests upon an unshakeable foundation of beliefs and values, but because poetry uncovers the process of erecting such buildings, which involves a struggle with the natural elements, especially the force of gravity. This struggle, moreover, is continuously present even after the construction process is over, as the monument itself becomes an incarnation of that struggle, rather than a steadfast symbol of a robust and unshakable culture or artistic intention. “The Morning” says “Acmeism is for those who, inspired [*obuyannyi*] by the spirit of building, do not like cowards renounce their gravity [*tyazhesti*], but joyously accept it in order to arouse and exploit the powers architecturally sleeping within.”³⁰ The desire for order and stability, the espousal of architectural images, and the celebration of form all seem to coexist in the essay with an emphasis on performance, dynamics, and instability. This instability of the monument as a symbol for the poetic work takes precedence over the understanding of art as an eternal unchangeable essence, shaped by an ever-present artistic intention.

While Mandelstam often likens his poetry to a Gothic cathedral—as a sturdy architectural center of gravity and order—he concurrently underscores the dynamics

inherent in the image: “The handsome arrow of the Gothic belltower rages [*zlaya*] because its function [like that of poetry] is to stab [*ukolot’*] the sky, to reproach [*popreknut’*] it for its emptiness [*pusto*].”³¹ These statements display what Wallace Stevens would call “a rage for order,” a paradoxical urge, which resonates with as Mandelstam’s claim that “To build means to conquer emptiness [*borot’sya s pustotoi*], to hypnotize space [*gipnotizirovat’ prostranstvo*].”³² The struggle between order and disorder, stability and destruction, which is necessary to sustain the Gothic cathedral, as Mandelstam depicts it, appears as a reverberation of the struggle between Apollo and Dionysus, as expressed in Attic tragedies according to Nietzsche.

In “The Morning” Mandelstam lays an emphasis on the dynamism of his central image of a Gothic cathedral, underscoring its monstrosity by explicitly referring to the Dionysian principle in Nietzsche: “What in the thirteenth century appeared to be the logical development of the concept of the organism—the Gothic cathedral—now has the aesthetic effect of something monstrous: Notre Dame is the triumph of physiology, its Dionysian orgy [*dionisiiskii razgul*].”³³ In his earliest essay, “François Villon” (1910), Mandelstam launches a number of rhetorical questions emphasizing the tension between stability and instability inherent in the artistic principles of Acmeism: “But is not Gothic architecture the triumph of dynamics [*torzhestvo dinamiki*]? Or another question is raised: which is more mobile [*podvizhno*], which is more fluid [*tekuche*]—a Gothic cathedral or the ocean surge?”³⁴ Mandelstam’s explicit references to both Apollo and Dionysus, as form-making and form-destroying energies, which can be found in most of his earlier essays, testify to the poet’s engagement with the philosophy of Nietzsche—despite his disagreements with the philosopher concerning the music/language divide—in order to undermine his poetic predecessors and adversaries, the symbolists.

The builder’s impulse for order and stability—which echoes that of the poet—is forever interrupted by the impending force of gravity that subjects the building to its power, so that the building can never rest at peace, but is always the locus of the dynamic struggle of elements. The same, Mandelstam implies, counts for the poem, which once written, does not remain a coherent, finished, stable unit, but is subject to the structural and historical forces that alter it during its journey in time. This latter diachronic aspect of poetry is undeniable in Mandelstam’s later essays, such as “Conversation about Dante,” where the architectural metaphors for poetry are replaced by cosmic ones, indicating that poetry is a futuristic journey in space. Thus, Dante’s work appears as a complicated flying machine that traverses space and time, in order to achieve its meaning in a future whose horizons are constantly shifting ahead. I see this futuristic image of Mandelstam’s later view of poetry as congruent with the poet’s early architectural understanding of poetry, and I shall examine this continuity of figures later in this essay.

Toward Structuralism and Poststructuralism

It is necessary to recall here Mandelstam’s claim that Acmeists “introduce the Gothic element into the relationship of words (*v otnosheniya slov*), just as Sebastian

Bach established it in music.”³⁵ The fact that the struggle between Apollo and Dionysius manifests itself in the “relationship of words” (*otnosheniya slov*) underscores Mandelstam’s understanding of language as one that prefigures structuralism and, consequently, poststructuralism. When Mandelstam defines “the word as such” (*slovo kak takovoe*) as the primary element of acmeist poetry, he focuses not on the referential aspect of language but on its structural and diachronic ones, which reveal the potential of poetry to resist the constraints of the specific meaning assigned to it at the time of its composition. In an essay titled “Nature of the Word” (*O Prirode Slova*), written ten years after “The Morning,” Mandelstam provides the most significant definition of “the word as such,” which strikes an odd resemblance with the structuralist and poststructuralist concepts of the signifier. In Mandelstam’s words:

...a word is not a thing [*ne veshch*]. Its significance is not a translation of itself. Indeed, it has never happened that anyone has christened [*krestil*] a thing, calling it by an invented name. The most appropriate and, in scientific terms, the most correct approach, is to regard the word as an image [*obraz*], that is, as a verbal representation [*slovesnoe predstavlenie*]. In this way, the question of form and content is avoided [*ustranyaetsya vopros o forme i soderzhanii*], phonetics being the form, all the rest—the content. Also avoided is the question of giving primary significance to the word as opposed to its phonetic nature. A verbal representation is a complex composite of phenomena, it is a connection, a “system” [*slozhnyi kompleks yavlenii, svyaz’, “sistema”*].³⁶

This perplexing definition seems to elicit more questions and objections than to provide answers regarding the nature of the word. Christening a thing by calling it by an invented name, for example, is not uncommon. Yet the insight behind Mandelstam’s claim supersedes its literal meaning. It implies the structuralist understanding of language not as a system of labeling (or “christening”) things—or as a composite of form and content—but as a system in which the relationship between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary and relational, as Saussure postulated it. Granted that Mandelstam’s exposition of the nature of language is very obscure and imprecise compared to that of Saussure, the structuralist trend in that exposition cannot be overlooked.

Mandelstam’s definition appears as a work in progress, as the poet shifts from one definition of the word to another: the word is not a thing but an image (*obraz*); it is not quite an image either, though, but “a verbal representation” (*slovesnoe predstavlenie*). The most insightful conclusion of this seemingly impressionistic deliberation is the definition of a verbal representation as “a complex composite of phenomena,” (*slozhnyi kompleks yavlenii*), which is also a “connection” (*svyaz*) or a “system” (*sistema*). This idea of language as a system or a complex of “composite phenomena”—which tends to focus mainly on the “connection” or “relation” between its elements—is surprisingly similar to Saussure’s definition of language as a system of oppositions and differences, in which what matters most is precisely the relation

between the elements. There is no evidence, however, that Mandelstam had read *Course in General Linguistics*, which came out in 1916, six years before the publication of “On the Nature of the Word.” A more likely influence on Mandelstam regarding this matter is the work of the Russian formalist thinkers, Viktor Shklovsky—who formed the *OPOYAZ* group in 1916, the same year that Saussure’s book was published—and Boris Eikhenbaum, who joined the group in 1918. Mandelstam was a close friend of both, especially of Shklovsky, who helped the poet on many occasions when the latter was in trouble with the Soviet authorities.³⁷ Yet, Mandelstam’s expositions of language as a dynamic body of opposing forces predate both Eikhenbaum’s and Shklovsky’s accounts, as Mandelstam’s reflections on language appeared in his earliest essays, written in the years 1910–1913.

The much earlier essay, “The Morning,” written in 1913, is the one that launches Mandelstam’s concept of “the word as such” by not only emphasizing the relational aspect of meaning but also by providing a proleptic criticism of Saussure’s model. “The word as such” here is persistently compared to a stone as building material participating in the construction of the Gothic cathedral. Mandelstam’s first collection of poems, published in the same year as “The Morning,” was also fittingly titled *Stone* (*Kamen’*), implying that the image of a stone is an extended metaphor for his poetry and for the poetic “word as such.” “The Morning” discusses “the word as such” as consisting of several formal elements, one of which Mandelstam calls “the conscious sense” (*soznatel’nyi smysl*):

“The word as such” [*slovo kak takovoe*] was born slowly. Gradually, one after another, all the elements of the word were drawn [*vtyagivalis’*] into the concept of form [*ponyatie formy*]. To this day the conscious sense [*soznatel’nyi smysl*], the Logos, is still taken erroneously and arbitrarily for the content [*oshibochno i proizvol’no pochitaetsya soderzhanie*]. The Logos gains nothing from such an unnecessary honor. The Logos demands nothing more than to be considered on an equal footing [*ravnopraviya*] with the other elements of the word... For the Acmeists the conscious sense of the word, the Logos, is just as magnificent a form as music is for the Symbolists. ...in Acmeism it [the conscious sense of the word] has for the first time assumed a dignified upright position and entered the Stone Age of its existence.³⁸

In this deceptively simple definition, Mandelstam presents a great challenge to the traditional classification of the linguistic sign as a fixed unit consisting of form and content, or a signifier and a signified. First, the linguistic sign, which Mandelstam calls “the word as such,” is subject to historical transformations: “‘the word as such’ was born slowly (*medlenno rozhдалos’*)”; that is, the concept of the sign evolves gradually in time. This evolution, which Mandelstam commends, has granted preference to the formal elements of the sign. Yet he claims, “To this day the conscious sense, or the Logos, is still taken erroneously and arbitrarily for the content.” In this statement lies the poststructuralist insight of Mandelstam, who differentiates between the “conscious sense,” or meaning, of the sign and its content.

By distinguishing between the meaning of a word and its content, Mandelstam establishes his departure from the ideas of traditional linguists, including Saussure, who had argued that a sign has a given fixed content or signified—even though that signified was not a specific material object but a mental concept. For Mandelstam, the sign, or “the word as such” is, therefore, always already only a signifier,³⁹ or as the poet puts it, “a magnificent form” (*prekrasnaya forma*) whose meaning is not fixed but continuously determined by its context in a structure. The sign, having finally entered “The Stone Age of its existence,” becomes like a stone in a building, continuously subject to gravitational tensions and historical reconstruction. This latter historical dimension of the linguistic sign is developed by Mandelstam later in the same essay featuring an image of a rolling stone in Fyodor Tyutchev, whom the Russian Symbolists claimed as one of their greatest forefathers:

But Tyutchev’s stone, which “having rolled down the mountain, lay in the valley, torn loose itself, or loosened by a sentient hand,” is the word. The voice of matter in this unexpected fall sounds like articulate speech. Only architecture can answer this challenge. Reverently the Acmeists raise this mysterious Tyutchevian stone and make it the foundation stone of their own building.

It is as if the stone thirsted after another existence [*kak byi vozzhazhdal inogo byitiya*]. It revealed its own dynamic potential hidden within itself [*skrytyu v nem potentsial’no sposobnost’ dinamiki*], as if it were begging admittance into the “groined arch” in order to participate in the joyous cooperative action of its fellows.⁴⁰

This reference to Tyutchev’s stone from the poem “Having Rolled Down the Mountain” (*S gory skativshis’*) discloses the structural tensions inherent in acmeist poetry composed of words that develop their meaning not only synchronically—that is, in relation to other words—but also diachronically, that is, in relation to their varying historical applications. Thus, the “word as such,” as a signifier or a relational entity, is being subjected here to the structural tensions of the poem’s composition, rather than having an independent essence or being a thing in itself, which both its Russian original (*slovo kak takovoe*) and English translation may wrongly imply. Instead, “the word as such,” metaphorically represented also as a stone in Mandelstam’s poetics, appears to be a formal entity, determined not by a meaning (or a signified) that it always carries in itself, but by its structural position in relation to other similar formal entities. These entities are other words resembling stones embedded in a building, each stone identical to the others except for its position in the structure that subjects it to different gravitational and lateral tensions. If the building collapses or loses its function in society, its stones could be used as building material for new edifices, gaining new significance based on the new position they happen to occupy.

Although Mandelstam repeatedly defines acmeism as a reverence for the “word as such,” (*slovo kak takovoe*)—a designation that may wrongly suggest an inherent independent essence or meaning of the word—passages like the above one on

Tyutchev, which recur in his early essays, hint at the subversive nature of the word, making it impossible to consider the word as having an essential meaning, or existing as a thing in itself. Instead, the poetic word in Mandelstam’s account points to the dynamic process of signification that does not rely on an already given or predetermined meaning. Therefore, the Acmeist “the word as such,” akin to Saussure’s signifier, is not a word that has a designated autonomous or fixed meaning in itself. On the contrary, it is defined as a carrier of intertextual signification that cannot be abstracted from its past and future applications. And it is in this latter sense that Mandelstam’s notion of “the word as such” moves beyond the atemporal synchronic nature of Saussure’s structuralist view of language and closer to a Poststructuralist diachronic reading of language.

In discussing Tyutchev’s stone, for example, Mandelstam indicates that the symbolist poetics itself, as grounded on the poetry of Tyutchev, is already a departure from itself, as its language acts subversively to its original intention and context. In this dynamic sense, the word always provides for a dialog between poets from different historical eras, as it resembles a journey through history. As evident from passages like this, it is not the conscious will of the poet, however, that determines the outcome of the composition. Instead, such passages testify to the unconscious and inexplicable effect of “the word as such,” which underlies Mandelstam’s poetry and prose, despite his insistence at times on the conscious agency of the poet in molding culture.

Mandelstam’s choice to identify the poetic “word as such” with the image of a stone as a building material arrives surprisingly close to one of Nietzsche’s aphorisms, although there is no way of telling if Mandelstam was familiar with it. The aphorism, titled “Philosopher’s Error,” goes as follows:

The philosopher supposes that the value of his poetry lies in the whole, in the structure; but posterity finds its value in the stone which he used for building, and which is used many more times after that for building—better. Thus it finds the value in the fact that the structure can be destroyed and *nevertheless* retains value as building material.⁴¹

Building “better” in the sense of believing in progress was not the forte of either Nietzsche or Mandelstam. Yet they both believed in the power of art to overcome modern culture and its metaphysical preferences for an otherworldly reality, as manifested in religious, scientific, or utopian ideals. Nietzsche’s aphorism prophesies the demise of metaphysics as an attempt to understand the world in an ideological way, that is, through grand narratives. By using the image of a stone as a continuously recyclable building block, Nietzsche emphasizes the continuous erection and destruction of cultural outlooks and philosophical interpretations of the world. The cyclical pattern of creation and destruction implied in this passage is reminiscent of Nietzsche’s idea of eternal return, but it also carries a strong resonance with Mandelstam’s understanding of the addressee from the future, two notions which I see as intimately related to each other.

The Eternal Recurrence and the Addressee from the Future

Nietzsche's idea of the eternal recurrence is considered probably as the philosopher's most obscure yet most captivating one. Some of the greatest followers of Nietzsche, including Martin Heidegger and Gilles Deleuze, have insisted that this sporadic and seemingly inconsistent idea forms the basis of Nietzsche's overall thought. One expression of this idea takes place in the section "On the Vision and the Riddle" from *Zarathustra*, when the prophet debates with a dwarf on the nature of eternity. It is the dwarf that ambiguously claims that "Everything straight lies... All truth is crooked, time itself is a circle" (*Alles Gerade lügt... Alle Wahrheit ist krumm, die Zeit selber ist ein Kreis*).⁴² This postulation of Nietzsche's eternal recurrence goes hand in hand with Mandelstam's understanding of the word as a recyclable entity, whose meaning is constantly redefined by the readers of the future.

As expressed in Mandelstam's essay "On the Addressee" (*O Sobesednike* 1913), from the moment of its conception, a poem becomes a call for its future readers who may interpret it in ways radically incomprehensible to its own author. The success of the poem is entirely dependent on its unpredictable and intangible spell on a future reader, who finds it personally intriguing. Only the awareness of that unknown and unknowable future reader will help a writer compose his poems with openness toward that radically unfamiliar destination which will bring about a re-creation of the poem. Tyutchev's stone is an illustration of a word's recurrence in a new poetic framework; yet the logic of that recurrence is reversed in Mandelstam's account: the ancestor-poets do not have a conscious control over their poetic inheritance; the poem originates not in the moment of its composition but in its re-appropriation by new generations of readers demanding new articulations.

It is in this context that Tyutchev's stone—that is, his poetic voice and imagery—defies the symbolist laws that determined its structural, poetic, and ideological significance. From the time of its conception, the poetic word "thirsts" for another existence—or for another poetic context—"begging admittance into the 'groined arch' in order to participate in the joyous cooperative action of its fellows." The poetic "word as such," then, according to Mandelstam, is not a self-identical stable entity whose meaning needs to be disclosed by future readers hoping to recover an original authentic signification. Instead, the poetic word is defined as a dynamic signifier which is not tied to any particular signified, but craves to be constantly redefined—that is to eternally return, in Nietzsche's sense—by the radically different and even (maybe necessarily) unfaithful readings of future generations.

Jacques Derrida's later work—particularly his *Specters of Marx*—resorts to Nietzsche's idea of the eternal return as a way of envisioning a future that does not comply with our rational expectations. This "future to come," as Derrida calls it, seems to proceed from his concept of *différance* as "temporalization" and "spacing conjoined."⁴³ In Derrida's words from the eponymous essay, "we will designate as *différance* the movement according to which language, or any code, any system of referral in general, is constituted 'historically' as a weave of differences."⁴⁴ Derrida's

understanding of language as a movement that "weaves" differences seems to closely echo Mandelstam's 1930 definition of poetic discourse as "a carpet fabric [*kovrovaya tkan'*] containing a plethora of textile warps [*tekstil'nyikh osnov*]." ⁴⁵ "It is an extremely durable carpet," Mandelstam writes, "woven out of fluid [*vlagi*]... Ornament is good precisely because it preserves traces of its origin [*sokhranyaet sledyi svoego proiskhozhdeniya*], like a piece of nature enacted [*kak razyigrannyy kusok prirody*]." ⁴⁶ This dynamic temporal account of language presents the poem (or any text) as a fabric woven of differences that retain a trace of their origin—that is, they cannot give a full testimony of their origin or authorial intention, yet the effect of that intention is present despite our inability to fully reconstitute it.

Such a reading of Mandelstam also exacts a mention of Mikhail Bakhtin, whose book *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* Mandelstam briefly refers to in "Conversation about Dante." It is hard to trace exactly how influential Bakhtin was on Mandelstam, but the parallel between their dialogic and diachronic understanding of language is very pronounced. In his book on Dostoevsky, Bakhtin reacts against the way traditional linguistics looks at language—that is as an object of study arrived at through "abstraction from various aspects of the concrete life of the word." "But precisely those aspects in the life of the word that linguistics makes abstract"—Bakhtin insists—"are for our purposes, of primary importance." Therefore, he defines his method of examining language—or "the life of the word"—not as linguistics, but as metalinguistics, whose subject are "dialogic relationships," as "language lives only in the dialogic interaction of those who make use of it."⁴⁷

For Bakhtin, then, as for Mandelstam, language cannot be studied in isolation from its application in time—yet *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* was first published in 1929, sixteen years after Mandelstam's essays "The Morning of Acmeism" and "On the Addressee"; Mandelstam's "On the Nature of the Word" predates Bakhtin's book by seven years, coinciding with the first few mentions of Bakhtin's new project on Dostoevsky, which appeared in Bakhtin's correspondence and in a literary journal based in Petrograd.⁴⁸ While it is certain that Mandelstam had read *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* by the time he wrote "Conversation about Dante" in 1933—and was perhaps in strong agreement with Bakhtin's dialogic view of language—the chronology of Mandelstam's work indicates that the poet could not have based his linguistic model on Bakhtin's theory of language.⁴⁹

"Conversation about Dante": Poetry as a Cosmic Flight

Mandelstam's diachronic aspect of poetry is, indeed, much more fully developed in "Conversation about Dante," where poetry appears as a futuristic journey in space, without losing track of its earlier architectural manifestation. Dante appears here as "the unrivaled master of transmutable and convertible poetic material;" yet "he is least of all a poet in the 'general European' sense or in the usage of cultural jargon," as his "poetry establishes itself with astonishing independence in a new extraspatial field of action, not so much narrating as acting out in nature by means of its arsenal of devices, commonly known as tropes."⁵⁰ What Mandelstam clearly emphasizes here is that the

mastery of a great poet does not lie in his control over the poem's meaning, which will never appear as intact and self-contained as, perhaps, some critics from the European tradition, including the Russian symbolists, intend to see it. Instead, poetry achieves an independent agency of its own and acts according to its own ungovernable laws. Thus, twenty years after he wrote "The Morning of Acmeism," Mandelstam persists with his criticism of the symbolists, maintaining that they are victims of the "ignorant cult of Dantean mysticism," which depicted Dante as the enigmatic figure of the poetic master, "consisting of a monk's hood, an aquiline nose ... procuring of something among the mountain crags." Among the Russians, Mandelstam claims, "none other than Alexander Blok fell victim to this voluptuous ignorance on the part of the ecstatic adepts of Dante who never read him."⁵¹

The image of Dante as that mysterious poetic genius was, as Mandelstam suggests, a creation of the European tradition that obfuscated the most valuable traits of Dante's poetry—its structural dynamics. "The inner illumination of Dantean space derived from structural elements alone"—Mandelstam writes—"was of absolutely no interest to anyone."⁵² Even as Mandelstam underscores the importance of the structural elements in Dante's poetry, he insists on differentiating between the concepts of form and structure. Targeting critics who insist on Dante's skill as sculptural, Mandelstam makes it clear that comparing Dante's poetry to a sculpture—that is, a fixed material form—is an "impoverished definition" for *The Divine Comedy*. Instead, Mandelstam insists that, "the material structure [of Dante's poetry] is infinitely more significant than its celebrated sculptural quality. 'Imagine,' Mandelstam writes, "a monument of granite or marble whose symbolic function is intended not to represent a horse or a rider, but to reveal the inner structure of the marble or granite itself."⁵³ This statement makes it evident that Mandelstam is interested in the metalinguistic or metapoetic quality of Dante's work, a concern that draws Mandelstam closer to both Bakhtin and poststructuralist thinkers, like Derrida.

For Mandelstam, moreover, a poem is an unstable "composition" that undergoes various metamorphoses in space and time. It is "formed not as a result of accumulated particulars, but due to the fact that one detail after another is torn away from the object, leaves it, darts out, or is chipped away from the system to go out into a new functional space or dimension."⁵⁴ This passage seems to provide a straightforward commentary on Mandelstam's 1913 essay "The Morning of Acmeism"—as it evokes the image of Tyutchev's fallen stone, which is about to become the cornerstone of a new structure—indicating a consistency in Mandelstam's lifelong vision of the nature of poetry. The poetic composition, furthermore, achieves its potential not at the time when all of its elements are put in place, but when these elements start detaching themselves from one system to join a different one, a process that might befit the Derridean term "de-construction."

In his tropes for poetry in "Conversation about Dante," Mandelstam shows an irresistible penchant for modern physics and astronomy. Dante's composition is not just a granite monument that honors granite itself, but a performance in time and

space; his cantos, in Mandelstam's words, are "missiles for capturing the future."⁵⁵ To understand how Dante's poetry works, Mandelstam compels us to imagine the flight of an airplane, which, while in full flight, constructs and launches another machine:

Furthermore, in the same way, this [second] flying machine, while fully absorbed in its own flight, still manages to assemble and launch yet a third machine. To make my proposed comparison more precise and helpful, I will add that the production and launching of these technically unthinkable new machines which are tossed off in mid-flight are not secondary or extraneous functions of the plane which is in motion, but rather comprise a most essential attribute and part of the flight itself.⁵⁶

This remarkable metaphor of the poem as a flight in outer space reveals that for Mandelstam what was most essential about poetry is not the moment of composition, or the launching of the flight, but the duration and transformation of the flight itself, as it sheds its elements to generate new flights, which are yet integrally tied to the first one.⁵⁷

In "Conversation about Dante" the scientific image of poetry as a flight that Mandelstam proposes is further followed up with an atomic image of the word as a thing that has no fixed substance but exists because of the energy that sets it in motion—which Mandelstam calls a "differentiating impulse." Mandelstam's use of the word "thing" alludes to his earlier designation "the word as such," which had (perhaps erroneously) implied that the word may be perceived as a material thing in itself, the building block of poetry, perhaps the way a stone can be the building block of monuments and cathedrals. My analysis attempted to prove that this assumption that the word is an actual objective thing, which exists in itself, is not justified. In this late essay, Mandelstam seems to come back to the same image, providing further commentary on how we shall understand "the word as such," starting with a remarkably Kantian definition and moving into a model of language that resembles quantum physics:

We do not know things themselves; on the other hand, we are highly sensitive to the facts of their existence. ... [T]he thing emerges as an integral whole as a result of the simple differentiating impulse which transfixed it. Not for one moment does it retain any identity with itself. If a physicist, having once broken down an atomic nucleus, should desire to put it back together again, he would resemble the partisans of descriptive and explanatory poetry for whom Dante represents an eternal plague and a threat.⁵⁸

Mandelstam's commentary here describes the experience of reading *The Divine Comedy*, which is formed not as a result of the mechanical absorption of factual information, but as the combined effect of the interplay of information with the musical effect of the poem, along with the play that they both stir in our imagination. The experience of reading Dante's poetry, thus, cannot be contained by a biographical, historical, or psychological interpretation of the text. At the heart of this reading experience is "the

differentiating impulse,” which is perhaps the very condition for understanding (or experience) to take place. Mandelstam’s insistence on “the differentiating impulse” as the driving force propelling the “thing” to emerge as an integral whole, can be perceived as parallel to Saussure’s and Derrida’s assertions that difference—rather than sameness (or self-sameness in terms of words having essential meanings)—is what makes meaning possible. For critics who try “to explain” Dante, or who attempt to give any finality to Dante’s poem—whether by locating it in Dante’s genius, or in historical analysis—Dante, Mandelstam tells us, represents an “eternal plague” or a threat.⁵⁹

Although in his later work Mandelstam seems to have resigned his strictly architectural metaphors of stones, cathedrals, and gravity, establishing a preference for metaphors of currents, textiles, and flights, the poet seems to reconcile the former and the latter sets with his emphasis on fluidity, instability, and tension. The Gothic cathedral is just as dynamic as the waters of Ganges, and the textile threads of the Nile are as subject to their origins as Tyutchev’s stone. And all—Cathedral, stone, carpet, and the Nile, as figures for poetry—are subject to the call of their forever deferred destination, which Derrida names “the future to come,” and Mandelstam—the unknown future reader. It is a never-ending journey, as Mandelstam posits it in “Conversation about Dante”:

Any given word is a bundle [yavlyaetsya puchkom], and meaning sticks out [torchit] of it in various directions, not aspiring toward any single official point. In pronouncing the word “sun,” we are, as it were, undertaking an enormous journey [ogromnoe puteshestvie] to which we are so accustomed that we travel in our sleep. What distinguishes poetry from automatic speech is that it rouses us and shakes us [vstryakhivaet] into wakefulness in the middle of a word. Then it turns out that the word is much longer than we thought, and we remember that to speak means to be forever on the road [vsegda nakhodit’sya v doroge].⁶⁰

This fascinating metaphor of the word as a bundle that cannot contain its meaning, but, instead, sends it in different directions, points to Derrida’s insistence on the constant deferral of meaning in space and time. For Mandelstam, too, the meaning of a sign is never self-contained or self-evident—it is, instead, continuously produced in space and time, and the task of poetry is not to teach us any particular truth about the world or about its author’s intention, but to make us aware of the nature of the word itself as that ever mobile unstable entity that continuously gains and loses its meaning based on its synchronic and diachronic relationships with other words. It makes us aware of the relative nature of our everyday language, so that even our prosaic use of it is always subject to constant tensions and transformations.

Nietzsche’s influence on Mandelstam is not as overt in the poet’s later work as it is in the early essays “The Morning of Acmeism” and “The Nature of the Word,” in particular; however, Nietzsche’s vision of the dynamic struggle between forces that shape human culture underlies Mandelstam’s lifelong work. The philosopher’s metaphor of stones as the building blocks of philosophy that constantly await the

creative transformations of their application parallels both Derrida’s and Mandelstam’s models of language. Mandelstam’s presentation of the “word as such” as “thirsting” for an existence in a different context underlies that the apparent structural unity or stasis of a poem is always undermined by the tensions between the intertextual voices, which do not simply reside in it but constitute it. The poem would not exist without these borrowed poetic images and voices that also challenge its unity and coherence. The struggle between the poem’s attempt at structural and thematic unity on the one hand, and the disruptiveness of its borrowed elements, on the other, establishes a parallel with the struggle between Apollo and Dionysus as defined by Nietzsche. In both Nietzsche and Mandelstam, moreover, this struggle is fore-grounded in exemplary poetic masterpieces that mark the naissance of a new understanding of language in Western culture—one that prefigures poststructuralist thought.

NOTES

- ¹ Elaine Rusinko, “Apollonianism and Christian Art: Nietzsche’s Influence on Acmeism,” in *Nietzsche and Soviet Culture: Ally and Adversary*, ed. Bernice Rosenthal (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010), 84.
- ² Clarence Brown claims that the Acmeists were “if one can use without pejorative sense a word that would gratify their directors, encomiasts of the *status quo*. Their ideal was the real, after all, and whether conceived of as a ‘living equilibrium’ or as a ‘great chain of being,’ it had to be conceived as a system of fixed relationships beneath the lovely mutability of experience.” Brown, *Mandelstam* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1973), 150.
- ³ Nadezhda Mandelstam’s claim that her husband defined Acmeism as “Nostalgia for world culture” has been widely accepted by Mandelstam scholars. See Nadezhda Mandelstam, *Hope Against Hope* (New York: The Modern Library, 1970), 249. For Mandelstam’s cross-cultural upbringing and work, see the above reference to Gregory Freidin, *A Coat of Many Colors: Osip Mandelstam and His Mythologies of Self-Representation* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2010).
- ⁴ Clare Cavanagh, “Mandelstam, Nietzsche, and the Conscious Creation of History,” in *Nietzsche and Soviet Culture: Ally and Adversary*, ed. Bernice Rosenthal (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010), 339; Harold Bloom, *The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1973); Harold Bloom, *Figures of Capable Imagination* (New York: Seabury Press, 1976).
- ⁵ Elena Glazov-Corrigan, *Mandelstam’s Poetics* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 2000), 8.
- ⁶ “The Morning” was written in 1913 and published in 1919 in the bi-monthly journal *Sirena*, edited by Vladimir Narbut; “Francois Villon” was written in 1910 and published in 1913 in the fourth issue of the Acmeist journal *Apollon*. See Jane Gary Harris, *Mandelstam: The Complete Critical Prose and Letters* (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1979).
- ⁷ See *Mandelstam: The Complete Critical Prose and Letters*, ed. By Jane Gary Harris (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1979), 62. The reference to Descartes appears much more pronounced in the original Russian sentence than in the English translation since its literal translation is closer to the statement “I build—therefore, I am right.”

- 8 See footnote 2
- 9 See Mandelstam's discussion of the "Heraclitean metaphor" in "Conversation about Dante" *Mandelstam: The Complete Critical Prose and Letters*, ed. By Jane Gary Harris (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1979), 417.
- 10 Mandelstam, *The Complete Critical Prose*, 401.
- 11 In a culminating moment in *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, just before announcing that "man is something that must be overcome," Zarathustra proclaims his own teaching on life: "Let your love to life be love to your highest hope; and let your highest hope be the highest thought of life! Your highest thought, however, ye shall have it commanded unto you by me—and it is this: man is something that has to be surpassed." See *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. Thomas Common (Blacksbug: Wilder Publications, 2009), 47.
- 12 Stuart Goldberg compares Mandelstam's early work to a pendulum, representing the inner struggle of Mandelstam who is torn between two poetics—the Symbolist and the Acmeist. Tracing Mandelstam's "anxiety of influence" in regard to Alexander Blok, Goldberg demonstrates how Mandelstam, as a supremely gifted poet, managed to convert his anxiety of influence into "myriad strategies for uninhabited creation" associated with "the sublime." *Mandelstam, Blok, and the Boundaries of Mythopoetic Symbolism* (Columbus: Ohio State University, 2011), 216.
- 13 Bernice Rosenthal, *New Myth, New World: From Nietzsche to Stalinism and Nietzsche and Soviet Culture* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002).
- 14 Mandelstam, *The Complete Critical Prose and Letters*, ed. Jane Gary Harris (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1979), 478.
- 15 Clare Cavanagh, *Osip Mandelstam*, 124-28.
- 16 Vyacheslav Ivanov, *Selected Essays*, ed. Michael Wachtel, trans. Robert Bird, (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 2001), 178. In his essay "Nietzsche and Dionysus," Ivanov praises Nietzsche's "mission and prophetic madness" since the German philosopher "returned Dionysus to the world." Ivanov goes on celebrating Nietzsche's relevance to Symbolism, claiming that "We felt ourselves, our earth, and our sun taken up in the eddy of a universal dance... We have tasted of the universal divine wine and become dreamers. Our dormant potential for human divinity made us sigh over the tragic image of the Superman, over the resurrected Dionysus that was made incarnate in us." In his book *Russian Symbolism: A Study of Vyacheslav Ivanov and the Russian Symbolist Aesthetic* (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1970), James West points out Ivanov's fascination with Nietzsche's Dionysus and the desire for a "non-analytic" understanding of the world embraced by the Symbolists: "Ivanov, like Nietzsche, traces the birth of tragedy from a religious need in man. He tells how the tragic muse first blossomed in Dionysian art, and gives a detailed account of the birth of Greek drama from Dionysian rites... Ivanov found typically the desire for total non-analytic comprehension of the world, a longing which the modern European mind is, in his view, coming to share," p. 78.
- 17 Friedrich Nietzsche, *On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense* in *Portable Nietzsche*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin, 1976), 46. Throughout my essay I am using the widely acknowledged translation of Nietzsche's work by Walter Kaufmann. I cite the original text from vol. 1 of *Friedrich Nietzsche: Werke in Drei Bänden* (München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1966).

- 18 It remains unclear whether Mandelstam was aware of the existence of Nietzsche's "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense" ("*Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn*"), the notorious text identifying truth with metaphors, written a year after *The Birth of Tragedy*. However, it is certain that Mandelstam took a rather roundabout way of defending Nietzsche's understanding of language against Nietzsche's understanding of music—which nowadays we may recognize as a standard deconstructive gesture. Nonetheless, in defending language against music, Mandelstam's more immediate target seemed to be the Russian Symbolists, who had occupied the center of public attention regarding poetic taste, and if Mandelstam was reacting against Nietzsche, it appears much more likely that he was, in fact, reacting against the Symbolist aesthetics in order to find a way out of the confines of their particularly powerful and appealing poetics.
- 19 Nietzsche, *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, 55; *Friedrich Nietzsche: Werke in Drei Bänden*, 43.
- 20 Nietzsche, *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, 55. Author's emphasis. The exact wording in the original is as follows: "*Diese ganze Erörterung hält daran fest, daß die Lyrik ebenso abhängig ist vom Geiste der Musik, als die Musik selbst, in ihrer völligen Unumschränktheit, das Bild und den Begriff nicht braucht, sondern ihn nur neben sich erträgt*"; *Friedrich Nietzsche: Werke in Drei Bänden*. Vol. 1, 43. Nietzsche's emphasis.
- 21 Nietzsche, *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, 55; *Friedrich Nietzsche: Werke in Drei Bänden*. Vol. 1, 43-4.
- 22 Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, trans. Thomas Common (New York: The Macmillan Company), xv-xvi.
- 23 Ivanov, *Selected Essays*, 179-80.
- 24 Nietzsche, *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, 127.
- 25 Ivanov, *Selected Essays*, 14.
- 26 Nadezhda Mandelstam, *Hope Abandoned*, 400-408.
- 27 Mandelstam, *The Complete Critical Prose*, 61-2; Mandelstam, *Osip Mandelshtam: Stikhotvorenia, Proza*, 503.
- 28 Mandelstam, *The Complete Critical Prose*, 62.
- 29 In his poem "The Admiralty" Mandelstam compares the monument built by Peter the Great to an "areal ship," "a yardstick for Peter's successors, teaching / that beauty is no demi-god's whim, / it's the plain carpenter's fierce rule-of-eye" (Mandelstam, *Selected Poems*, trans. Clarence Brown, 6); The Russian original reads: "*sluzha lineikoyu preemnikam Petra, / on uchit: krasota—ne prikhot' poluboga, / a khishtnyi glazomer prostogo stolyara*." Mandelstam, *Osip Mandelshtam: Stikhotvorenia, Proza* (Moskva: Folio, 2001), 42.
- The same dynamics of building, involving creative struggle with the elements, is evident in the poem "Notre Dame," which Mandelstam calls an "elemental labyrinth, unfathomable forest, / The Gothic soul's rational abyss" Mandelstam, *Selected Poems*, trans. James Greene, 17); In the Russian original the poem reads: "*Stikhiinyi labirint, nepostizhimyi les, / dushi goticheskoi rassudochnaya propast*" "Mandelstam, *Osip Mandelshtam: Stikhotvorenia, Proza*, 38. All of my references to Mandelstam's original work are derived from this source.
- 30 See Mandelstam, *The Complete Critical Prose and Letters*, ed. Jane Gary Harris (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1979), 62; Mandelstam, *Osip Mandelshtam: Stikhotvorenia, Proza*, 503.

31 Mandelstam, *The Complete Critical Prose and Letters*, 63; Mandelstam, *Osip Mandelshtam: Stikhotvorenia, Proza*, 504.

32 Mandelstam, *The Complete Critical Prose and Letters*, 63.

33 Mandelstam, *The Complete Critical Prose and Letters*, 63.

34 Mandelstam, *The Complete Critical Prose*, 59; Mandelstam, *Osip Mandelshtam: Stikhotvorenia, Proza*, 500.

35 See Mandelstam, *The Complete Critical Prose and Letters*, 62.

36 Mandelstam, *The Complete Critical Prose*, 129; Mandelstam, *Osip Mandelshtam: Stikhotvorenia, Proza*, 456.

37 Both Nadezhda Mandelstam (in *Hope against Hope* and *Hope Abandoned*) and Emma Gerstein (in *Moscow Memoirs*) relate stories about Mandelstam's personal encounters with Shklovsky and Eikhenbaum. Most of their accounts, however, concern the period in the early 1930s, when Mandelstam's early essays were already written. Although the two women focus mostly on the friendship that Mandelstam shared with the two Formalist writers, occasionally they comment on Mandelstam's attitude toward Formalism as a school of thought. While Nadezhda Mandelstam suggests that her husband was critical of the Formalists as thinkers, Emma Gerstein, a good friend of the poet, indicates that in the 1930s Mandelstam was involved in theoretical debates with Eikhenbaum and was even interested in writing an article about Formalism (*Moscow Memoirs*, 39, 124).

38 Mandelstam, *The Complete Critical Prose*, 61-2; Mandelstam, *Osip Mandelshtam: Stikhotvorenia, Proza*, 503.

39 From this point on, I use the terms "sign" and "signifier" interchangeably in relation to Mandelstam's work. I have chosen to keep the term "sign" for the sake of readability and style, but for Mandelstam, the meaning of the term "sign" leans strongly toward its role as a "signifier," rather than a dualistic complex of form and content, as traditionally perceived even by Saussure.

40 Mandelstam, *The Complete Critical Prose*, 62; Mandelstam, *Osip Mandelshtam: Stikhotvorenia, Proza*, 504.

41 Nietzsche, *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, 156. Author's emphasis. The German original reads: "Der Philosoph glaubt, der Wert seiner Philosophie liege im Ganzen, im Bau: die Nachwelt findet ihn im Stein, mit dem er baute und mit dem, von da an, noch oft und besser glaubt wird: also darin, daß jener Bau zerstört werden kann und doch noch als Material Wert hat." *Friedrich Nietzsche: Werke in Drei Bänden* (München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1966), Vol. 1, 814.

42 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None*, Trans. Thomas Wayne (Agora Publishing, 2003), 120; *Friedrich Nietzsche: Werke in Drei Bänden* (München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1966), Vol. 2, 408.

43 Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*. Trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 10-12.

44 Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, 10-12.

45 Mandelstam, *The Complete Critical Prose*, 398; Mandelstam, *Osip Mandelshtam: Stikhotvorenia, Proza*, 558.

46 Mandelstam, *The Complete Critical Prose*, 398; author's emphasis.

47 Mikhail Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*. Trans. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 181-83.

48 Jane Gary Harris, *Mandelstam: The Complete Critical Prose*, xxix.

49 In "Conversation about Dante" Mandelstam writes that "It is absolutely false to perceive Dante's poem as some extended single-line narrative or even as having but a single voice." (Mandelstam, *The Complete Critical Prose*, 406). Two pages earlier, the poet had suggested that "scandal in literature is a concept going much further back than Dostoevsky...[as] in the thirteenth century and in Dante's writings it was much more powerful." While these two references show Mandelstam's allegiance to Bakhtin, one might also get a sense of the differences between the two writers. These remarks to Bakhtin suggest that the poet agreed with Bakhtin's dialogic model of language, but they also imply that, perhaps, Mandelstam's own work—like that of Dante—had anticipated Bakhtin's exposition of the dialogic model. Mandelstam's brief references also seem to counter Bakhtin's position that poetry, or lyrical discourse, is fundamentally different from prose. Mandelstam appears to challenge Bakhtin, indicating that poetry is inherently dialogic and intertextual and perhaps, even more innately so than prose, as it temporally predates prose, or the novel, in view of the much later establishment of the novel as a genre. Mandelstam does not go as far as trace the origin of poetry back to the Ancient Greek chorus, but the implication is not unfounded, as Mandelstam sees Dante's poem as a sort of a choir of suffering voices, or "an orgy of quotations," in his words, whose drama cannot be resolved by an external force of authority or redemption (Mandelstam, *The Complete Critical Prose*, 401). This is precisely the way Nietzsche had imagined the origin of Greek tragedies before the concepts of a plot and an actor emerged out of the original incoherence, madness, and destructiveness of the voices of the chorus.

50 Mandelstam, *The Complete Critical Prose*, 427.

51 Mandelstam, *The Complete Critical Prose*, 411.

52 Mandelstam, *The Complete Critical Prose*, 411.

53 Mandelstam, *The Complete Critical Prose*, 407.

54 Mandelstam, *The Complete Critical Prose*, 401.

55 Mandelstam, *The Complete Critical Prose*, 420.

56 Mandelstam, *The Complete Critical Prose*, 414.

57 Perhaps this image of movement as consisting of heterogeneous elements that somehow belong together as an entity, is Mandelstam's way of picturing the unthinkable ways in which our consciousness works while perceiving and remembering data, as proposed by Henri Bergson in *Matter and Memory*. Mandelstam refers to Bergson on "On the Nature of the Word" to help explain his own understanding of "connection" or relationship between words (or poems) in time. Phenomena for Bergson are not temporally or causally connected to each other, Mandelstam reminds us; they are related "according to their spatial extension," forming, in Mandelstam's view, the shape of a fan that can be opened up or closed in time. This is an exceptionally valuable model, Mandelstam insists, because instead of focusing on causality, "which for so long dominated the minds of European logicians ... [Bergson] poses the problem of connection alone, purged of any admixture of metaphysics." In other words, Mandelstam's allusion to Bergson in the image of the flight is also an allusion to his essay "On the Nature of the Word," and thus

serves as a reminder that what Mandelstam himself is interested in all along is confronting an older model of language which stems from the logic of metaphysics with a purely structural or relational model of the way words or phenomena work. Mandelstam, *The Complete Critical Prose*, 118; Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, trans. Nancy Paul and W. Scott Palmer (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1911).

⁵⁸ Mandelstam, *The Complete Critical Prose*, 401-2.

⁵⁹ In his first visit to the United States in 1909, Freud famously commented to his then protégé Carl Jung, “They do not know that we are bringing them the plague.” Whether American people realized this is questionable, but what many literati in the Western World would agree on is that not Sigmund Freud, but Jacques Derrida had brought the plague to the field of literature, as he had showcased the self-destructive and self-contradictory ways in which texts establish their meaning. Perhaps the kind of plague that Mandelstam imagines Dante brought to traditional European critics was not unlike the plague that Derrida was accused of having brought, albeit half a century after Mandelstam had perceived it.

⁶⁰ Mandelstam, *The Complete Critical Prose*, 407; Mandelstam, *Osip Mandelshtam: Stikhotvorenia, Proza*, 568-69.

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Philosophy Manifesto

ARKADY NEDEL

Ἀθάνατοι θνητοί, θνητοί ἀθάνατοι...¹

Heraclites

मृत्युश्चरणंप्रपन्नोऽमृतं...²

Chandogya Upanishad

Theme

Philosophy is neither the explanation of the world nor the way to change it. Philosophy is the world in its original sense. The source of philosophy is death. In it philosophical idea characterizing the very nature of the human being reveals itself.

Around thirty thousand years ago, in the epoch of the Gravettian culture, man sets up ceremonial burials (the “polished” skulls *Homo sapiens idaltu* discovered in Ethiopia are to be considered as the practice of ritual murder). Death becomes the element of consciousness; humans start not just being conscious of death, they think death.

Death, having entered the human consciousness, brings about philosophical reflection. We don't know what were the feelings of that far-off man building the grave for his siblings: Was it sorrowful or delightful to send a close to the safer world or, sending him there, he knew that the separation will not last long. Importantly, death, entering consciousness, changed the mode of human thinking forever. Transcendence results from reflecting death; God is secondary to the proto-philosophical act of thought, to the consciousness that devoured death.

Burials are the primal act of philosophy, the first judgment about abstract things. Inventing the burials for his siblings, the human being initiated his thought to the incomprehensible and mysterious. The understanding of the latter can happen only within philosophy, for it is impossible to comprehend death in the concepts of existence.

Why do the dead need burials? To this childish question one can give a following answer: burials are the living being's business. Someone may say: “philosophy, then, is necessary just in order to understand death which conditions the first one...” Objection: philosophical consciousness is indeed the condition of death, however not in the sense that philosophy makes death possible but that it recognizes death as such. Death doesn't come to someone who has no idea of dying.

Freud wrote about death and studied it as one of his chief subjects; in Freud it

remained the cause of anxiety. In the Freudian psychoanalysis death is an ‘empirical’ proof of the unconscious. Man's inmost anxiety is to die, i.e. this anxiety resides in the unconscious. But it is not yet a skill to think death. Jim Morrison would have said “Fuck death” that in no way implies desire, like in the case of mother. “Fuck death” means only this: *Get rid of it, Go to hell*, etc. Someone can find in it a tautology since “fuck” and “death,” at the level Freud was concerned about, are the synonyms. In spite of all attempts, before and after the classical psychoanalysis, to comprehend death, the Western vision of it as absence did not help in solving the problem. The apophatic model, taken from theology, even if it was effective in the case of the transcendent, is not applicable to death. At first glance, God is unknowable as death; his presence opens to one who becomes God himself (not haphazardly that the Islamic mystic Mansur al-Hallaj, who said “I am God,” and the Azerbaijani poet ‘Alī ‘Imādu d-Dīn Nasīmī, who repeated these words, both paid their lives).

In the beginning gods suffered, vanished and died like men. Thus at the beginning of history Dumuzid the Shepherd, a Sumerian god, died. The literary sources inform that Dumuzid dreamed of his own death and tells Ngeshtin-ana, who tells him it is a sign that he is about to be toppled in an uprising by evil and hungry men coming to Uruk for the king. Married according to his wish, Dumuzid was sent to death by his wife, more precisely to the eternal death. He managed to escape several times but the underworld's cruel messengers captured him. The story of Dumuzid is probably the first dramatic narrative about the ineluctability of death.

When Nietzsche said “God is dead” he meant something else: the end of *the* God, the very idea of the divine, but afterwards this saying got a more sophisticated meaning. Man lost his ability to think of death and such a disability closed down his consciousness for philosophy. The search of salvation, being the pinnacle of all the world religions, ended in Europe. Death took over the man without coming *de facto*. Today the twice-dead settle Europe: those who know they will die and those who turned away from philosophical reflection.

Axiom 1: There is no consciousness desiring its death.

The understanding of an individual death and the idea of God is the most fundamental revolution that ever happened to the human consciousness. Today we are on the threshold of the next revolution: to conceive death as a mental event. It means to do the maximal philosophical action possible for consciousness. As a result we will see the radical transformation of death and God.

Poor minds can't manage without these two appealing to illusory ontology which seems better than the renewal of the foundation of consciousness. Those who nowadays strive for salvation in that illusory way should go on leave. The revolution of consciousness is not to apperceive death (and God) but to *abperceive* it; thus the human being will recreate himself anew. The end of history, oft-debated for the last three decades, will be replaced by the abperceived death.

The history of consciousness began with two fundamental tasks: to apperceive death and the transcendent. Remaining incomplete, however, these two tasks defined

the very nature of consciousness. To solve them is to grasp the nature of consciousness itself. We are not talking about the Hegelian ‘ablation’ of the idea of death and God, but about the *abperceiving* which removes their existence.

Axiom 2: The apperceived doesn’t exist, i.e. not subjected to death, the existing is not apperceived.

Death takes place beyond consciousness, into existence, but not beyond the possibility to conceive it. The complexity of death is for us that it has no its proper ontology to be deprived of, however this paves the way to its non-ontological understanding: neither as an object nor as an event but as the defined time of consciousness itself. Metaphysics, being generated by the mind wholly directed at death, gives such data.

What does it mean to think death? The paradox that eluded metaphysics is as follows: thinking death we think indeed only our dependence on it creating thus a thanatological subject. As to death, it escapes from consciousness which sees itself existing. *Cogito ergo sum* of Descartes is insufficient to get rid of the death dependence. This is why the essential insufficiency of consciousness consists in its existential self-perception.

So, today’s mission is to *abperceive* death and to remove all the ontological obstacles linked with the idea of existence.

More philosophico

Man cannot be deprived of philosophy since it is not a property at all; philosophical activity always directed at its source because everything else is of relative importance. Rigorously speaking, philosophy has no subject, and this is what the majority of philosophers deny, since being, essence, etc. are not its subject but the positions of consciousness determining the degree of consciousness’s bond to existence. Then, can philosophy outstep its own limits in a way to become the radically other? No, because philosophy has no “other” or “beyond;” in others words it knows no non-philosophy. If we talk about a genuine philosophy, any “other” is another possibility of consciousness. If it is a spoof then any “other” will remain just the clumsy exercises of narcissistic minds (cf. below).

Philosophy is distinct even from an elegant mathematics which works with formalized abstractions. Let’s give some examples:

α) Dedekind cuts whose purpose is to provide a sound logical foundation for the real number system. A set partition of the rational numbers into two nonempty subsets S_1 and S_2 such that all members of S_1 are less than those of S_2 and such that S_1 has no greatest member. In other words, Dedekind realized that the straight line is more “filled out” than the set what gives the idea of continuum. The idea was to articulate that a real number α intuitively is determined by the rationals smaller than α and those larger than α . Dedekind cuts are the abstract generalization of intuition.

β) Georg Cantor made a similar observation when he generalized the features of natural numbers by his set theory. Cantor’s radicalism consisted in his demonstration of some objects lying beyond the human intuition.

γ) Ricci flow, the background of the Poincaré Conjecture solution: every closed, smooth, simply connected 3-manifold is diffeomorphic S_3 or simply a sphere. Ricci flow is a process that deforms the metric of a Riemannian manifold in a way formally analogous to the diffusion of heat, smoothing out irregularities in the metric. Ricci flow is a geometric “time” describing the curvature of surface as long as it curves. A trivial case is a wineglass whose neck shrinks into the point under Ricci flow.

Even such a complicated mathematical device as Ricci flow, dealing with probably the most speculative matters, is very distinct from philosophical reflection. Ricci flow and noetic flow in phenomenology differ from each other as to the first one is a means helping to solve a task and the second is the possibility to set a task. Setting a task means thinking of something as a task but it doesn’t mean understanding its very possibility, i.e. the consciousness of the thinking one.

Philosophy doesn’t seek for an ideal language based on an illusory logical syntax, as it was imagined by the Austrian positivists, the intellectual hobos who took themselves for the inquisitors of metaphysics. They have seen in science what it has never been: salvation. By reducing the variety of meanings to a set of basic concepts and rules they snuffed out the possibility of setting any philosophical task. Philosophy left them, science closed its doors.

It is worth remembering the positivist lesson since it shows the case of “non-philosophy” when the thinking subject makes an attempt to exorcise his own thought.

Philosophy goes beyond physics. By posing the question about the beginning it time and again finds itself in a metaposition regarding the content of the question. If physics seeks and tries to prove the existence of a hypothetical element, say, Higgs boson, philosophy inversely treats existence only as a concept. This is why the beginning of philosophy is that moment when the human being apperceived death, i.e. something that doesn’t exist. Any attempt to ground philosophy on its own concepts is doomed to failure; such attempts are based on the wrong intuition to ontologize consciousness. Kant studied this type of intuition in the opening chapters of his *Critic of Pure Reason* (1787) having come to a conclusion that consciousness is a reflecting contemplation. One of Kant’s feeble points is the following: his theory of *a priori* synthesis says nothing about the conditions under which consciousness apperceives intuition, how the latter becomes the subject of consciousness?

How to omit the conversion of intuition into ontology? The question seems to have even bigger significance nowadays laying out illustrative historical examples before us: the Hegelian being, the Marxist master-class or the various shapes of *Dasein* and Δντοϛ appropriate consciousness *within* existence and, more importantly, *as* existence. It began with Aristotle and his doctrine of ορσά. Everything that exists, says the philosopher, *ex-ists* the ορσά; to this unfinished actualization the subject’s consciousness owes its own existence.

Ontological presumption articulated by the Sarvāstivādins in India and by the realists in Europe weakens the faculty of consciousness to think the out-existing other. Consciousness is not linked with being otherwise than by the acknowledging of

its existence. But such acknowledging is not yet knowledge in the true philosophical sense or abperceiving; the latter doesn't exist. Indeed, it can't exist since it apperceives the existence itself as non-existence.

The greatest philosophical problem today is to learn thinking out-essentially: the way, we believe, God thinks. The time came when philosophy can replace God. This is why the key to immortality lies not in the death of God, as Nietzsche once assumed, but in the apperceiving of non-existence. The Yogācārins view it as the appearing-disappearing dharmas. Dharmas appear and disappear without having such a feature as existence.

Axiom 3: Consciousness slips off from existence; it ceased to exist when it starts abperceiving what it is.

Thus we got the idea of the highest philosophical action. A thought, capable to abperceive everything including itself, creates philosophy and the out-based thinking field where thinking is not an activity directed at a thing – a thought which is not the subject of consciousness – but an act freed from the metaphysical system within which consciousness is bounded to essence.

We call it “the sacrificial nature of consciousness.” Its origin, let's stress it once again, goes back to Aristotle.

Finally, metaphysics converted the consciousness of the primitive sacrificator into onto-epistemological concepts. Trying to talk to gods by sacrifice, the man finds himself before a fundamental problem as to how one can overcome death. In history consciousness has been trying to solve this problem by sacrificing the very idea of death; death was apperceived as a complete stranger to consciousness. It was an epistemically wrong skew, for as existence death is ungraspable. The man didn't manage to think death because thinking it has turned out the essence of death itself.

Axiom 4: The sacrificial consciousness can't apperceive death due to its ontic connection to the latter.

Philosophy breaks down this connection.

Indo-European Philosophy

In Europe the deathful is not only included in the culture production, it stays closely to the divine. Death and God are homologous for the European mind. Nietzsche bamboozled his contemporaries: if God is dead, how can we bury him? How can we bury someone who is the cause of burials? So, consciousness was faced with the necessity of apperceiving its own omniabsence.

Philosophy is not a regional occupation by definition. It became so after World War II. Medieval merchants crossed over the continents for the sake of their business, philosophers opted for safety. The philosophical map of Europe became much similar to parishes in the feudal Germany: pray and cry at place of residence. Only fools and bigoted academic dons may do philosophy today without, say, considering Indian schools. Philosophy, divided into the squares of competence, often justifying the fabrication of meager texts, can't be called contemporary. Doesn't it sound absurd that philosophical work is governed either by political, or politically correct discourse, or

still worse by a meek self-censorship? Today philosophical work is squeezed in the edge stones of comfort, and all they wish from philosophy is the innocuity.

But there is another “today” stemming from diverse intellectuals tendencies and taking shape of a coherent project: there are the thinkers neglecting the formalistic limitations and tuning their minds on the Indo-European perspective, i.e. including in the work both Indian and European thought. Let's stress: we are not talking about the experts in certain fields or the comparatists but about the philosophers capable of apperceiving their work in such a way that it gets embedded into Indo-European thought, at least. Briefly, we are talking about the philosophy that abperceives death.

In India the question about death became the most severe test for consciousness. From it appears the resistance to death that classical Buddhism transforms into the problem of man-as-the-limit and teaches the ways to eliminate it. The highest aim is to apperceive death not as the givenness that everything will be over one day but as a state of consciousness ignorant about such givenness. The exit to the out-of-death reality where death becomes a mental event, discloses a radical difference between consciousness and being. Śāṅkara and Hegel are mistaken when they identified one with another. Death has no being for there where it is, “is” disappears; easy to understand. This is why the philosophical consciousness is not only a condition of death but also the way to overcome it. If to apperceive death as something without givenness and subjected to consciousness, and thus having no its proper ontology, the result will be not the self-consciousness, always meditating on the human finitude, but the origin of consciousness knowing zero time of death.

Axiom 5: Philosophy is stronger than God.

Axiom 6: Only philosophy can save God from death.

In Europe people buried the dead, in India they buried death which has been kept in the state of constant apperceiving. In Europe, inversely, death keeps consciousness in the state of anxiety. However, these distinctions, indisputably important as they are, should not become an obstacle in bringing both philosophies into unity. This matters little that there is no word “φιλοσοφία” in Sanskrit and the Greek language has no equivalent for “dharma” or “sāṃkhya.” Everyone who thinks philosophically will find the apt concept. Just mentioned ‘bringing into unity’ implies not an historical synthesis but a mental one.

Let's repeat: there is no comparatism here like *ātman-brahman* of the Upanicad with Spinoza's idea *deus sive natura* or St. Thomas' ontology with Mahayanist *tathāgatagarbha* or *saCtānāntarasiddhināmaprakaraGa* (Proof of Others' Continuums) of Dharmakīrti with Wilhelm Schuppe's *Solipsist*. We don't compare Krishna Bhattacharya and Ernst Cassirer on the basis of their conceptions of symbolic forms or, together with Hajime Tanabe, the Christian κένωσις and *śūnyatā* on that basis that both ideas lead us, striving for salvation, to the Pure Land (淨土宗 *jōdo-su*), to the absolute.

By the “Indo-European thought” we mean first of all a unified mental field covered with the same set of problems and marked by one super-problem: by means of

intuition and intellectual reasoning to attain salvation. Put it differently, the idea of salvation is so profoundly entrenched in the philosophies of India and Europe that its epistemological impact was very strong. This directedness at salvation within the thinking mind compels the philosopher to see things from this perspective. In other words, philosophy can't go on without the question about its origin.

To begin anew is not to die and resurrect or imitate the Hindu idea of cosmic death and rebirth with no stop; it means to put into doubt everything including the philosopher's thought. There is a good number of such self-renewing. Let's name just three: Nāgārjuna's *madhyamika*, Descartes, Husserl's phenomenology later biased by Heidegger toward his pseudo-theology. One can call this bias "μετάνοια" corresponding to the Japanese 悟 (*satori*) or 見性 (*kenshō*). Hajime Tanabe preferred the word *sange* meaning the roll-over of thinking into existence, the confession in one's guilt. The consciousness of guilt (*sange*) retains the subject within ontology changing not one's consciousness but the apperceiving of one's existence. *Sange* is the closest neighbor of *Sein-zum-Tode* which implies the complete ontologisation of consciousness. *Sange*, confession transforms consciousness into being. The *sange*-consciousness derives from existence and knows itself only as obstacle. Tanabe is a European thinker writing in Japanese; pairing himself with the Judaic prophets, Tanabe attributes to *sange* universal character. It gives an existential understanding of *śūnyatā* fortified by the Evangelic collectivist feeling. The consciousness of guilt liberates the human being not from guilt but from the consciousness itself. The Heideggerian *Sein und Zeit* belongs to this type of confessional discourse where the thought, directed at Being, seeks to justify itself ontologically. Consciousness apologizes for what it is and for being the obstacle to Being. But it is temporarily and will go away as a good servant. This is an illustration of the metaphysics of anti-consciousness that tamed man to worship death and existence.

This is why a collateral job today is to kill Heidegger. And let him to be killed by those who love him. By doing this they will free their heads from his Romantic razzmatazz.

Today and yesterday the European is guilty not because he or his ancestors committed crimes but by the very fact of thinking. Like karmic deeds, he accumulates his guilt by thinking and apperceiving existence. Guilty is not just a man but consciousness as a whole. Such is a metaphysically set up order.

Guilt is neither a state of affairs nor ethical self-fashioning. It's the position of consciousness, a gnoseological mindset. Strictly speaking, only the guilty can apperceive and what he apperceives is his guilt. *Cogito ergo sum* is a confession in the guilt of existence or the expressed readiness to scarify oneself. Kazuo Muto called it 自己批判 (*jiko gisei*) that he compares with the Christian ἀγάπη or *caritas*. The aim of philosophy here is to grasp the consciousness of the individual-in-guilt, his self-consciousness by apperceiving the eternal death of the *ego*, its accomplishment in the absolute. Someone will notice in it the point of conflation between Eastern and Western eschatological projects. There is a special reason for it especially if one remembers

such Pietists as Paul Anton and August Francke who implanted their ideas in Halle. Pietistic education was extremely severe; almost any kind of amusement was considered sinful. The life of a Christian is a permanent confession.

Eschatology is, however, a product of the heart. It is impossible to base on it a theory of consciousness. Moreover, any eschatology sees consciousness vanished into the transcendent. In other words, the eschatological mind knows itself more in the beginning than in the end. Such is the position of the deadly threatened being confessing in his or her guilt.

Axiom 7: Guilt is the epistemological platform of the European consciousness.

A new theory of consciousness should be constituted on a totally different ground: not by the apperceiving of one's guilt nor by setting the latter as the transcendental condition for conscious acts but as a theory of consciousness eliminating existence (*tattva*) as its own condition. Thought which doesn't think of itself as existing becomes a philosophical one. All the Indo-European thought aimed at the apperceiving of consciousness, attaining its pure state, is entirely based on the self-sacrificial consciousness. That is, the thinking subject is the sacrificial subject, one who apperceives himself as the sacrificator. But this apperception makes him also the sacrificed.

Philosophical thought is a unified process composed of fundamental mental actions. This can be proved by any examples taken from its history. In India Buddhism revolutionized the Brahmanic doctrine Atman-Brahman, i.e. the idea of the absolute knowledge; in Europe the relativist revolution revaluated the absolute space of classical mechanics. These two intellectual events are of the same order. No matter that they belong to a different historical time that doesn't correspond to the philosophical time. Time is an apperceived element of existence. The ablation or the constitution of the absolute is a philosophical act.

The majority of the Indian systems as well as the European ones are the salvation doctrines. Besides, philosophy should not create such doctrines but be it. To think philosophically already means to practice immortality.

What does it mean then to think philosophically? First, it means thought as such for thinking per se is a philosophical state; there is no other thought save this one. Secondly, philosophical thinking is a resistance giving the human being to make one step further from his present place. This is a way to the abperceiving of death. The essence of death is the absence of thinking. One cannot think in death but can think – abperceive – death. Who does so become *homo philosophicus* and acquires the art to resist the lie overwhelming the contemporary world. This is why the task is to replace today's political world, based on a total lie, by the philosophical one modifying individual consciousnesses. Such would be the revolution of a new type (cf. below).

The Gymnosophists of the post-Alexandrian epoch were indeed the Indian thinkers both as they regarded the world and themselves. One can call their positions the radical critique of the givenness under which the latter is changing. The notorious indifference of the "naked wise" is not as it is usually seen. There is no need to make

a sharp distinction between them and the Pyrrhonian skepticism genetically linked to it: Pyrrho defined the *skepsis* as epistemological position, his *skepsis* is the point of view; the Gymnosophists practiced not the *skepsis* but a negative absolute similar to Buddha's silence. They resisted not only the being of (and in) the world but the knowing of it what make them meta-philosophers and the meta-humans. A most difficult question is whether the Gymnosophists' practices echo one way or another the yoga in the Patañjali sense? Or they stood closer to the Buddhist sangha way of life? One thing is certain: the Gymnosophist was unknown to Europe as the subject of thought.

We are lucky to have the precise date of the beginning of European philosophy: 529 B.C. According to Aristoxenus of Tarentum, in this year, after a very long journey, Pythagoras returns to Croton and start teaching mathematics and philosophy. Iamblichus and the others note the unprecedented success of his lectures gathering more and more participants. Pythagoras established the school in which the few initiated got access to the transcendent truths. These truths – they know it – don't depend on the mortal mind. Philosophy in Europe began by expurgating man from the sphere of the ideal knowledge. The truly philosophical in the early Pythagoreanism was this idea of absolute knowledge whose subject will come much later; in Pythagoras there is no "Subject," one who strives for the absolute knowledge. The concept of the subject appears in metaphysics due to this initial limitation of the subjective.

Just *Timaeus* would be enough to prove Plato's life Pythagoreanism; Plato ciphered in his dear Socrates his true master, Pythagoras. In many late Plato dialogues "Socrates" is Pythagoras. After almost two millennia the Italian monk Luca Pacioli will draw attention to Plato's obsession for the middle as one of the key principles of geometry – *harmonia mundi*, what gave Kepler not just the title for his book but the way of his thought.

Ab ovo

Philosophy seeks for the ultimate knowledge. It is not haphazardly that Democritus who interpreted Leucippus' ideas or Praśastapāda and his commentator Śridhara have been looking for the first elements (ἄτομος, *paramāṇu*) ; Albert the Great, Nicolas Flamel, Roger Bacon have pursued *lapis philosophorum* struggling against death even with the help of alchemy. Through Aristotle and his Arabic exegetics Albert realized that to philosophize means to be directed at death. It was the Scholastics who elaborated the conception of the mortal mind understanding its finitude through the idea of God. The scholastic worlds are analogous and homologous one to another: *Quod est inferius est sicut quod est superius*. The idea of analogy, bequeathed by Aristotle, was used by the Middle Ages as a philosophical tool. It allowed not only to see the invisible, i.e. how the divine mind works, but also to inscribe oneself in the multileveled universe. Philosophers haven't considered their work without the world they lived in; their concept of the "world" was entirely different from ours. Their world was composed not only of material elements – quanta of objectivity, – it was also intelligent and intelligible. The world is not the only the object of perception but also the intellectual partner living his own life. Abhinavagupta, a chief thinker of Kashmir

Shaivism, has described the world as composed of *vr̥tti*, moving ontic elements – perturbations – irritating both the matter and consciousness. The *vr̥tti* are linked together not by existence but by the way of how consciousness produces its own object of perceiving. This knowledge, as well as the primal impulse to philosophy, needs no existential guarantees.

Yet again, can philosophy treat the beginning as its object since the 'beginning' is something already invented and existing? The answer might be as follows: beginning or foundations are the object of philosophy in time. Philosophy invests *its* time into it. The idea of time, so fundamental for consciousness, is manifested first of all in the consciousness' attempts to return to its origin. From this point of view, the origin occurred in a certain past, and this is where the grave error lies. The time of returning to the origin is the false time (let's call it the "Hegelian time" since Hegel as anybody else appealed to the necessity to know the origin). Philosophy lives in such false time up to now; this time became its essential property.

Let's stress: the quest for origin turned out not only the constituting principle of metaphysical consciousness, it provided philosophy with the Hegelian time skewing it essentially. Briefly, it was the question with infinite curve.

Axiom 8: Consciousness constituted itself in the false time.

However, it is sufficient to remove this time from the conscious acts and the situation will radically change. The inquired source of consciousness, necessarily alluding to a past, will become spontaneous or timeless. Put it another way, the source of consciousness can reside in any time. This source is the consciousness' action. It is such an action when consciousness doesn't seek, i.e. doesn't reside in the false time but produces its own source.

Here lies the fundamental difference between philosophy and other disciplines: philosophy has no foundation rooted in time.

Still, don't we make a conceptual mistake by asking the question about the beginning of the universe? Doesn't this questioning hide another question about the beginning of the consciousness itself? Because the question about the beginning of the universe is not just cosmological or physical, it results directly from the necessity of consciousness to comprehend its own nature. Indeed, we create for the world a beginning which is one of its possibilities. Did the universe come up from a blown singularity or it bounced from a bigger one? – the idea shared by a number of physicists in the '60s after Hugh Everett's hypothesis. We have no strict answer to this question. One thing is clear: the question about beginning can't be solved only in the framework of a physical theory.

Beginning (αρχή/prabhava) is a mental concept as well as the foundation; the question about the ultimate source sends us back to the metaphysical problem of essence (οὐσία) without any certainty that the universe does have it. The most provocative physical theories, as the loop theory of quantum gravity, are philosophical in their foundations since, following the Greek and Indian atomists, they hold up with the idea of the existence of the 'first element.' The loop or string or *adr̥ṣṭa*, the invisible

force, the immortal within the mortal individuum, are such primal elements. But ἀρχή means a time when God was at rest. The question about beginning has its weak point: being posed, it falls in the frame of existence.

Narcissi

What should have happened to philosophy that it was trimmed down to what so-called “postmodernism”? There are at least two reasons:

Firstly, the ignorance and unwillingness of the majority of post-modern authors to see anything beyond their own wee world. Thus the true philosophical problems have been swapped for pseudo-problems;

Secondly, these authors refused to open themselves to anyone else. They closed the doors of their club. The otherness, postmodernism and deconstruction liked to say, was not a radical philosophical act but the otherness regarding philosophy *per se*.

Deconstruction results from the anxiety before the preceding epoch. Anxiety and envy before the total style of totalitarianism are its true source. Yet, the Hegelian Absolute Spirit, hovering over the post-modern thinkers, the spirit of the end of philosophy has troubled them at most. Still, postmodernism is cutesy, that is inexcusable for philosophy. This cutesiness trace back to the Nazi era for which philosophy should take responsibility. The idea is simplistic: by the cutesy talks and texts we will persuade the wide public in the safety of philosophy, worse in its senselessness. Doing philosophy is like playing cards, sort of killing time.

But philosophy has no need of such lawyers; it doesn't charm the wide public performing that kind of tricks the public wishes to see, philosophy is no Lady Gaga. It never justified itself before those who make no attempt to understand what philosophy is. Justification is not productive. To think that Hitler came as the philosopher and then transformed into murder is a postmodern reflection, i.e. amateurish.

Postmodernism is incestuous, it has no idea of the other. It looks always in the mirror. Its concepts – playing cards – are just a game with itself and for itself. This game proved to be absolutely barren.

Consider just one example: *différance*, one of the key concepts of deconstruction, signifying a free sliding on the field of meanings where meanings are gathering like cottony cones by crossing over the field many times. The problem is that you gather all the time the same meanings or you always gather the meanings you want. That's the deconstructivist comfort making you believe that the damned dichotomy is, hurrah, overcome. Such a spoof has nothing to do with philosophy.

The Yogācārin Asaṅga worked out the conception of the *Dharmakāya* (the true body) that was one of the most thoughtful attempts to overcome dualism. If *différance* is a field of random meanings, any meanings ejected on the surface by the reading of a text, Asaṅga's non-duality exposed in *Mahayanasangraha* is attained by consciousness through the removal of all the random in order to reach the ultimate cause. To play *différance* one needs to relax, the abhidharmist non-duality requests the maximal concentration of intellectual forces.

Antonio Negri noted sarcastically that the body in postmodernism is the only concrete thing, something one should not play with. But in the end postmodernism left the body to the girly journals.

What do we have now? Ashes. In fact, postmodernism is related to philosophy as *fabula atellana* to Euripides' plays. Like Santa Claus postmodernism has something for everybody. Just play. You will never lose. There is no risk. This illusory guarantee of success makes philosophical work meaningless at the outset: throw the dice. But philosophy is never based on the *a priori* impossibility to fail.

Philosophy is inseparable from risk, it is a continuous risk. Consider Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, Asaṅga, Śaṅkara, Husserl... The risk resides in the very nature of philosophical thinking. The beginning may bring no results or benefits. The true thinking brings no benefits or leads to a comfort because at any moment one needs to start it again and again.

Descartes realized it clearly when he tried to save the idea of existence by rooting the latter into the act of thought. It is impossible because thinking philosophically implies that you don't think of yourself. When in *Krisis of European sciences* (1936) Husserl speaks of a philosopher capable to remove the world from the field of his thought, he gives no guarantees of existence or mental comfort so dear to postmodernism. The experience of the XXth century showed all the illusory character of such guarantees. Philosophy discovered it much earlier than history moving ahead of the latter, never behind as Hegel has thought.

Ἐποχή, *cogito* or any other radical act, leaving nothing save its own, makes the human being overcome everyday pseudo-thinking. *Abperceiving* (cf. supra) makes him meet the naked consciousness which is undoubtedly the most challenging meeting the human being may ever have since consciousness is always considered as existent – *quod existit*. Consciousness exists neither in the scholastic sense nor as the Cartesian evidence of the existence. Consciousness doesn't exist as something that is given or something referring to its origin, to essence.

Axiom 9: Naked consciousness appears from the abperceived death.

Someone may ask: how should we interpret the Yogācāra's or, in a softer version, Berkeley's or Schuppe's idea that there is nothing save consciousness? The answer is as follows: in the Yogācāra as well as in Berkeley or in Schuppe consciousness has no existential parameter; the 'existence of consciousness' is to be understood as the act of consciousness itself. So, if the existence of consciousness is open to consciousness only, then the latter can remove anything including the idea of existence.

It seems more convenient to define the “existence of consciousness” by the Sanskrit word *āśraya* composed of “*śri* – “to lean, to lay in, to bring support” and the prefix-nominalisator *ā*. In this context one can translate *āśraya* as “footing” that in no way exhausts its Sanskrit semantics. *Āśraya* supports consciousness when it exerts any kind of ἐποχή: retention, ablation, etc. If the Yogācārins aimed to liberate consciousness from all forms of bondage to the external world, to revolve it to itself (*āśraya paravṛtti*), now the goal is to see consciousness in a radically different way.

Axiom 10: There exists (or can exist) only what I don't see in my thinking.

"I" is what apperceives this. The next step is to enter the metahistory unifying both India and Europe including the levels of individual consciousnesses. Both lines of thought have at least one fundamental trait in common: India and Europe set the task of bringing the human consciousness to a superlevel even by sacrificing the thinking subject himself. Some authors, like Aristotle and the composers of the early Upanishads, recognized in it an ontological goal; others, like Clement of Alexandria, Utpaladeva, Ramanuja, Meister Eckhart or Hegel, saw in it the theological challenge; Vasubandhu, ŚāAkara and Husserl, for example, chosen the epistemological way of solving the problem. There is no comparatism here; inversely, we came to a 'metahistorical position' of the concrete consciousness within philosophy neglecting all the possible geographical or, worse, political limits.

It is not enough today to exploit the Indian thought in Europeans categories, even if it had brought certain encouraging results (Hegel, Th. Stcherbatsky). Today the goal seems to be harder: to construct a unified philosophical super-experience which will lead to a grounding reconstitution of consciousness. Such an experience becomes possible only in the superphilosophy where the standard analysis bringing about some historical comparisons is no longer sufficient. In order to see philosophy one needs to neglect artificial distinctions.

Axiom 11: In superphilosophy the division between the East and the West ceases to exist.

Such philosophy should be constituted not as an "historical heritage" but as a conceptual network where the domination of the historical time is left. Consider one example: in *Krisis* Husserl speaks about the recalling intuition (*wiedererinnernde Anschauung*) that shows "the object as-the-just-been in certain perspectives and other appearances but modified in recollection." This, indeed, re-conceptualizes the Buddhist concept *smṛti* (meaning: the recalled item) whose first exploitation seems to have appeared in the *smṛtyupasthāna sūtra* the chief idea of which is that the stabilized mind leads to mental liberation.

Husserl's epistemological procedure gets close to *smṛti*, even the word "perspective" is used not haphazardly, for Husserl, as well as the Buddhist epistemologists, fixes up the origin of that type of consciousness that deals not with the object *per se* but with its residence in consciousness, with its quasi-objective nature.

Husserl and the *smṛtyupasthāna sūtra* speak of the similar thing, and there is no coincidence here. Perspectives, from the historical point of view having different sources, conflate in philosophical action originally aimed at the abperceiving of the object as existent.

"Originally" means in accordance with the very nature of the philosophical thought. Philosophy doesn't try to seize the essential as existent; its goal consists in bringing consciousness to the truth, to *tattvajñāna*.

Axiom 12: Consciousness is not what it apperceives but only what it abperceives.

The *cogito*'s consciousness exists inasmuch as its existence is not abperceived. The true time is the abperceiving of the false one.

How do we know what is consciousness? Indeed, by understanding the *is* as the obstacle and removing it from consciousness. Consciousness attains its ultimate, naked state when *is* gets dropped.

What does it mean, in this case, the truth? It means consciousness that doesn't perceive of itself *as such*. A healthy person doesn't sense his or her working leaver; similarly, consciousness in the state of truth doesn't perceive of itself as consciousness.

Political Ontology

Politics has one indisputable particularity: any political discourse or any talk about politics turns into a lie. In politics Feuerbach's statement *Homo homini duces* is mainly justified since belief in a ruler is similar to belief in God. It is very much so when they delegate to the ruler the right to save the life of the whole nation. Consider the presidential elections of 2008 in the United States. *Yes, We Can* of the Democrats sounded not just as the plea for a radical political change and the choice of the first black president but also as belief in the salvational force of this choice. After the election the hopes began gradually to fade.

President Obama didn't do what his electors wished him to do: miracles. They forgot that the president is a politician and his promises are political promises.

After being elected, Obama willy-nilly had to desacralize himself: from the Savior he became a statesman who performs no miracles but tries to push his reforms in economics. In fact, the disillusion of the Americans came not from Obama but from their own soteriological mind. It was, perhaps, one of the most striking events in American political life. As a political subject the United States depends on its religious patterns in no way less than Europe.

America seems to approach the mental revolution similar to the European one in the last third of the XIXth century what later made politics total in Europe. This is to be considered as the important source of the totalitarian systems.

"What do we want?" asks Negri and answers: "We, of course, want world democracy, democracy for all." Even if he is honest, Negri honestly lies, and this is also the paradox of political discourse. The concept "world democracy" is meaningless since there is no political subject who could take it as *modus vivendi*. As recent history showed, any forced export of democracy to the countries showing no will to accept this, is doomed at the outset. Islamic states, like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and some others, whose socio-religious patterns rooted in *ṣarī'ah*, will not leave their model for the sake of the Western democracy for one simple reason: democracy is redundant to *ṣarī'ah*. Everyone who is familiar with Islamic political doctrine knows that the concept of *ṣarī'ah* implies totality, or the unification of politics and religion, unknown to the West. Unlike the countries of the caliphate, the European model has always balanced between the royal and papal power. King and Pope composed the social binary structure organizing not only all European state institutions but also the European social mind.

It is hardly believable that Kim Jong-Il would have delighted to see his regime,

“democratic” in the North Korean sense, spread all over the world. This is a reptilian model opposed both to Islam and to the Europe. Paradoxically or not, the Kim statecraft with its *Songun* principle, articulated again in the 2009 Constitution, borrowed much from Italian fascism: the state is a primary value of the nation. The nation in North Korea is viewed as the pure subject, a sort of the Husserlian transcendental subject made of blood and bones. The North Korean democracy is one-dimensional with no extension whatsoever.

The largest lie (or illusion) of Negri’s idea resides not in the word “democracy” but in “we,” for this “we” constitutes the empty subject into which any political content can be implanted, any political power can hide behind this emptiness. The authors of *Empire* (2000) hint on it asking a Hobbes question: Is it possible at the same time to keep the empire – the quasi-imperial structure of the contemporary world – and to eschew multiplicity capable to trigger the war? How to strengthen the desire of the common people that fills out the individuals and transform it into the state power?

Obviously, whatever political institutions would have been invented, whatever democratic ideas were embedded in them, will not liberate today’s man from the anxiety of his own consciousness guilty in history itself. The political man will always long for world democracy as well the medieval man had longed for life after death. Since certain epochs we live within the discontinuous states that are in us as an *idée fixe* of themselves. The state wants us to remember it all the time, and this memory takes shapes of our duties, both real and symbolical. The *state-memory* is a new type of mental fatigue.

Such an omnipresent memory about the state compels us to lie, especially those who are inclined towards such a lie. When Giorgio Agamben compares contemporary society (state) with the concentration camp that conducts bio-political experiments depriving the man of his “symbolical skin,” Agamben construes the lie of the second order; he speaks of the political practices as if they had an anthropological goal. The critic’s reflections have much in common with the courses of aerobics for the retired taking care of their physical shape and also killing their leisure time. That might even sound pretty, if the critic has not lied to his audience what whittles away any philosophical content of his texts. Agamben perfectly knows that the contemporary Europe, where he circulates as a teacher of wisdom, is all but the concentration camp. It works neither at the metaphorical level. The concentration camps, if he means the Nazi ones, needed no reflections, they were banned there. Moreover, the contemporary Europe leaves no room for *homo sacer*, Tamil tigers or the Dalits; “*homo sacer*” is a concept showing the impossibility of its author to think otherwise than in political terms. In fact, *homo sacer* returns and politics takes the sway over more and more living space. Agamben is the first who should be happy of this fact since politics is his living space. In fact, the bourgeois author criticizes the bourgeois society for letting him to criticize this society. One more detail: Agamben explains that the Jews in the Nazi concentration camps were *homini sacri*, this is a conceptual error. Unlike the “inferior races,” the Jews were bowdlerized from humankind by the Nazi propaganda.

Axiom 13: Lie is the ontology of politics.

This is why the “philosophy of politics” has no sense. A philosophical reflection on politics undoes the philosophical reflection itself, for philosophy vies for the truth and politics for its truthful partisans. In politics there is no and can’t be truths, its reasoning is essentially stranger to the truth, to the philosophical reasoning. Politics has no thinking subject, instead it has certain “nothingness” or “we,” imitating the thinking. “We” is an illusion created by politics, Śaṅkara’s *māyā*; with little historical difference “we” is always a political variant of salvation.

“You can’t or don’t want to think, become “we,” and everything will be good.”

“We” know they are immortal. Lenin was right when he asked his intellectual fellows to convert philosophical abstractions into the real actions; he was also right at criticizing Hegel who subjected politics to the Idea.

Axiom 14: Politics has only one idea, that of masses who believe only in politics.

These two similar illusions are generated by the same drive: to do what religion failed to do. To pave the way for salvation. The total politics was born as a soteriological idea.

The Western civilization, based on the anxiety of death, doesn’t know to think – abperceive – the latter. The West, living on the political cinders left after the World War II and constituting from it its contemporary history, is a result of the Western incapacity to think death; in other words, it results from a suspension of the philosophical thought. Western man sought the salvation in the exterior, i.e. in self-redemption before God.

The consciousness of guilt brings the person in constant state of waiting for punishment or mercy. The existential platform of the European man is the quest for mercy, the epistemological – the apperceiving of his guilt. In *Alcestis* of Euripides the Thessalian king Admetus for his hospitality is granted by Apollo freedom from death, but Admetus must find someone to take his place when Death has come to claim him. The time of Admetus’ death comes and he still has not found a volunteer. His father, Pheres, is unwilling to step in and thinks that it is ludicrous that he should be asked to give up the life he enjoys much as part of this odd deal. Finally, Admetus’ devoted wife Alcestis agrees to be taken in his place because she doesn’t wish to see her children fatherless. The death of the young woman provokes in the king the deep sense of guilt torturing him for the rest of his life. The king blames everybody, including himself, for this sacrifice.

The consciousness begging for mercy is not the philosophical, for it is impossible to think philosophically waiting for punishment.

Axiom 15: The Western anxiety of death results not from death itself but from the inability to think it.

Nietzsche was perhaps the last European thinker who meditated on death. Freud sealed death in the unconscious. Paradoxically, the lethal XXth century passed under the tabooing death.? Anyway, the capacity to abperceive death entirely belongs to the living consciousness. To abperceive signifies neither pessimism nor escape

from life. It means, indeed, by means of consciousness to go beyond the innate finitude given to the human beings by their nature. The fact that the being has its physical and mental limits is to be understood as a metaphysical clue; the abperceiving consciousness will see them. It suffices to recognize that consciousness can't be identical to the being. Hegel was wrong identifying the being and consciousness and thus endowing the latter with ontology. Husserl, who had no knowledge about the Yogācāra, managed to purify consciousness from ontology. It was definitely a serious impact.

Axiom16: Consciousness is not what is conceived but left after the conscious act.

It doesn't become being because the latter sees no its limits. Being appears only within certain limits.

Political man

Today we can state with absolute conviction: both Nazism and communism failed to construct the superman; the first took ethnicity as a matter of fact, the second tried to embody the superman in the working class, non-intellectual by definition.

Why did the project fail? Obviously, both ideologies contained epistemological errors.

"Nation" and "class" are the set-up parameters identifying man according to his external features. Both were political projects with soteriological content, both lacked philosophical thought. They ended politics *per se*.

What we call today 'politics' is a set of minor wars for the corporate influence and money. From a political tool money is transformed into the political goal. The contemporary politicians aim at increasing capital. The economy nowadays is entirely based on the selling of time. Credit became the ontological basis and the cause of the soteriologization of money. There is no longer time one can't buy; as a consequence there is no eschatology and salvation.

If any time can be sold, nothing can save us any longer.

Axiom 17: Today, money as salvation is salvation enough.

Thus is the religion without philosophy. One can buy not only the historical time but also the time *after* the end of history. If to paraphrase Nietzsche: God is sold.

Today, money saves itself transforming into credit derivatives, the virtual money or CDS (Credit Default Swap). It is a bilateral agreement between the buyer and the seller: the buyer makes a series of payments to the seller and in exchange he receives a payoff if his loan defaults. Such is an ideal ontology of credits derivatives. In fact, the received payment is substantially less than the face value of the loan. CDS plays a most significant role in the systemic crisis of the world economy. The credit derivatives changed the currency market into a financial Chernobyl. Nobody knows the total amount of them whose approximate value is more than forty trillion dollars. In fact, credit derivatives are the modern man's path to immortality, the ambrosia for the humankind that sold almost all its time.

The credit derivatives don't exist in the sense as its owner but it gives to the latter the existence not only on the present but in the quasi-future. This odd time

seems to exist by itself. The credit derivative is based on the pagan belief in its omnipotence. The market ceased to be real; in other words, it became the only reality where any mortal can find his or her place. From this place, however, the person moves directly towards death. The market lets us accumulate the derivatives but this is not the capital as at Marx's time. Today such accumulation means the sacralization of the capital. In order to complete this sacralizing process the capital must become transcendent to itself. The capital thus acquires the function God ceased to fulfill.

In the actual world political thought no longer exists. It has nothing to do with a more or less efficient planetary order or with the ramshackle axe of "super-powers;" the actual absence of politics is due to the lack of goals having philosophy as their basis. Political goals are replaced by political interests, more precisely, by their financial equivalent. Unlike the philosophical subject, the political "We" manifests itself as the knowing but never thinking.

Axiom 18: Politics knows, philosophy thinks.

This "We" removed individual reflections; the political *cogito* is a Cartesian transvestite.

We are entering Armageddon between politics and living thought taking shape above all in philosophy. In the XXth century politics offered their paths to salvation. The mission impossible at the outset since the political soteriology always served the interests of a small group of the ruling mandarins at the moment. Such a project is ontologically false.

Politics is a lying tantra. Nowhere the amount of lie is bigger than in a political statement. The most honest was Leo Strauss, a quiet American of the Heideggerian origin, whose ideas gained success among neo-conservatives. In order to be effective one should convert politics into the esoteric, i.e. to provide the simultaneous existence of the "noble lie" and the "hidden truth." Meaning: you can lie to the masses but never to yours, to your inner circle ruling the first ones. Strauss' honesty consists in revealing this to his men who then applied this principle to political practice. One of the recent examples of the noble lie is Iraq's chemical weapons. Needless to say, the noble lie always protects democracy and liberty.

Axiom 19: Political power seeing itself as the guard of supreme principles is fake and hypocritical.

Masses go on to believe that, in the end, political power works for their good. They believed in the ruler's good will, in his noble lie. They let the ruler become a semi-divine figure disseminating promises that will never become true. Anything goes.

Beginning with the 1930s the soteriological idea entered politics that is a mark of profound despair felt by the Western mind. Later, after the 1945, the totalized politics began to spread over cultural and intimate spaces. Today we trust politics as the medieval people trusted symbols; both are magical forms of our existence. In fact, in the West the political took power over consciousness during the Renaissance when Girolamo Savonarola has organized public debates on the Venetian squares. At the time politics becomes the fourth dimension competing with philosophy for the shape of man.

Kant could allow himself to believe in politics as if he viewed the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815), the second Peace of Westphalia or a proto-UN, when European countries made an attempt to create a structure stabilizing the world order. Later the anti-militarist goals of the agreement were dropped and it was used to suppress the 1848 riot. In Kant's time, however, politics was the part of the Napoleon reconstruction of the world.

It would suffice to increase the number of thinking people and the present will radically change. Now, when the loosely composed university programs transform philosophy into a fast-food and its place within sciences diminishes dramatically, now we feel at most its necessity. What else can counterbalance the barbarity of the totalizing today's man's mind? Like in the epoch of the Italian Scapigliatura, nowadays we see a havoc of devastation feeling ourselves deprived of the time of consciousness. Many of our tamed intellectuals see philosophy as the servant to certain political groups or to their own pernicky purposes. This is coming to an end. Philosophy is regaining its force.

Axiom 20: The human being with no philosophy is no human being.

NOTES

- 1 Mortals are immortal, immortals mortal.
- 2 I found a shelter in death. (II. 22:4)

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